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E
conomists often assert that trade liberalization improves welfare and al-
leviates poverty. By how much? That has depended on whom you ask. As 
shown in this study, recent estimates of the effects of trade liberalization 
have diverged widely. Estimates of the increase in world welfare stemming from 
full trade liberalization range from 0.2 percent to 3.1 percent, and estimates of the 
number of people who could be lifted out of poverty range from 72 million to 440 
million.
  This study examines how well trade modeling captures the benefits from trade 
liberalization. It surveys the methods used to assess the impact of trade liberalization 
and it considers the extent to which such assessments diverge.
  Why do the modeling results differ so widely? The study attributes the differ-
ences to the fact that models use different experiments, different data, different be-
havioral parameters, and different theoretical features. Author Antoine Bouët exam-
ines these explanations and concludes that overall, the benefits of trade liberalization 
have recently been revised downward because direct trade barriers are smaller than 
some experts previously thought. Yet he convincingly shows that trade liberalization 
improves welfare and alleviates poverty, and he offers policy recommendations to 
help ensure that trade agreements are beneficial for developing countries’ welfare 
and economic development. He also points to areas where further research could 
help clarify policy options. Of course, not all poor people gain from trade liberaliza-
tion. Social policy needs to accompany trade liberalization, and more research on 
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T
rade liberalization is expected to act positively on world economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation, both of which have become high priorities of 
the international community. This emphasis explains why numerous studies 
have focused on assessing the expected benefits of trade liberalization on develop-
ment. The main empirical tools for these assessments have been the use of spatial 
and nonspatial partial equilibrium models, gravity equations, and single- and multi-
country computable general equilibrium models (CGEMs). Multicountry CGEMs, 
however, have produced strikingly divergent results. As demonstrated by recent 
studies, the associated increase in world welfare from full trade liberalization ranges 
from 0.2 to 3.1 percent—results that differ by a factor of 15!
  The objective of this study is to examine the efficiency of trade modeling in cap-
turing the benefits from trade liberalization. It provides a survey of methodologies 
utilized to assess the impact of trade liberalization, putting an emphasis on multi-
country CGEMs, and examines the extent to which such assessments diverge. The 
survey also demonstrates the benefits of “complementary analysis,” which utilizes 
different methodologies to study a specific topic.
  The report presents global modeling results using a general equilibrium model 
—the modeling international relations under applied general equilibrium (MIRAGE) 
model—the results of which are compared to those obtained in recent studies. Us-
ing the MIRAGE model,1 full trade liberalization is estimated to increase world real 
income by US$100 billion (+0.33 percent) after 10 years of implementation. This 
trade reform would be development-friendly, as it entails a larger growth rate of real 
income for developing countries and especially for least-developed countries.
1
1The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter- 
nationales (CEPII), Paris. A full description of the model is available at the CEPII website (www.cepii.fr).  The report offers four explanations on the divergent results of multicountry 
general equilibrium models, including the MIRAGE study undertaken here:
1.    experiments are not the same;
2.    data are not the same;
3.    behavioral parameters are not the same; and
4.    theoretical features are not the same.
  Each explanation is examined in detail. The simulation in this report is also 
utilized to check explanations of divergent results in the literature. To quantify the 
importance of the four factors, a sensitivity analysis is carried out. This method 
provides a quantitative assessment of expected benefits from liberalization when 
one hypothesis is modified, and it confirms that:
•	 	 Direct	trade	barriers,	such	as	tariffs,	tariff	quotas,	and	antidumping	duties,	are	
smaller than previously expected. Consequently, the expected benefits from full 
trade liberalization are not as large as assessed in recent literature.
•	 	 In	multicountry	trade	models,	the	size	of	the	expected	benefits	depends	cru-
cially on the value of Armington trade elasticities. The simulation that has 
been carried out in this study is founded on the Global Trade Analysis Project 
elasticities, which are small compared to others used in the literature.
•	 	 The	size	of	expected	benefits	from	trade	liberalization	also	depends	crucially	
on the potential positive impact of trade openness on factor productivity. Sev-
eral multicountry trade models utilize ad hoc methodologies to capture this 
element, such as a relation that automatically amplifies expected benefits, but 
these methodologies do not explain how trade integration raises factor produc-
tivity.
  Benefits from eliminating tariff barriers, domestic support, and export subsidies 
have been recently revised downward; nevertheless, trade liberalization is beneficial 
and could contribute to poverty alleviation.
2      introductionChapter 1
Background
D
evelopment and poverty alleviation have become high priorities of the 
international community. One of the key objectives of the Millennium 
Development Goals, set forth by the United Nations for 2015, is a reduc-
tion by half of the number of people living on less US$1.00 per day. But the world 
poverty headcount was stagnant in absolute terms during the 1990s. In 2003, nearly 
one-quarter of the world population was living on less than US$1.00 per day, and 
one-half on less than US$2.00 per day. To emphasize the need to combat these high 
poverty levels, the current global trade negotiations conducted by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are referred to as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).
  Although recent literature confirms the positive relationship between liberal-
ization and poverty alleviation, it also emphasizes that the relationship is complex. 
Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) and Reimer (2002) identify several key 
linkages between liberalization and poverty alleviation, such as the price and avail-
ability of goods, factor prices, government transfers, incentives for investment and 
innovation, evolution of terms of trade, and short-term risk.
  The traditional argument in favor of a positive relationship between trade lib-
eralization and poverty focuses on the first two linkages. Many poor people are 
working in the agricultural sector, where trade distortions are particularly high. 
Liberalization could imply higher world agricultural prices and could raise activity 
and remunerations in this sector in the Third World. The same beneficial outcome 
could also occur in the textiles and wearing apparel sectors, where protection re-
mains high and developing countries have a comparative advantage.
  Nevertheless, openness might lead to negative outcomes. First, the decrease 
in import duties might reduce custom revenues so that the government’s public 
receipts may be cut and government transfers can shrink. Second, terms of trade   
3can be negatively affected, either because import prices increase or export prices 
decrease from more severe competition in export markets. Third, cutting trade 
barriers in a country increases import competition, which implies reallocation of 
productive factors and entails adjustment costs and short-term risk.
  Furthermore, this positive relationship between trade liberalization and poverty 
is based on the predominance of agricultural activities in developing countries. But 
not all developing countries have a comparative advantage in agriculture, and not 
all poor people are engaged in agricultural activities. In fact, benefits for the poor 
are expected from trade liberalization, but adverse effects can also occur in the short 
and the long run, which explains why numerous studies have focused on whether 
gains outweigh losses. Some of the analytical instruments used here are
•	 	 spatial	and	nonspatial	partial	equilibrium	trade	models, which study in detail 
equilibrium in some markets without consideration of what happens elsewhere, 
by assuming that a shock in the markets under study does not significantly af-
fect the rest of the economy;
•	 	 gravity	models,	which	seek	to	explain	bilateral	trade	flows	by	using	the	eco-
nomic size of the two trading partners and the geographic distance between 
them; and
•	 	 single-	and	multicountry	computable	general	equilibrium	models	(CGEMs),	
which consider the formation of equilibrium on all markets, supposing that a 
shock on a specific market may have a significant impact on all markets.
  The objective of this study is to provide a survey of methodologies utilized to 
assess the impact of trade liberalization on developing countries and world income, 
with	specific	focus	on	multicountry	CGEMs,	and	to	examine	the	diverging	re-
sults of such assessments. It is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 consists of this 
overview. Chapter 2 looks at the advantages and drawbacks of each model, with a 
particular focus on partial and general equilibrium models. Chapter 3 undertakes 
global trade modeling under general equilibrium—the modeling international rela-
tions	under	applied	general	equilibrium	(MIRAGE)	model.	Chapter	4	compares	
MIRAGE	to	other	CGEMs;	it	is	followed	by	a	conclusion	(Chapter	5).
  Chapter 2 suggests that although no single method is better than others from 
a	methodological	point	of	view,	the	multicountry	CGEMs	are	attractive	analyti-
cal instruments if the objective is to analyze the global effects of multilateral trade 
reform. Today, this analysis can be done more easily, thanks to the availability of a 
complete database (the Global Trade Analysis Project [GTAP]) and the increased 
capabilities of computers. Although offering a consistent picture of the world econ-
omy, this analytical instrument can be utilized to evaluate the impact of trade re- 
4      chapter 1form on a large number of productive sectors, trading zones, and productive factors. 
Nevertheless,	multicountry	CGEMs	are	complex	analytical	instruments	that	necessi-
tate highly simplified (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions and modeling choices.
  Chapter 3 undertakes global trade modeling to assess the impact of liberaliza-
tion	on	poverty.	Using	the	MIRAGE	model	full	trade	liberalization	is	expected	to	
increase world real income by US$100 billion (+0.33 percent) after 10 years of im-
plementation. This trade reform would be development-friendly, as it would entail 
a larger growth rate for developing countries, especially least-developed countries 
(LDCs). It could also contribute to poverty alleviation and reduce world income 
inequality. Nevertheless, certain developing countries might lose from this world 
reform because of adverse evolution of their terms of trade. Finally, this assessment 
highlights the major role played by agriculture and tariffs in expected benefits from 
liberalization.
	 Is	the	MIRAGE	assessment	comparable	to	conclusions	of	recent	studies	on	the	
same topic? To answer this question, Chapter 4 provides a literature review of recent 
CGEMs.	Recent	assessments	using	CGEMs	clearly	highlight	major	divergences.	
From full trade liberalization, the associated increase in world welfare ranges from 
0.2 to 3.1 percent (Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi 1999), results that differ by a fac-
tor of more than 15!1 The impact on the poverty headcount is also divergent, as the 
estimated number of people lifted from poverty ranges from 72 million (Anderson, 
Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005c) to 440 million (Cline 2004), a ratio of 
6.2 This picture is a rather diverse one of the effects of trade liberalization on poverty. 
Moreover,	as	a	sophisticated	and	complex	tool	of	analysis,	CGEMs	are	often	treated	
as “black boxes,” results of which are difficult to understand.
  Chapter 4 provides four different explanations for the divergent results of trade 
modeling:
1.	 	 Experiments	are	not	the	same.	Assessing	the	impact	of	the	DDA	is	a	difficult	
task because of insufficient information on the contents of the final agreement 
and	on	the	way	countries	will	implement	it.	Even	if	the	experiment	is	based	on	
full trade liberalization, divergences could arise: does the experiment concern 
all distortions or only border measures? Has a pre-experiment been conducted 
to account for the trade shocks that occur between the database period and the 
background      5
1Comparisons must be done in terms of percentages, as welfare might be defined in either 1997 or 
2001 dollars.
2In 2003, the number of people in poverty (using the definition of less than US$2.00 per day) was 
estimated at 2.8 billion (World Bank 2004b). Full trade liberalization is estimated to decrease world 
poverty by an amount ranging from 2.5 to 15.1 percent.implementation date of the liberalization?3 Finally, some modeling analyses 
envisage fiscal policy implemented simultaneously to offset the loss of tariff 
receipts, whereas others do not.
2.    Data are not the same. At this level, potential sources of divergent assessments 
are manifold: for instance, the social accounting matrix and data on economic 
policies. Among different assessments, the main source of divergence comes 
from data on market access. The data may or may not take into account all 
regional agreements and all preferential schemes. Tariff reduction may be im-
posed on bound or applied duties. Furthermore, data on the bound level of 
domestic support may or may not be included. Finally, sector and product 
decomposition can differ.
3.	 	 Behavioral	parameters	are	not	the	same.	A	CGEM	needs	an	estimation	of	
several parameters. A key parameter of this modeling exercise is the trade elas-
ticity: it measures the degree to which a change in relative prices leads to sub-
stitution of imported products for domestic products. There is a disagreement   
in the scientific community on the values of these parameters. The impact of 
liberalization on trade flows, and thus on activity, is highly sensitive to these   
parameters.
4.    Theoretical assumptions are not the same. Models can differ in their theoreti-
cal assumptions. Labor and capital may be sector-specific or they can be real-
located to other sectors. Land supply may be fixed or may be positively related 
to real remuneration. Competition may be perfect or imperfect. Openness 
may or may not have a positive effect on factor productivity. Divergence may 
also concern functional forms such as utility function, and complementarity 
versus substitutability of productive factors and intermediate inputs or among 
intermediate goods.
	 Each	explanation	is	examined	in	detail.	To	quantify	the	importance	of	these	
factors, a sensitivity analysis is carried out, which includes several specifications of 
the	MIRAGE	CGEM.	This	method	quantifies	the	impact	of	different	assumptions	
on results and confirms that:
•	 	 Direct	trade	barriers,	such	as	tariffs,	tariff	quotas,	and	antidumping	duties,	are	
smaller than previously expected.
6      chapter 1
3For example, recent assessments study the effects of implementing liberalization in 2005, while the 
most recent database available is for 2001. A pre-experiment can be realized to account for different 
trade agreements that took place between 2001 and 2005, such as the end of the Uruguay Round, 
Everything	but	Arms,	African	Growth	Opportunity	Act,	and	the	accession	of	China	to	the	WTO.	If	
these agreements are not accounted for, the effects of trade liberalization would be overstated.•	 	 In	multicountry	trade	models,	the	size	of	the	expected	benefits	depends	cru-
cially on the value of Armington trade elasticities.4
•	 	 The	size	of	expected	benefits	from	trade	liberalization	also	depends	on	the	
potential positive impact of trade openness on factor productivity or capital 
accumulation.
  In addition to providing explanations of divergent results of trade modeling, 
this report also sums up convergent conclusions of other studies on trade liberaliza-
tion and world income, which affirm that:
1.    Liberalizing agriculture is the main source of expected gains, accounting for 
about two-thirds of global gains.
2.    Tariffs are by far the main source of distortions.
3.    Developing countries could greatly benefit from these reforms.
4.    Liberalizing trade policies of developing countries could contribute to about 
half of the expected benefits.
5.    Full trade liberalization could be beneficial for nearly all countries through-
out the world, whereas it is quite plausible that the incomplete liberalization 
envisaged by the DDA could be negative for numerous developing countries, 
especially if it leads to special and differentiated treatment (SDT): under this 
WTO exception regime, developing countries are authorized not to liberalize 
their economy, or to do so to a lesser extent. This policy option could mean less 
liberalization for middle-income countries and no liberalization for LDCs.
  This study does not provide any estimation of how full trade liberalization 
could alleviate poverty. Such an assessment would require the utilization of numer-
ous household surveys in developing countries, which goes beyond the technical 
feasibilities of this survey. But another method would be feasible: using poverty 
elasticities, as in World Bank (2002, 2004a) or in Cline (2004). An examination of 
this method, however, reveals that it is founded on assumptions that are too strong: 
normal or lognormal internal distribution of income and constant dispersion of this 
distribution after the trade reform.
  Furthermore, this method describes the relation between trade liberalization 
and poverty alleviation as a simplistic one: liberalizing trade would suffice to increase 
unskilled labor’s remuneration in developing countries, which would automatically 
(and proportionally) reduce the stock of poor people in the world. This description 
is not realistic. Trade liberalization frequently has contrasting effects on poverty 
background      7
4In trade models, Armington elasticities measure the substitutability between domestic and imported 
products.(for example, differential effects on agricultural activities versus industry or services,   
urban versus rural, and on different levels of education). Studies on poverty allevia-
tion have to focus on these contrasting effects and on policies—international and 
domestic—that must be implemented simultaneously to accompany liberalization. 
Finally, poverty alleviation is a highly qualitative concept, an aspect that is not ac-
counted for in these studies.
  The objective of this study is to examine the efficiency of trade modeling in 
capturing the benefits from trade liberalization. It is aimed at evaluating the advan-
tages and drawbacks of different methodologies, but it is focused on multicountry 
CGEMs,	which	have	received	great	attention	in	recent	years	from	academics,	de-
velopment institutions, and the public in general. This methodological evaluation 
is founded on a new model of expected benefits from full trade liberalization, the 
results of which are carefully compared to those obtained in recent studies. The 
ultimate aim of this work is threefold:
1.  to   assess realistically the consequences of trade liberalization on development;
2.  to   understand the divergent results of recent studies; and
3.    to define the role that can be played by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) in this area.
  In conclusion, Chapter 5 responds to these three issues.
8      chapter 1Chapter 2
Methodologies for Assessing the 
Impact of Trade Liberalization
S
everal  methodologies  are  available  for  evaluating  the  economic  conse-
quences of trade liberalization: spatial and nonspatial partial equilibrium 
trade analysis; two-country and multicountry general equilibrium models; 
and gravity models. This chapter provides an overview of these methodologies and 
identifies their main advantages and drawbacks. These different methodologies are 
presented in light of the traditional distinction made between partial and general 
equilibrium models.
  There is no absolutely superior methodology for analyzing international trade. 
To understand why, keep in mind that the world of international trade is infinitely 
complex, involving hundreds of countries with different endowments and con-
sumer preferences, thousands of products and their derivatives (which are either 
substitutable or complementary in final or intermediate inputs), and a great variety 
of national policy instruments. Furthermore, this world is dynamic in time.
  But economists try to develop models to understand reality. Abstraction of 
critical elements is necessary, and models are by definition simplifications of the real 
world. These simplifications are made by the modeler, whose concern is to answer 
specific questions of particular interest.
  Depending on the objective of the research, the choice of modeling type is fairly 
obvious. If the researcher wants to evaluate the consequences of a multilateral trade 
agreement on national incomes, trade, and production, a multicountry multisector 
general equilibrium model is appropriate. If the objective is the impact of trade   
liberalization on income distribution and poverty, accounting for the diversity of 
households’ income sources and consumption structures is the key concern, and   
including heterogeneous households can be done in both a single- and a multi- 
country general equilibrium model. If the objective is to analyze the level of distor-
9tion and the consequences on trade flows in the world market of a specific commod-
ity that is characterized by a great diversity of production systems (such as sugar or 
rice), a partial equilibrium model or a gravity model is needed, and so forth. Each 
method has both advantages and drawbacks, and the modeler has to keep in mind 
these specificities. Presenting these advantages and drawbacks is the objective of 
this chapter.
Partial Equilibrium Modeling
The main feature of a partial equilibrium model is that it does not have to consider 
equilibrium on all markets in order to focus on one or several markets or sec-
tors. This approach leads to increased tractability and/or allows for more analytical   
detail in modeling complex policy instruments or spatially different production 
systems. Here I develop a very simple partial equilibrium model to explain its main 
features.
  Consider n countries, with 1 being the domestic country and j = 2, . . . , n 
being the index for foreign countries. In the sector studied, imports and domestic 
goods are imperfect substitutes: the Armington1 hypothesis means that products   
are differentiated by their country of origin. Let Qi
D be the demanded quantity of   
the good studied in country i, Qi
S the supplied quantity in country i, P 1 the domestic 
price of the good studied, P* j its foreign price in country j, tj is the tariff applied do- 
mestically on imports of this good when it comes from country j.
  Equation (1) is the demand function for domestically produced goods, and 
equation (2) is the demand function for imports from country j. Substitutability 
between products implies that demand for one product depends on all prices:
  Q1
D = Q1
D(P1; P2; . . .; P n),  (1)
  Qj
D = Qj
D(P1; P2; . . .; P n).  (2)




The supply of foreign goods depends on foreign prices:
  Qj
S = Qj
S(P* j).  (4)
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1See Armington (1969). This hypothesis is not a necessary one in partial equilibrium models.The partial equilibrium model allows for supposing that the consumers’ incomes 
and the cost of productive factors are constant.
  Finally, the gap between domestic and foreign prices reflects the domestic tariff 
(tj) and the cost of transportation from country j to country 1 (tj). The domes-
tic tariff is indexed by j (the exporting country), as preferential schemes, regional 
agreements, or certain features of the protective instrument2 can result in trade   
discrimination:
  P j = P* j(1 + tj + tj).  (5)
  This model is easily tractable (see the COMPAS model—Francois and Hall 
1993—for a log-linear version or Francois and Hall 1997 for a constant elasticity 
of substitution [CES] version). This very simple model can be enriched in several 
directions: other goods, complementary or substitutes; intermediate goods; more 
complex policy instruments; strategic interactions; or asymmetric information. The 
specificity of this model is that it supposes that other markets are in equilibrium and 
that shocking this market does not affect the equilibrium on other markets (that 
could then affect equilibrium on this market).
  The specific advantages of this type of model are its simplicity and tractability. 
As illustrated in the three following sections, tractability permits easy replication of 
calculations, while theoretical simplicity allows one to analyze specific issues more 
deeply, such as a complex policy instrument or production system. Nevertheless 
from a theoretical point of view, this model can be greatly enriched by complemen-
tarities or substitutability, intermediate goods, strategic interaction, or asymmetric 
information. The first advantage of partial equilibrium analysis is that it gives the 
researcher flexibility.
Estimating the Costs of Protection
This section illustrates the tractability of a simple partial equilibrium model. Sup-
pose that the objective of the research is an evaluation of the costs of protection in 
several sectors or several economies.
  Here I adopt the previous theoretical framework and add supplementary sim-
plifications: domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes; there are no trans-
portation costs, and the economy being studied is small, in the sense that any trade 
reform it implements has no impact on world prices. Finally, the tariff imposed is 
nondiscriminatory.
  The welfare cost CP of a tariff t in sector i can be directly expressed from this 
very simple framework:
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2The tariff may be specific and not ad valorem, or it can be an antidumping duty.  CP = (eSQS + eDQD)(t2/2),  (6)
where eS is the price elasticity of domestic production and eD that of domestic 
consumption. Equation (6) means that the cost of protection increases with the 
quantities demanded and supplied, the level of price elasticities, and the square of 
the tariff (higher tariffs are proportionally more distorting).
  The quantity of this good can be normalized so that the world price is equal to 
1. If the importing country is small, the economic consequences of a tariff can be 
derived immediately from this equation; calculating the distortion resulting from 
protection (variation in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and public receipt) 
only requires information on the level of the tariff, the levels of domestic consump-
tion and production, and the price elasticity of demand and supply.
  The Institute for International Economics has thus conducted several studies 
on the costs of protection with the help of this methodology (see Hufbauer and   
Elliott 1994 for the United States and Messerlin 2001 for the EU). It is of course a 
very simple theoretical framework, but it is transparent, permits decomposition into 
consumers/producers/fiscal gains and losses, and can be easily replicated allowing 
for direct international and/or intersector comparisons.
Estimating the Impact of Complex Instruments
National governments are adopting numerous and diverse policy instruments to 
restrict international trade, to control or modify the quality of imported products, 
or to guarantee domestic objectives (such as specific price levels for either consum-
ers or producers). Partial equilibrium models are highly appropriate for analyzing 
these instruments.
  The reference framework of partial equilibrium analysis is retained. Once again 
it is assumed that domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, there are no 
transportation costs, and the economy is small. Instead of a tariff, the domestic 
government imposes a minimum producer price P M. The domestic supply is now:
  Q1
S =  Q1
S(P M) = QM     if  P 1 ≤ PM,  (7)
  Q1
S(P1)  if  P 1 > PM.
  This description entails a kink in the domestic supply function, which means 
that there are two regimes of production. It has important consequences on the way 
prices and quantities adjust to an external shock, as it increases inelasticity of excess 
supply and/or demand on international markets (see McCalla and Josling 1985). 
This production function can be easily analyzed in a partial equilibrium model.
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port levies, quotas, minimum prices, voluntary export restraints, tariff rate quotas, 
sanitary and phytosanitary norms, and the like. Partial equilibrium models are ex-
tremely useful to evaluate their impacts.
Accounting for Spatially Diverse Production Systems
Spatial price equilibrium models are one of the most commonly utilized classes of 
agricultural models. This kind of model is designed to endogenize trade flows in a 
consistent way with spatial analysis. Prices in two markets are linked only if trade 
occurs between these two places. More precisely, according to the logic of Enke-
Samuelson-Takayama-Judge model, if P it is the price in place i at time t, tjit the   
transaction costs of spatial arbitrage from location j to location i at time t, and xijt is 
exported quantity from i to j. The transaction cost may be defined as a function of 
the prices in the two places and of transportation costs.
  The rent Rjit of spatial arbitrage between places i and j can be defined as the 
benefit of exporting from j to i, that is, of buying in j, transporting the commodity 
from j to i, and selling in i:
  Rjit = P it – P jt – tjit.  (8)
Rents of spatial arbitrage are exhausted when trade occurs (trade implies that the 
difference in prices is equal to transportation costs); when no trade takes place, rents 
are negative or null (under no trade, prices are disconnected, so that exportation is 
not beneficial):
  xjit > 0      ⇒   Rjit = 0,  (9)
  xjit = 0    ⇒   Rjit ≤ 0.
Putting it differently: Rjitxjit = 0.
  Takayama and Judge (1964) showed that this problem can be represented by 
the maximization of a quadratic objective function subject to a set of linear con-
straints (a quadratic program). Bawden (1966) and Takayama (1967) introduced 
trade policies into the model.
  As an example of the use of this model, Devadoss et al. (2005) examine the 
effects of the U.S.–Canadian softwood lumber disputes on all national markets 
(including the United States and Canada). The model is solved under several con-
straints: total shipments from i to all j are not greater than quantity supplied in 
i; total shipments from all i to j are not smaller than quantity demanded in j; the 
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portation costs and tariffs; and demand, supply, and shipments are positive or null. 
This model allowed for a precise assessment of the impact of the U.S. imposition of 
a 27.2 percent tariff on Canadian softwood lumber on U.S., Canadian, and other 
markets.
  A great advantage of this analytical instrument is the facility with which differ-
ent policies can be introduced. A tariff is as easily implemented as in a nonspatial 
equilibrium model. A quantitative restriction can be introduced in a direct manner, 
just as for a linear inequality constraint.
  I now turn to general equilibrium models.
General Equilibrium Models
The first objective of general equilibrium is to analyze how equilibrium is simul-
taneously determined in every market. The expansion of activity in a sector may 
have economy-wide effects, which can be captured by this framework but which 
are not systematically accounted for by partial equilibrium models. This expansion 
increases demand for primary factors and their remuneration; it therefore raises 
the cost of production for other sectors and the demand of intermediate goods 
addressed to other sectors. Further, it affects the level of net public receipts and/
or expenses if the production or the utilization of some factors is either taxed or 
subsidized; the variation of remuneration modifies the income level of households, 
which in turn change their levels of consumption, and so forth.
  As a result of this full integration of income and interdependence effects, gen-
eral equilibrium accounts for the complete budget closure of a model. If the be-
havior of n agents is modeled and (n – 1) agents are globally in budget deficit (they 
consume more than they produce), it ensures that the nth agent is in surplus: she 
or he produces more than she or he consumes; and this surplus exactly matches the 
global deficit of the other (n – 1) agents. In making this assumption, a general equi-
librium model is fully consistent, but simultaneously a general equilibrium model   
needs simplifying assumptions about specific elements, such as policy instruments, 
household or government behavior, and complementarity/substitutability among 
productive factors. Here I present three possible applications of general equilibrium 
models in international trade.
Single-Country CGEM and Trade Agreements
The most direct way to account for general equilibrium effects is to construct a 
single-country trade model. Of course, this kind of model cannot measure bilateral 
trade flows, but it takes into consideration general equilibrium effects. To illustrate 
this method, consider one country and N sectors (k = 1, 2, . . . , N). In the fol-
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there is no intermediate input in production, no government, and labor is the sole 
productive factor (its remuneration is w). These are uncommon features of single-
country trade models used in the literature, but they allow for a concise presentation 
of the model in only eight equations—equations (10) through (17). Furthermore, 
there is perfect competition in all markets and perfect mobility of labor across sec-
tors. The demand function of good k depends on all prices (allowing for substitut-
ability or complementarities among goods) and national income Y, supposedly 
distributed to a single household whose demand is representative:
  Qk
D = Qk
D(P 1; P 2 . . . P N; Y ) = Qk
D(P; Y ).  (10)
P is a vector of N prices. The country’s supply of good k is a function of the domestic 
price of good k and the remuneration of labor w:
  Qk
S = Qk
S(P k; w).  (11)
  Let EDk be the domestic excess demand for good k. If it is positive (negative), 
it represents imports (exports):
  EDk = Qk
D(P; Y ) – Qk
S(P k; w).  (12)
Let ES* k be the rest of the world’s excess supply of good k. If it is positive (negative), 
it represents the exports (imports) of the rest of the world.
  ES* k = ES* k(P* k ).  (13)
The government applies import duties tk on good k:
  P k = P* k(1 + tk).  (14)
P k might be sufficiently low for EDk to be positive: the country imports good k, 
which is in excess supply in the rest of the world (ES* k > 0). Exports occur in the 
case of high values of P k (the case of positive exports and positive tk is possible; then 
tk represents an export subsidy). Then EDk and ES* k are negative.
  Let Lk
D be the demand of labor by sector k and L ¯ the total endowment of labor. 
The labor market equilibrium requires:
  N
  SLk
D(w; P k) = L ¯.  (15)
  k=1
methodologies for assessing impact of trade liberalization      15National income comes from labor and import taxes:
  Y = wL ¯ + StkP* kEDk.  (16)   k
It is important to note that in the case of exports, either tk is zero or exports are 
subsidized (tk is positive and EDk is negative).
  There are several ways to bring about closure of this model. One is to consider 
that the current account is constant; in other words, the country is unable to borrow 
from, or to lend to, the rest of the world:
 – SP* kEDk = CA ¯¯¯ .  (17)   k
  I show the advantages and drawbacks of this kind of model after having pre-
sented the multicountry general equilibrium model.
Multicountry CGEM and Trade Agreements
The previous framework is now extended to n countries (i =1, 2, . . . , n); there are 
still N sectors (k = 1, 2, . . . , N). Products are differentiated by their country of 
origin (Armington 1969).
  Let CPk,i,j be the price paid by country j’s consumers when they buy good k 
produced in i (consumer price).3 The demand in country j for good k produced in 
country i QD
k,i,j depends on all consumer prices and on country j’s income:
  QD
k,i,j = (CP; Yj),  (18)
where CP is the vector of all consumer prices. If i is different from j, QD
k,i,j represents 
trade flows of good k from i to j.
  Let PPk,i,j be the price received by country i’s producers when they sell good k in 
country j (producer price). The supply of good k produced in i to country j (QS
k,i,j) 
depends on PP k,i,j and the cost of labor in i:
  QS
k,i,j = QS
k,i,j(PP k,i,j; wi).  (19)
Let tk,i,j be the tariff imposed by country j on good k coming from country i. The 
gap between producer price and consumer price is defined by:4
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3In the case of the double country index (i, j), the first index i refers to supply; the second one j refers 
to demand.
4We could also add a transportation cost tk,i,j of good k from i to j, but it would require the modeling 
of a transportation sector.  CP k,i,j = PP k,i,j(1 + tk,i,j).  (20)
If Lk,i is the demand of labor in sector k in country i and L ¯
i is the total supply of   
labor in country i, factor market equilibrium requires:
  SLk,i(wi; PP k,i) = 
_
Li,  (21)   k
where PPk,i is a component of a vector of production prices of good k in country i. 
Country j’s national income is defined by:
  Y j = wjL ¯  j + S Stk,i,jPP k,i,jQD
k,i,j.  (22)   k  i ≠ j
Finally, all countries’ current accounts CA are constant:
  S SPP k,i,jQS
k,i,j – S SPP k,j,iQD
k,j,i = CA ¯¯¯
i.  (23)   k  j ≠ i  k  j ≠ i
  Compared to a single-country model, the immediate advantage of a multi-
country trade model is its ability to calculate bilateral trade flows. It is all the more 
important in a world where trade discrimination is extensive. Single-country trade 
models cannot really capture discriminatory effects of trade, such as regional agree-
ments or preferential schemes.
  Nonetheless, the complexity is significantly increased in multicountry models, 
as they add a new dimension to trade. Equations can now be four-dimensional (in-
termediate inputs: two sectors; two countries), and their number increases exponen-
tially with the number of geographic zones and sectors.5 All theoretical assumptions 
(households’ disaggregations, imperfect competition, imperfect mobility of produc-
tive factors, unemployment, and the like) that can be applied in a single-country 
trade model can also be adopted in a multicountry trade model, but these extensions 
are constrained by computational capacity. Thus these models are complemen-
tary analytical instruments of trade liberalization: for example, multicountry trade 
models can evaluate the impact of regional agreements at a macroeconomic level, 
whereas a single-country trade model with extended disaggregation of households 
can use this macroeconomic shock (variation in world prices) to evaluate its distri-
butional impact.
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5That is, intermediate inputs of good k originated in country i by sector l in country j. Thus decom-
posing in 10 sectors and 10 geographic zones leads to 10 × 10 × 10 × 10 = 10,000 equations for 
intermediate inputs. But in a majority of CGE applications, the trade flows are three dimensional, 
because trade data in the GTAP database are in three dimensions.  For assessing the impact of trade reform, two-country or multicountry trade 
models need data on household consumption; sector production; value-added, in-
termediate inputs, exports, and imports; and data on economic policies to represent 
the world economy. The model is calibrated so that it represents the world economy 
at the initial period of time, and the trade reform is then applied.
  CGEMs are thus consistent representations of the world economy, but adopt-
ing this theoretical framework is costly in terms of economic data, information on 
behavioral parameters, and computational time. The modeler is therefore commit-
ted to simplifying assumptions.
Gravity Models
The gravity equation has been an attractive analytical tool for researchers in the 
international trade area, as its utilization has been manifold. Gravity equations can 
be utilized to evaluate market access, border effects, trading potentials, the impact 
of regional agreements, and so forth.
  Yet the first generation of gravity equations had no solid theoretical foundation; 
they were intuitively appealing for explaining international trade through attractive 
forces (activity in the exporting zone, demand in the importing one) and resistive 
forces (transportation costs, trade barriers, and the like). Fortunately, the gravity 
equation has received specific theoretical attention in the works of Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1989, 1990), Deardorff (1998), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
and is now well founded.
  Consider a gravity equation following the theoretical model of Fontagné,   
Pajot, and Pasteels (2001): in a general equilibrium model, all goods are differenti-
ated by place of origin and each region is producing only one good. The supply of 
each good is fixed. Consumers have identical and homothetic preferences repre-
sented by a CES utility function.
  I adopt the following notations. The value of exports from i to j is xij, yi is 
country i’s total income and yW is the world income, ai are weights, sk is the share 
of country k in world income, and (tij – 1) measures trade costs. Trade costs might 
be seen only as direct costs resulting from transportation and taxation at the border. 
They might also include information costs on quality, technical features, and avail-
ability of the product. Finally, s is the elasticity of substitution between all goods.
  The following expression can be drawn from this model:
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is a CES index of the rate of trade costs when acceding to country j. The meaning 
of the gravity equation (24) is intuitive and straightforward. Exports from i to j are 
positively related to the supply capacity of i (i’s income), the demand capacity of j (j’s 
income)—these are the attractive forces—and negatively related to trade costs.
  Compared to the gravity equation expressed in McCallum (1995) and Wall 
(1999), a new insight is the inclusion of not only absolute trade costs (tij) but also 
of relative trade costs—see the numerator of the third fraction in equation (24). 
Consider the case of trade flows from New Zealand to Australia: they are larger 
because the absolute geographic distance between the two countries is smaller, but 
also because the importing country is remote from all other countries in the world. 
Considering that the level of bilateral protection is fixed, increased protection of 
Australia on products coming from the rest of the world strengthens trade flows 
from New Zealand.
  The advantage of the gravity equation is its extreme tractability. Furthermore, 
it gives very positive econometric results. Nevertheless, it explains only exports, even 
though in a tentative (but not convincing) effort, Wall (1999) tries to draw welfare 
costs associated with protection from a gravity equation; he tests econometrically a 
nonmicroeconomically founded equation, utilizes a weakly founded index of trade 
policy, and derives welfare effects by applying a proportion rule to the trade effect.
In concluding this methodological review, it is important to note that these ana-
lytical instruments are complementary, not global substitutes. Multicountry general   
equilibrium models are comprehensive and consistent analytical tools for evaluating 
the consequences of trade liberalization: they account for income effects, interdepen- 
dence among factor and product markets, discriminatory aspects of international 
trade, and so forth. Nevertheless, they are complex and demanding in terms of sta-
tistical information. Furthermore, they cannot fully reflect the complexity of na-
tional economies, because the modeler is bound to simplify theoretical representation 
to simultaneously account for international trade relations with other geographic 
zones. On the other hand, partial equilibrium models offer less consistency and are 
less extensive, but they give the modeler more freedom to study a specific aspect of 
trade liberalization. They are an excellent instrument to analyze complex behavior 
(such as strategic interaction or asymmetric information), complicated production 
systems, or intricate policy instruments. For example, IFPRI’s International Model 
for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) is an inter- 
national partial equilibrium analysis that can assess the effects of population, invest-
ment and trade scenarios, and more recently of long-term change in water demand 
1Table 2.1    Comparisons of types of models
  nonspatial  spatial  single- 
  partial  partial  country  multicountry  gravity
characteristic  equilibrium  equilibrium  cge  cge  equation
Flexibility and/or tractability  ***  **  **  *  **
Degree of realism  **/***  **/***  **  *  **
Accounting for  
    interdependence and  
    real income effects  *  *  **  ***  **
Complex policy instruments  ***  **  **  *  **
Concern with overall impact 
    of global changes in 
    levels of protection  *  *  *  ***  *
Concern with implications  
    of policy or shipping  
    rate changes across  
    many commodities  ***  ***  *  *  ***
Concern with impact on  
    income distribution  *  *  **  **  —
Notes: Models are ranked from * (least applicable) to *** (most applicable) in terms of their applicability to each charac-
teristic listed. CGE, computed general equilibrium; — indicates not applicable.
and availability on food security and nutrition status. This model can clearly cover a 
large scope of research issues under a flexible and tractable methodology.
  Table 2.1 summarizes the advantages and drawbacks of these five types of mod-
els: nonspatial partial equilibrium, spatial partial equilibrium, single-country gen-
eral equilibrium, multicountry general equilibrium, and gravity. The usefulness of 
a methodology is sometimes enhanced through a radical modification; for example, 
disaggregating households and incorporating household surveys in a single-country 
general equilibrium model allow worthwhile studies of distributional impacts.
  The rest of this study focuses on multicountry general equilibrium models for 
the following reasons. First, they have been extensively used in recent years to study 
the potential impact of full trade liberalization or a potential Doha agreement.6 Sec-
ond, these studies have drawn a very contradictory picture of these consequences, 
so that their credibility has been questioned. Third, these models are often treated 
as “black boxes,” the results of which are difficult to understand.
  The next chapter focuses on an evaluation of full trade liberalization using the 
MIRAGE model. It tries to put in perspective the stakes of trade reform for devel-
oping countries while highlighting the advantages and drawbacks of the analytical 
instrument.
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6See, for example, the development of the GTAP network, but also the works of the World Bank 
(2002, 2004a) and of Cline (2004).Chapter 3
A New Assessment of the   
Impact of Trade Liberalization
T
he objective of this chapter is to carry out an experiment using a multi- 
country CGEM that analyzes the impact of full trade liberalization on world 
income and developing countries. World poverty is mainly found in the 
agricultural sector, which is also subjected to major trade distortions worldwide. 
Thus, full trade liberalization should entail a positive impact on poverty alleviation. 
Liberalization of the textile and clothing industry—which is labor intensive—could 
bolster economic activity and contribute to poverty reduction in developing coun-
tries. Moreover, elimination of domestic distortions could enhance welfare and 
economic growth.
  Nevertheless, some questions remain. Some developing countries are highly 
specialized in products for which distortions are very low worldwide (for example, 
coffee, cocoa,1 and copper). Is there any potential positive impact of full trade lib-
eralization on these economies?
  Exports of other developing countries, especially LDCs and Sub-Saharan coun-
tries, have been granted large trade preferences by rich countries, especially the EU 
(for example, the “Cotonou” regime and Everything but Arms [EBA]) and the 
United States (for example, the African Growth Opportunity Act [AGOA] and 
the U.S. Caribbean Initiative). Naturally, these developing countries will gain no 
improvement in market access; instead, they could be negatively affected by tougher 
competition from large agricultural exporters, such as the Cairns group. Eroded 
trade preferences have been at the heart of the contention since the beginning of the 
DDA. This issue requires special attention.
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1Tariffs on coffee and cocoa are low on the raw commodities but high on processed products.  Today, most intervention in agriculture contributes to augmented world pro-
duction and diminished demand, pushing down world prices of agricultural com-
modities. Therefore, elimination of these distortions should raise world prices. It 
could have negative effects on net food-importing countries, however, even if the 
increase in prices contributes to augmented domestic agricultural production.
  These questions lend themselves to theoretical modeling. When liberalizing 
an economy, welfare gains stem from two major sources: allocative efficiency gains 
and terms-of-trade gains. A country’s own trade reform explains the former: by 
eliminating import tariffs, consumer surplus is increased and productive factors are 
allocated more efficiently. These gains are obtained regardless of what trade partners 
are carrying out. They are called “what you do is what you get” (WYDIWYG) gains 
(Winters 2000). Terms-of-trade gains can be achieved through raising export prices 
and/or lowering import prices. Improved access to foreign markets contributes to 
the former. From a mercantilist point of view, the main goal of trade liberalization is 
achieved through opening foreign markets and raising exports. In contrast, neoclas-
sical theory emphasizes allocative efficiency gains (WYDIWYG gains).
  The theoretical basis of CGEM is neoclassical. In this sense, allocative effi-
ciency gains are fundamental in these studies: WYDIWYG gains have even been 
considered as the major source of gains for developing countries in the Uruguay 
Round of trade talks. From a policy perspective, it means that every country will 
gain from its own trade reform.
  But CGEMs capture other sources of gain through the evolution of terms of 
trade (for constant trade volumes, increased export prices or decreased import prices 
mean improvement in terms of trade, whereas decreased export prices or increased 
import prices mean deterioration in terms of trade). Terms-of-trade effects might 
be negative, so that multilateral liberalization can imply welfare losses for a country. 
From a policy perspective, this loss could be a result of tougher competition on ex-
port markets (eroded preferences imply that exports are receiving more competitive 
pressure)—which entails reduced export prices—or rising import prices.
  Thus, in this kind of modeling exercise, methodological choices are funda-
mental. Aggregating all developing countries in one zone, for example, would 
mislead policy conclusions: a global zone composed of South America and Sub- 
Saharan Africa would be a net food-exporting zone, but some Sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries are net food-importing countries. To tackle the issues previously 
mentioned, special attention has to be given to the geographic decomposition of 
the model. Also, the importance of the way in which competition is modeled and 
dynamic gains are captured should be emphasized. A sensitivity analysis has to be 
specifically devoted to these issues.
  The next three sections describe the technical features of MIRAGE and the 
geographical and sector decomposition adopted. The fourth section presents the 
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ing full trade liberalization: level of gross domestic product (GDP) and trade, and 
level of distortions. The final section in the chapter describes the impact of full 
trade liberalization at both the world and country levels. It finally decomposes the 
shock (the shock is the trade reform implemented in the model) to tackle the main 
economic policy issues: which countries are the main beneficiaries? Which are the 
most distorting measures?
Technical Presentation of MIRAGE
MIRAGE is a multisector, multiregion CGEM devoted to trade policy analysis. 
The model is done in a sequential dynamic recursive set-up: it is solved for one 
period, and then all variable values, determined at the end of a period, are used 
as the initial values of the next one. Macroeconomic data and social accounting 
matrixes, in particular, come from the GTAP 6 database (see Dimaranan 2006), 
which describes the world economy in 2001. Tariff averages have been recalculated 
using the MacMap methodology (see Bouët et al. 2006, 2008).
  From the supply side in each sector, the production function is a Leontief func-
tion of value-added and intermediate inputs: one output unit needs for its produc-
tion x percent of an aggregate of productive factors (labor, unskilled and skilled; 
capital; land and natural resources) and (1 – x) percent of intermediate inputs.2
  The intermediate inputs function is an aggregate CES function of all goods: it 
means that substitutability exists between two intermediate goods, depending on 
the relative prices of these goods. This substitutability is constant and at the same 
level for any pair of intermediate goods. Similarly, value-added is a CES function 
of unskilled labor, land, natural resources, and of a CES bundle of skilled labor and 
capital. This nesting allows the modeler to introduce less substitutability between 
capital and skilled labor than between these two and other factors. In other words, 
when the relative price of unskilled labor is increased, this factor is replaced by a 
combination of capital and skilled labor, which are more complementary.3
  Factor endowments are fully employed. The only factor whose supply is con-
stant is natural resources. Capital supply is modified each year because of deprecia-
tion and investment. Growth rates of labor supply are fixed exogenously. Land sup-
ply is endogenous; it depends on the real remuneration of land. In some countries 
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2The fixed-proportion assumption for intermediate inputs and primary factor inputs is especially 
pertinent to developed economies, but for some developing economies that are undergoing dramatic 
economic growth and structural change, such as China, the substitution between intermediate inputs 
and primary factor inputs may be significant.
3Substitution elasticity between unskilled labor, land, natural resources, and the bundle of capital and 
skilled labor is 1.1, whereas it is only 0.6 between capital and skilled labor.land is a scarce factor (for example, Japan and the EU), such that elasticity of supply 
is low. In others (such as Argentina, Australia, and Brazil), land is abundant and 
elasticity is high.
  Skilled labor is the only factor that is perfectly mobile. Installed capital and nat-
ural resources are sector specific. New capital is allocated among sectors according 
to an investment function. Unskilled labor is imperfectly mobile between agricul-
tural and nonagricultural sectors according to a constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) function: unskilled labor’s remuneration in agricultural activities is different 
from that in nonagricultural activities. This factor is distributed between these two 
series of sectors according to the ratio of remunerations. Land is also imperfectly 
mobile among agricultural sectors.
  Therefore, in MIRAGE there is full employment of labor; more precisely, there is 
a constant aggregate employment in all countries (wage flexibility). It is quite possible 
to suppose that total aggregate employment is variable and that there is unemploy-
ment; but this choice greatly increases the complexity of the model, so that simplifying 
assumptions have to be made in other areas (such as the number of countries or sec-
tors). This assumption could amplify the benefits of trade liberalization for developing 
countries (see Diao et al. 2005): in full-employment models, increased demand for 
labor (from increased activity and exports) leads to higher real wages, such that the 
origin of comparative advantage is progressively eroded; but in models with unem-
ployment, real wages are constant and exports increase much more.
  Capital in a given region, whatever its origin, domestic or foreign, is assumed to 
be obtained by assembling intermediate inputs according to a specific combination. 
The capital good is the same whatever the sector. MIRAGE describes imperfect, as 
well as perfect, competition. In sectors under perfect competition, there is no fixed 
cost, and price equals marginal cost. Imperfect competition is modeled according to 
a monopolistic competition framework. It accounts for horizontal product differen-
tiation linked to product variety. Each firm in sectors under imperfect competition 
produces its own unique variety, with a fixed cost expressed as a fixed quantity of 
output. According to the Cournot hypothesis, each firm supposes that its decision of 
production will not affect the production of other firms. Furthermore, the firms do 
not expect that their decision of production will affect the level of domestic demand 
(which would be what modelers call a “Ford effect”).
  The monopolistic competition framework implies that each year, firms exert 
their market power by applying a markup to their marginal costs. This markup de-
pends negatively on the price elasticity of demand according to the Lerner formula. 
This price elasticity, as perceived by firms, depends positively on the elasticity of 
substitution between the goods produced domestically and abroad, and negatively 
on the number of competitors and the market share of the firm in the demand 
24      chapter 3region.4 In the long term, the number of firms is endogenous, as it increases when 
profits are positive. An implication of this hypothetical structure is that interna-
tional trade has procompetitive effects and reduces mark-ups and prices.
  The number of firms may adjust progressively, either quickly (2 years in frag-
mented sectors) or slowly (5 years in segmented sectors). This classification is based 
on the seminal work of Sutton (1991) and has been confirmed by Oliveira-Martins 
(1994) and Oliveira-Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996). These works are the basis 
of the taxonomy used by MIRAGE to distinguish fragmented and segmented sec-
tors.




land available for production in the wheat sector).
  The demand side is modeled in each region through a representative agent 
whose propensity to save is constant. The rest of the national income is used to 
purchase final consumption. Preferences across sectors are represented by a linear 
expenditure system–constant elasticity of substitution (LES-CES) function. It im-
plies that consumption has a nonunitary income elasticity; when the consumer’s 
income is augmented by x percent, the consumption of each good is not systemati-
cally raised by x percent.
  When competition is imperfect, the product is horizontally differentiated (called 
“product variety”), and consumers have increased utility with more variety; this   
hypothesis is a traditional one (the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz function). But MIRAGE 
introduces here two specific features. First, in some sectors (such as industry), prod-
ucts coming from developed countries and those from developing countries are 
supposed to belong to different quality ranges. Their substitutability, therefore, is 
assumed to be lower than the substitutability among products coming from the 
same quality range. Second, domestic products benefit from a specific status of 
consumers; they are less substitutable for foreign products than foreign products 
are among one another within a given quality range.
  The sector subutility function used in MIRAGE is a nesting of four CES func-
tions. In this study, Armington elasticities are drawn from the GTAP 5 database and 
are assumed to be the same across regions. The other elasticities used in the nesting 
for a given sector are linked to the Armington elasticity by a simple rule (see Bchir 
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4This specification is very close to the one used by Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1997).et al. 2002 for more details). Finally, the elasticity of substitution in the LES-CES 
function is set at 0.6. Macroeconomic closure is obtained by assuming that the 
sum of the balance of goods and services and foreign direct investments (FDIs) is 
constant and equal to its initial value.
Geographic Decomposition
Table 3.1 indicates the geographical decomposition that was designed for this study. 
Given that the study is an assessment of trade liberalization on developing countries, 
14 of the 20 selected zones are developing countries.5 Table 3.1 reflects specific 
characteristics of various countries and regions. The reason, for example, that the 
EU and the United States are presented as separate zones is because they have the 
richest markets in the world and they have granted large trade preferences. Austra-
lia and New Zealand are powerful agricultural exporting countries, which could 
be among the main beneficiaries of this trade shock. The zone called “Developed 
Asia” includes countries with extremely high protectionism in agriculture (Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan). In other rich countries, Canada has a very low density 
of rural population per arable land area. The zone Rest of OECD is composed of 
rich countries (Mexico is not included) with land as a scarce factor and with a very 
high protectionism in agriculture: Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland.
  As far as developing countries are concerned, India and China have been treated 
as distinct zones, because between them they include 37 percent of world popula-
tion and 50 percent of world poverty (using the US$2.00 per day definition).6 
Moreover, these countries could be winners of worldwide full trade liberalization 
for different reasons:
1.    Liberalization would entail eliminating large domestic distortions, as today 
they are highly protected countries (especially India).7
2.    These countries have been granted only small trade preferences, such that lib-
eralization should imply a significant improvement of their market access to 
the rest of the world.
  Brazil and Argentina are powerful agricultural exporting countries with very 
large productive capacities, and they have only been conceded a small preference in 
their access to Europe and the United States, compared to other developing coun-
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5Table B.1 gives the geographic and sector correspondence table between these decompositions and 
the GTAP classification.
6These data on population and poverty are from the World Bank (2003).
7According to the MacMap-HS6 database, the average protection tariff in India was 33.5 percent in 
2001. China is less protected, with an average tariff of 14.1 percent in the same year.tries. In contrast, Tunisia and Bangladesh could be penalized for two reasons: they 
are net food-importing countries and their export performance has been bolstered 
by large trade preferences (the Euromed partnership in the case of Tunisia, EBA in 
the case of Bangladesh). Zambia mostly exports copper, which is only marginally 
taxed by import duties throughout the world. Moreover, Zambia is a beneficiary of 
all main preferential schemes: EBA, AGOA, and the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP). The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) must be distinguished 
from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa: its members are not LDCs, except for Lesotho. 
Mexico has a relatively low average income per capita and free access to the United 
States. It may also be affected by an erosion of trade preferences.
  Finally, four developing zones have been distinguished because of the specific-
ity of their geographic trade composition: the rest of developing Asia, the rest of the 
Middle East and North Africa, the rest of Latin America (excluding OECD coun-
tries) and the rest of Sub-Saharan African countries. The Middle East and North 
Africa zone is a large net food-importing zone, and it exports mainly primary, non- 
agricultural, and oil commodities. This product structure of exports is also a feature   
of the Rest of Latin America zone (Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela). The rest of Sub- 
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Table 3.1    Geographical decomposition
country/zone  north/south  is land a scarce factor?
Australia/New Zealand  North  No
Canada  North  No
Developed Asia  North  Yes
European Union 25  North  Yes
United States  North  No
Rest of OECD  North  Yes
Argentina  South  No
Bangladesh  South  Yes
Brazil  South  No
China  South  Yes
Developing Asia  South  Yes
India  South  Yes
Mexico  South  Yes
Southern African Customs Union  South  Yes
Tunisia  South  Yes
Zambia  South  Yes
Rest of Latin America  South  Yes
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  South  Yes
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  South  Yes
Rest of the World  South  Yes
Notes: The terminology “North/South” is traditional in international economics and distinguishes between rich (OECD) and 
poor (non-OECD) countries. OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Saharan countries have extended export preferences for Europe and the United 
States. Thus, the geographical decomposition of this study emphasizes the hetero- 
geneity of developing countries according to forces that could contribute to im-
proved welfare for some countries (Brazil, China, and India) but also to great losses 
for others (Bangladesh, Mexico, Tunisia, and Zambia).
  Since the launching of the DDA, several negotiating blocks have appeared, add-
ing complexity to this process, compared to the negotiations between the United 
States and the EU, which characterized the previous trade rounds. The geographical 
decomposition used here also illustrates the new partition: the United States, the 
EU, the rich countries of the Cairns group (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), 
the G-10 (with the Developed Asia zone and the Rest of OECD zone), the G-20 
(Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and South Africa), the G-90 (Zambia, Tunisia, 
and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa). Thus, this model could also be utilized to explain 
the positions of these negotiating blocks.
Product Decomposition
The sector decomposition emphasizes the existence of key sectors in which distor-
tions are high and numerous. Of course, agriculture must be the main focus of 
study, which is why out of the 17 sectors considered, 9 are agricultural. Among 
these agricultural activities, some are of key concern, as their distortions are espe-
cially high: tariffs for wheat, sugar, meat, rice, and milk; and domestic support for 
cotton (plant-based fibers). In the case of sugar, rice, and milk, the processed goods 
have been isolated, because paddy rice, raw milk, sugar cane, and sugar beet are only 
marginally traded. Finally, vegetables and fruits constitute a key agricultural activity 
for numerous developing countries. Textile and clothing sectors are still highly pro-
tected compared to the rest of industrial activity throughout developed countries.
  In Table 3.2, the last three columns give valuable information for MIRAGE. In 
each sector, competition may be perfect or imperfect. According to the traditional 
point of view, agricultural sectors and transportation are characterized by perfect 
competition, whereas other sectors are characterized by imperfect competition. Ac-
cording to Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta (1999) textiles and wearing apparel are 
assumed to be fragmented; other sectors under imperfect competition are assumed 
to be segmented. In the version of MIRAGE utilized for this central experiment, 
unskilled labor is imperfectly mobile between agricultural and nonagricultural ac-
tivities. The last column indicates this distinction: here the food sector is considered 
as agricultural.
  First, a pre-experiment is conducted to account for the liberalization that oc-
curred from 2001 to 2005. Then, full trade liberalization is applied by eliminating, 
in all countries, tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies linearly in 10 years.
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The Pre-Experiment
Initial data (the social accounting matrix and tariffs) are from 2001. As substantial 
liberalization occured between 2001 and 2005, a pre-experiment is conducted: data 
on market access are changed to include the last implementation of the Uruguay 
Round, the elimination of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, enlargement of the EU, 
implementation of the EBA initiative and the AGOA, and finally, the accession of 
China to the WTO. These reforms should result in welfare benefits but are not part 
of a current deal on trade liberalization.
Main Features of the Initial Trading System
The initial world is characterized by a few statistics presented in Tables C.1–C.4 and 
Figures 3.1–3.5: levels of tariffs, export structure by destination, export structure   
by product, and net trade balance in agricultural and food products. This choice 
is justified by the arguments mentioned previously: domestic support and export 
subsidies are only minor distortions compared to tariffs; preferential access to a 
large market is a common feature, such that its erosion is a central concern; and 
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Table 3.2    Sector decomposition
  type of   segmented/  agricultural/
sector  competition  fragmented  nonagricultural
Wheat  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Vegetables and fruits  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Plant-based fibers  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Meat: cattle, sheep,  
    goat, horse  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Milk (processed)  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Rice (processed)  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Sugar (processed)  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Other food products  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Other agricultural products  Perfect  —  Agricultural
Other primary products  Perfect  —  Nonagricultural
Textiles  Imperfect  Fragmented  Nonagricultural
Wearing apparel  Imperfect  Fragmented  Nonagricultural
Metal, mineral, petroleum,  
    and chemical products  Imperfect  Segmented  Nonagricultural
Vehicles and equipment  Imperfect  Segmented  Nonagricultural
Other manufacturing products  Imperfect  Segmented  Nonagricultural
Other services  Imperfect  Segmented  Nonagricultural
Transport and trade  Perfect  —  Nonagricultural
Notes: See text for definitions of fragments and segmented; —, not applicable.agricultural world prices are expected to rise, so that being a net importer or exporter 
is a key issue.
  Table C.1 gives bilateral levels of protection for each zone in 2005. Each row 
defines the average tariff charged by an importing country (for example, Canada 
taxes products coming from the Australia/New Zealand zone at 6.7 percent), while 
each column indicates the average duty faced by a country on its exports to a spe-
cific destination. The last column indicates the average protection in each zone 
(protectionism that a country imposes on its imports), and the last row expresses the 
average duty faced by exports (the extent to which a country’s exports are penalized 
by foreign protectionism). This information is summarized in Figure 3.1.
  India is by far the most protectionist country, but trade barriers are also high in 
Bangladesh, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Tunisia; they are marginally less so in Brazil, 
Argentina, and Zambia. Global protection in rich countries is lower. Because of 
preferential schemes (EBA, AGOA, Cotonou, and Caricom) or specialization in 
products lightly taxed across the world (coffee, coca, cotton, and mining), numerous 
developing countries are facing low average tariffs on their exports: Tunisia, Rest 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh, Zambia, and especially Mexico and Rest of 
Middle East and North Africa. For Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agree-
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Average duty faced by exports ment (NAFTA) provides free access to a major market, while for the other zones this 
relief is a combination of two elements—Euromed partnerships and exportation 
of raw commodities—which explains the very low average duty faced on exports. 
In the case of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and New Zealand, specialization in agri-
culture implies that their exports are penalized more than those of other countries. 
Conversely, specialization in industry gives relatively good access to foreign markets: 
Canada, China, Developed Asia, the EU, and the United States.
  The necessity of taking fully into account preferential schemes and regional 
agreements is now widely admitted by the international community of researchers. 
It has changed the global picture of world protection, not only because average 
world protection is now considered lower than previously thought (see above), but 
also because trade policies from industrial countries appear to be less antidevelop-
ment. For example, in 2004 the Global Economic Prospects of the World Bank 
(2004a, 81) emphasized the regressive aspect of trade policies:
Tariffs imposed by the industrial countries on imports from developing countries are typically 
much higher than those they levy on other industrial countries. In agriculture, the indus-
trial countries impose an average 15 percent tariff on imports from other industrial countries, 
whereas the rates on imports from developing countries range from 20 percent (Latin America) 
to 35 percent (Europe and Central Asia). Outside of agriculture, the discrepancy is even more 
striking. Tariffs on imports from other industrial countries average 1 percent, while those 
from developing countries face tariff averages ranging from 2.1 percent (Latin America) to 8.1 
percent (south Asia).
  From Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2005, 104–105) it now appears that
Developing countries’ exporters of agricultural products faced an average tariff of 16 percent 
in 2001, a rate that is expected to fall to 15 percent once current commitments, particularly 
by China and other developing countries, are phased in. The average tariff facing industrial 
countries was 17 percent in 2001, and will fall to 16 percent with full implementation of 
current commitments. The LDCs as a group face lower, but still significant barriers, with an 
average tariff of 12 percent even after preferences are taken into account.
  In agriculture, the imposition of specific duties by numerous rich countries 
(Switzerland, the EU, and Norway) has a very negative impact on protection faced 
by developing countries: because they export products of lower unit value on aver-
age, the rate of protection associated with the same duty is higher. Nevertheless, 
the impact of preferential schemes is substantial. Thus, globally, trade policies are 
progressive, in the sense that the poorest countries are facing lower average duties 
on their exports than richer countries face; the policies are not regressive, as previ-
a new assessment of impact of trade liberalization      31ously thought (and stated, for example, in World Bank 2004a). Of course, these 
two new qualifications (lower world protection and “progressive” trade policies) are 
key elements to keep in mind when explaining trade pessimism.
  In Europe, preferences have been given to Bangladesh and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(EBA), the Middle East and North Africa (the Euro–Mediterranean partnership), 
the rest of OECD (the EU–European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA] agreement); 
in the United States, to Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), and to Sub-Saharan Africa 
(AGOA). Table C.1 shows that these schemes imply systematically lower rates of 
protection.
  Table C.2 gives the level of protection by importing country and/or zone and 
product, and Figure 3.2 provides a graphical snapshot of the world average protec-
tion by product. Protection is very high in the case of rice (with a record duty of 
615 percent in Developed Asia), sugar, and milk; it is also substantial for meat and 
wheat. In industry, only textiles and wearing apparel are significantly taxed.
  Table C.3 provides detailed information, and Figure 3.3 gives a synthetic rep-
resentation of the initial geographical structure of exports: rich countries and, in 
particular, Developed Asia, Europe, and the United States are the main destinations 
of world exports. It also highlights the impact of regional agreements or preferential 
schemes; trade is highly concentrated in North America (from Canada and Mexico 
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Figure 3.2    World average import duty, by product, 2005to the United States) and in Europe (inside the EU and from the EFTA–Rest of 
OECD to the EU). The EU is by far the most likely destination for exports from 
Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 3.3 illustrates the global 
heterogeneity in destinations of exports from developing countries. While Bangla-
desh, China, Mexico, and Tunisia concentrate their exports on the markets of rich 
countries, Argentina clearly prioritizes middle-income countries for its exports.
  Figure 3.4 illustrates the product composition of exports (detailed information 
is in Table C.4). Some countries, such as Zambia (for which 70 percent of exports 
consists of metal, mineral, petroleum, and chemical products) and Bangladesh (for 
which 70 percent of exports consists of textiles and wearing apparel), are specialized 
in mining activities and industry; others are specialized in agriculture (Australia/ 
New Zealand, Brazil, and especially Argentina).
  Figure 3.5 shows the net trade balance of the 20 zones in agricultural and food 
products. Such zones as Rest of Middle East and North Africa, Rest of OECD, 
Developed Asia, EU 25, and Mexico are net food importers and could lose from 
an increase in agricultural world prices. Conversely, Argentina, Australia/New Zea-
land, Brazil, and the United States are large net food exporters.
  It  is  noteworthy  that  no  simple  categorization  of  developing  countries  as   
net food exporters and developed countries as net food importers can be made: 
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34      chapter 3Australia/New Zealand is the largest net exporter of food, whereas some developing 
zones are net food importers. Similarly, preferential margins have been granted to 
LDCs and developed countries (Canada, Mexico, and the EFTA).
Expected Benefits from Trade Liberalization
Before describing the results of the impact at the country level, I analyze the impact 
of full trade liberalization at the world level.
Impact of Full Liberalization at the World Level
Compared to the baseline situation, full trade liberalization increases world welfare 
(real income) by 0.33 percent, or US$99.6 billion (Table 3.3).8 When focusing on 
the rate of increase in real income, if the reference is the last group of assessments 
based on recent data on market access and domestic support, this result is close 
to those of Hertel and Keeney (2005) and Francois, Van Meijl, and Van Ton-
geren (2005). But it is smaller than the results of Anderson, Martin, and Van der 
Mensbrugghe (2005a). The difference between the values given in Table 3.3 and 
Cline’s results (2004) is large, as it is with the assessments of the World Bank (2002, 
2004a). This welfare increase is associated with an augmentation of world trade by 
5.25 percent. Because trade barriers are numerous in the agricultural sector, world 
agricultural trade increases by 6.5 times more: 33.67 percent.
  Trade liberalization consists of eliminating import tariffs and production and 
export subsidies. Thus, it increases world demand and decreases world supply, con-
tributing to an augmentation of world prices. This point is confirmed by Figure 3.6, 
which indicates the evolution of world prices after trade liberalization (see also the 
first column of Table D.1 in Appendix D) for all sectors. But price augmentations 
are uneven: although they are only minor in industry and services, they are large in 
agriculture, especially for wheat, plant-based fibers, and other agricultural products. 
These increases in agricultural world prices are quite similar to those obtained by 
other studies (see, for example, Diao, Somwaru, and Roe 2001).
  Table D.1 indicates the evolution of world prices by exporting countries. In 
a model like MIRAGE, there is no single world price for a specific commodity: 
according to the Armington (1969) hypothesis, every country produces a specific 
product; the world price indicated in Figure 3.6 is an average of trade-weighted ex-
port prices. The evolution of export prices is particularly divergent among countries 
for meat, plant-based fibers, (processed) rice, (processed) sugar, and wheat.
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8This version of MIRAGE does not include exogenous change in total factor productivity, which is 
accounted for in such models as LINKAGE (a global dynamic CGEM maintained by the World Bank 
to support global trade policy analysis; see Van der Mensbrugghe 2005). As a consequence, it is better 
to make comparisons on a relative basis.36      chapter 3
Table 3.3    Impact of full trade 
liberalization: Rate of change for 
world indicators for 2015 (percent)
indicator  total
World agricultural trade  33.67
World merchandise trade  5.25
World welfare  0.33
Percent
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Figure 3.6    Impact of full trade liberalization: Rate of change of 
world prices for 2015 compared to baseline
Impact of Full Liberalization at the Country Level
What is the impact of this trade reform for different countries in the model? It is 
progressive: the increase in welfare is proportionally higher for developing countries, 
especially for LDCs (see Table 3.4), although their share of the overall world wel-
fare increase is smaller. The rate of change in welfare is two times greater for LDCs 
than for middle-income countries and more than two times greater than for rich 
countries. In this sense, full liberalization is development friendly.
  This result does not mean, however, that each developing country profits 
evenly from this higher rate of change in welfare. Table 3.5 shows that welfare gains 
are unequally distributed among developing countries. In this table, countries are 
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Table 3.4    Distribution of welfare gains among beneficiary 
groups and rate of change in welfare (percent)
beneficiary group  share of total welfare gain  increase in welfare
Rich countries  73.8  0.3
Middle-income countries  24.1  0.4
Least-developed countries  2.2  0.8
Note: The numbers in column “Share of total welfare gain” add up to slightly more than 100 percent because of roundoff 
errors.
Table 3.5    Impact of full trade liberalization: Rate of change in 
macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
    allocation   terms-of-trade 
country/zone  welfare  efficiency gains  gains
Australia/New Zealand  0.9  0.1  1.4
Canada  –0.1  0.6  0.2
Developed Asia  1.4  2.3  0.1
EU 25  –0.1  0.2  –0.1
Rest of OECD  1.0  1.0  0.1
United States  0.1  0.0  0.1
Argentina  –0.1  0.3  0.3
Brazil  0.2  0.1  0.4
China  0.6  0.8  0.1
Developing Asia  0.4  0.7  –0.1
India  0.7  1.5  –0.9
Mexico  –0.3  1.3  –0.5
Rest of Latin America  0.0  0.8  –0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.9  1.2  –0.5
Rest of the World  0.1  0.9  0.0
Southern African Customs Union  –0.2  0.3  0.6
Tunisia  0.4  0.4  –0.4
Bangladesh  1.5  1.8  –1.1
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.6  1.3  –0.6
Zambia  0.3  1.6  –2.4
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
and finally the LDCs. This information is completed by macroeconomic indicators 
on production and exports in Table 3.6.
  There are several sources of variation in welfare gains. First, distortions are 
reduced, and productive factors are reallocated to sectors where they are more ef-
ficient. Table 3.5 indicates these gains in allocation efficiencies, which are systemati-cally positive, as numerous distortions are eliminated.9 Second, terms of trade are 
modified. A better access to foreign markets increases export prices, while, on the 
contrary, erosion of preferences implies more competition in export markets and 
lower export prices. Furthermore, because distortions are numerous in agricultural 
sectors, full trade liberalization entails an increase in the relative world price of these 
commodities. Agricultural exporters are generally benefiting from an improvement 
in their terms of trade, whereas net food-importing countries are penalized.
  Nevertheless, consideration of only the initial agrifood balance can be mislead-
ing: trade of wheat, sugar, rice, and meat is severely distorted, whereas other agricul-
tural products are much less distorted. Specialization of each country is not evenly 
distributed in all agricultural sectors. For example, agricultural exports of India, Rest 
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Table 3.6    Full trade liberalization: Rate of change of 
macroeconomic indicators for production and exports  
(percent by volume)
  agrifood   nonagrifood
country/zone  production  production  exports
Australia/New Zealand  18.3  –1.5  10.1
Canada  –2.8  –0.1  –3.7
Developed Asia  –6.4  –0.2  6.8
EU 25  –2.5  –0.2  –4.4
Rest of OECD  –10.8  0.2  0.8
United States  0.5  –0.2  –0.5
Argentina  7.5  –2.5  12.5
Brazil  12.2  –1.3  21.7
China  –0.2  0.8  9.0
Developing Asia  7.1  0.3  8.8
India  –4.0  2.8  52.2
Mexico  –4.9  –1.8  4.4
Rest of Latin America  4.4  –1.2  20.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  –6.1  1.6  11.9
Rest of the World  –3.4  –1.4  14.3
Southern African Customs Union  7.6  –1.4  6.4
Tunisia  0.8  1.1  –4.2
Bangladesh  0.7  2.7  55.5
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  –4.0  –0.4  19.2
Zambia  –4.4  3.2  21.2
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
9Because some distortions, such as (final and intermediate) consumption taxes, remain after the shock, 
and because the economic variable on which these taxes are levied can be modified by trade reform, 
allocation efficiency losses could occur.of Latin America, and Developing Asia are highly concentrated in the category of 
other food products (at a level of 46, 45, and 61 percent, respectively). This is the 
only agrifood commodity for which the world price decreases after trade reform (see 
Figure 3.6). Conversely, these three zones are also net exporters of industrial products 
whose world prices remain almost constant (metal, mineral, petroleum, and chemical 
products). As a result, these three zones lose from a deterioration of their terms of 
trade, even if they were initially net food-exporting countries (Table 3.5).
  But like other models of its generation, MIRAGE captures other effects of 
welfare changes (otherwise the first column in Table 3.5 would be equal to the sum 
of the two other columns—which is why, in the case of Argentina, Canada, and 
Southern African Customs Union, total gains coming from allocative efficiency 
and terms of trade are very different from welfare gains). It accounts for imperfect 
competition activities, so that expansion of these sectors implies new welfare effects. 
As production increases, average costs and prices are cut, which results in greater ef-
ficiency. Moreover, as horizontal differentiation is modeled, selling on a larger scale 
allows for an increased product variety to be produced: it implies accrued utility for 
consumers who value variety.
  Conversely, as already noted by Francois, Van Meijl, and Van Tongeren (2005), 
this feature has negative consequences on countries where specialization in perfect-
competition activities (agriculture) increases because of liberalization. Compared to 
the baseline, it might entail a smaller economic activity in industry, fewer economies 
of scale, and less product variety.
  Finally, in MIRAGE, as in the World Bank’s LINKAGE model, land supply is 
endogenous and is determined by real remuneration of this productive factor. The 
elasticity of land supply is higher in zones (Argentina, Australia/New Zealand, Can-
ada, and the United States) with lower densities of farmers per arable land area.
  In rich countries, the impact of full liberalization is positive, except in the case 
of Europe and Canada, even if this welfare loss is marginal. The welfare gain is quite 
marginal for the United States, but it is significant for others, because distortions are 
very high in the case of Developed Asia (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), and Rest 
of OECD (Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland). For Australia/New Zealand, full 
liberalization implies a significant increase in real exports and activities and a sub-
stantial improvement in terms of trade, because it raises the prices of exported goods 
and provides better access to large markets, such as Europe and the United States. 
Agrifood production increases by nearly 20 percent in this zone, while it decreases 
in other rich countries (except the United States, for which the augmentation is   
insignificant—see Table 3.6).
  Agricultural specialization has a mixed effect in the case of Argentina, Australia/ 
New Zealand, and Brazil, as it entails augmented real remuneration and supply of 
land but less activity in industry and fewer welfare effects associated with this sector. 
a new assessment of impact of trade liberalization      39Agrifood production decreases significantly for Canada, although initially it was a 
net food exporter. For Canada, multilateral liberalization implies much more severe 
competition for its primary export destination: the United States (initially 75 per-
cent of its exports). Its export of meat to the United States decreases by 10 percent; 
vegetables and fruits by 4 percent; rice by 18 percent; clothing and wearing apparel 
by 28 percent; and metal, mineral, and chemical products, vehicles, and equip-
ment by 9 percent. Globally, this full trade liberalization entails a cut in its total 
exports of merchandise by nearly 4 percent, resulting from the loss of preferential 
access to its rich neighbor and reduced activity in both industry and agriculture. 
This evolution has two negative consequences for Canada: first, industrial activity 
is reduced compared to the baseline situation; it decreases welfare gains coming   
from economies of scale and product variety. Second, because agricultural produc-
tion is negatively affected, real remuneration of land decreases, such that land supply 
is reduced.
  In developing countries, efficiency gains are large where distortions are initially 
high: Bangladesh, India, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Because Argentina, Brazil, and 
SACU are large net food exporters, the rise in agricultural world prices implies an 
improvement in their terms of trade. The zone Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is initially 
a net food exporter (see Figure 3.5). Nevertheless, its terms of trade are worsened, 
because it faces more competition in large markets, such as the EU, where its pref-
erential access is eroded, so its export prices decrease. Furthermore, in the cases of 
Bangladesh and Rest of Middle East and North Africa, preferences are eroded and 
prices of imported goods are raised: these two negative effects are cumulative.
  The adverse effect of agricultural specialization on welfare gains, which comes 
from economies of scale and product differentiation, explains global welfare losses 
of Argentina, Canada, and SACU.10 Allocating more productive factors to sectors 
under perfect competition reduces the gain from multilateral liberalization in the 
case of Australia/New Zealand, Brazil, and Rest of Latin America. Conversely, full 
trade liberalization expands the industrial sector and increases associated welfare 
gains in Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Zambia.
  The case of Bangladesh is fascinating, as full trade liberalization entails a 55 
percent increase in total merchandise exports (by volume). Bangladesh is a highly 
specialized country, with two sectors (textiles and wearing apparel) representing 
70 percent of its exports (see Table C.4). Furthermore, it has a duty-free access 
to Europe, but its exports to Argentina, Australia/New Zealand, Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States are still highly taxed. This structure of protection 
and specialization explains such an increase in export performance, but at the same 
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10This point is confirmed later by a sensitivity analysis. If the same model is implemented using perfect 
competition in all sectors, Argentina, for example, experiences a large increase in welfare.time, trade reform has two negative consequences for this country: first, it faces an 
increased competition on its exports to Europe (44 percent of total exports), which, 
in turn, decreases the prices of these exports; second, it is a net food-importing 
country, and its import prices are raised.
  Table 3.7 presents estimates of the impact of full trade liberalization on factor 
remunerations in real terms. As demonstrated by international trade theory, trade 
openness has more effect on the real remuneration of less mobile factors. Moreover, 
because distortions are initially concentrated in the agricultural sector, full trade lib-
eralization has a prominent impact on world prices and activities in this sector. This 
effect explains why, on one hand, the remuneration of land and natural resources is 
significantly modified by full trade liberalization, while, on the other hand, capital 
and skilled labor are much less affected. The real remuneration of land is much 
reduced by liberalization in Rest of OECD, EU 25, and Developed Asia.11 This 
table shows that gains from liberalization have to be shared among several produc-
tive factors, whereas losses are concentrated on one or two factors, which may imply 
strong resistance and weak support for liberalization.
  What is the potential impact of trade liberalization on poverty? It cannot be 
measured in this version of MIRAGE.12 Nevertheless, Table 3.7 can give some 
insights into this potential effect. In developing countries, poor people are mostly 
endowed with unskilled labor. Thus, Table 3.7 points out that full trade liberaliza-
tion could have a very positive impact on poverty in Bangladesh, Developing Asia, 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, SACU, Latin America, and Tunisia. It clearly has a 
contrasting effect on industrial and/or agricultural unskilled labor’s wages in China, 
India, Mexico, and Rest of Middle East and North Africa, where it increases remu-
neration of unskilled industrial workers and decreases that of agricultural workers. 
Finally, it has an unambiguously negative effect on low-skilled labor in Zambia.
Trade Liberalization and World Income Distribution
The potential impact of full trade liberalization on world inequality can also be 
measured. Recent studies (Bourguignon, Levin, and Rosenblatt 2004; Milanovic 
2005) focus on comparison of GDP per capita and conclude that world inequality 
decreased during the 1990s because of rapid growth in China and India.13 A similar 
assessment might be done here, but in a prospective way. Although some countries 
are aggregated into a single set, this calculation gives some insights on the size and 
the direction of the redistribution associated with trade reform.
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11These three zones were the main contenders for agricultural liberalization during the negotiation 
of the DDA.
12It cannot be measured because poverty elasticities are not used. I explain why later.
13Note the exceptional work by Milanovic (2005), who takes into account domestic distribution of 
income with the use of household surveys; his conclusions are less clear-cut.  Does full trade liberalization reduce world inequality? The answer is that is has 
no impact, as shown in Table 3.8.14 Using results on real income from the above 
modeling exercise, it is possible to calculate real income per capita, with and with-
out full trade liberalization: in Table 3.8, countries are ranked in increasing order 
according to their real income per capita. Lorenz curves can be constructed using 
cumulative population (percent) and cumulative real income (percent). Full trade 
liberalization implies only a very slight move of the Lorenz curve, so that only one 
curve for the two income distributions appears in Figure 3.7.
  Full trade liberalization entails a slight upward move of the Lorenz curve except 
at four points: those for Argentina, Canada, the EU, and Mexico. The Gini coef-
ficient is reduced from 0.73993 to 0.73981. Globally, free trade means less inequal-
ity among countries in the world (with the above limitations), but the impact is   
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Table 3.7    Impact of full trade liberalization: Rate of change of 
remuneration of production factors for 2015 in real terms (percent)
          real 
  agriculture:  industry:  real  real  return to
  Unskilled  Unskilled  return to  return to  natural  skilled
country/zone  real wages  real wages  capital  land  resources  real wages
Australia/New Zealand  10.3  2.1  –0.7  3.9  –4.4  1.2
Canada  –0.3  –0.3  –0.4  –24.2  4.0  –0.2
Developed Asia  –2.7  1.9  1.4  –30.9  –6.0  2.3
EU 25  0.1  0.3  –0.8  –41.6  –3.8  –0.1
Rest of OECD  –4.9  0.9  1.0  –50.1  5.5  1.2
United States  0.8  0.1  –0.3  –17.0  2.3  0.0
Argentina  5.8  1.5  –1.4  3.0  –6.1  –1.4
Brazil  7.1  1.6  –0.8  4.8  –6.9  0.3
China  –0.7  2.3  –1.7  –7.3  –18.7  4.3
Developing Asia  0.8  1.2  –0.4  –5.3  –16.2  0.9
India  –1.6  1.8  0.1  –4.7  –25.5  4.2
Mexico  –4.4  0.3  0.4  –23.1  –23.1  –2.0
Rest of Latin America  4.2  1.4  –1.1  7.3  –14.2  0.0
Rest of Middle East  
    and North Africa  –2.3  1.0  1.2  –7.4  –11.2  1.3
Rest of the World  –1.1  2.1  –2.3  –5.7  12.4  0.0
Southern African  
    Customs Union  4.8  0.8  –1.7  12.7  8.8  –0.3
Tunisia  1.0  1.1  0.6  –1.0  –7.5  0.3
Bangladesh  1.5  1.3  1.0  1.9  –6.5  0.6
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3  1.6  –0.8  –0.4  –4.5  1.5
Zambia  –4.1  –1.0  1.8  –9.0  –22.7  0.6
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a new assessment of impact of trade liberalization      43minor: this trade reform does not change the fact that 63 percent of world popula-
tion receives only 8 percent of world income.
  This trade reform implies a redistribution of world agricultural production. 
The United States, Brazil, Australia/New Zealand, Rest of Latin America, Develop-
ing Asia, Argentina, China, and SACU increase their net trade balance in these com-
modities (see Figure 3.8), while the trade deficit in agricultural and food products 
of Developed Asia, the EU, Rest of Middle East and North Africa, India, and Rest 
of OECD worsens.
Decomposing Trade Reform
Breaking down trade reform by sources allows for a better understanding of the un-




  In doing so, the conclusions that emerge from the literature are confirmed. First, 
developing countries’ own trade reforms matter a lot; second, agriculture provides 
the greatest welfare gains; third, tariffs are by far the main source of distortions.
  In the next sections, full trade reform is decomposed successively by liberalizing 
region (North and South), then by liberalized activity (agriculture and industry), 
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Figure 3.7    Lorenz curve on world inequality
15The decomposition technique that is usually adopted (see Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson 2000) 
is not used here, however, as trade shocks are not considered to be additive.
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With full trade liberalizationand finally by instrument (tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies). Detailed 
results are provided in Appendixes E–G.
Decomposition by liberalizing region.    Figure 3.9 represents welfare gains by country 
coming from full trade liberalization in the North, and it decomposes such gains 
into efficiency and terms-of-trade gains. Figure 3.10 provides the same data in the 
case of full trade liberalization in the South. Liberalization in the North implies the 
greatest welfare gain (+0.11 percent; see Appendix E), but trade reform in develop-
ing countries also matters (+0.06 percent). Although the average protection is higher 
in the South, dispersion of protection across sectors is higher in rich countries: in 
that sense, it is more distorting than in the South. Furthermore, liberalizing access 
in developed countries creates more trade, as these countries are richer.
  The origins of these welfare gains are quite different. Efficiency gains are high 
for the countries that carry out the reform. In the case of Northern liberalization 
(see Figure 3.9) efficiency gains are large for developed countries and small for 
developing countries; the opposite is true when liberalization takes place in the 
South.16 Terms-of-trade gains are generally positive for developing countries when 
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Figure 3.8    Impact of full trade liberalization on net agricultural 
exports
16Exceptions stem from variations in fiscal base while tax and/or subsidy rates are unchanged. For   
example, if import duties are unchanged but imports increased, efficiency losses are augmented. In 
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46      chapter 3developed countries carry out trade liberalization. This trend stems from the posi-
tive impact that the Northern trade reform has on improved market access and on 
world prices of agricultural goods and textiles/clothing, goods in which developing 
countries have a comparative advantage.
  The exceptions to this scheme are Tunisia and Mexico, whose preferential access 
to the EU and the United States, respectively, is eroded by multilateral liberalization: 
more competition in the destination of their exports means reduced export prices. 
The benefits from Northern liberalization for Argentinean exports are mitigated by 
an initial geographic concentration on middle-income countries (see Figure 3.3).
  The cases of Zambia and Rest of Middle East and North Africa are of great 
interest, because Northern liberalization for these two zones has negative conse-
quences in terms of real income. Their exports do not profit from improvement of 
terms of trade or market access, because they either export mainly untaxed products 
(oil, petroleum, and copper) or their preferential access is eroded. Furthermore, they 
lose from rising world agricultural prices. On the contrary, reforming their own 
trade policies brings these two countries significant allocative efficiency gains (see 
Figure 3.10) and reinforces South–South trade.
  On average, terms of trade for developing countries worsen when these coun-
tries carry out their own trade reform, although this deterioration is marginal in 
most cases. For specific countries, the extent to which their terms of trade deteriorate 
might be large (see India, Bangladesh, and Zambia).
  In a nutshell, in general trade reforms in both the North and South matter 
for developing countries. However, on average Northern trade reform implies im-
provement of foreign market access and increased export prices, whereas Southern 
trade reform is beneficial because it entails a reallocation of productive factors to 
competitive sectors. Nevertheless, Northern trade liberalization can generate welfare 
losses for developing countries stemming from deterioration of terms of trade.
Decomposition by liberalized activity.    Consider two case scenarios: (1) only agricul-
ture is fully liberalized (see Figure 3.11), and (2) only trade in industry is freed (see 
Figure 3.12). Agriculture is by far the main source of welfare gains: +0.18 percent 
(see Appendix F), whereas industrial liberalization entails a minor increase in world 
welfare. This asymmetry reflects the concentration of distortions in agriculture. On 
average, world protection is 19.1 percent; it is only 4.2 percent in industry but 10.5 
percent in textiles and wearing apparel (these figures are from Bouët et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, domestic support and export subsidies are concentrated in the agri-
cultural sector, whereas they are rare in industry.
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North. The loss comes from high taxes, especially on production, implemented in China. As Northern 
trade liberalization entails variation in Chinese production, it causes efficiency losses, even if Chinese 
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48      chapter 3  In the same vein, from Figures 3.11 and 3.12, it clearly appears that the level 
of efficiency gains reflects the initial pattern of protection. In the case of full agricul-
tural liberalization, they are high in Developed Asia, India, Rest of Middle East and 
North Africa, Rest of OECD, and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. For industrial lib-
eralization, efficiency gains are large in Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Rest of Middle 
East and North Africa, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, and Zambia—that is to say, in 
zones where protection is initially high.
  As far as terms-of-trade gains are concerned, as already explained, agricultural 
liberalization entails a substantial rise in world prices of agricultural commodities. 
It is beneficial for countries that were initially net exporters of agricultural and food 
products. Others lose from augmented world agricultural prices, while Mexico and 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa cope with more competition for their main export des-
tinations, for which they lose preferential access.
  Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa have contrasting 
interests in full trade liberalization, as they gain from agricultural liberalization but 
lose from industrial liberalization. In the case of Argentina, liberalization of only the 
industrial sector increases the relative prices of industrial goods, which implies de-
terioration of terms of trade. Furthermore, industrial sectors attract productive fac-
tors, and the remuneration of land is reduced. The land supply decreases, damaging 
the agrifood sector, which is a prominent sector in the economy. Thus, agricultural 
reform is a key issue for Argentina.
  Except for China and Zambia (which are negatively affected, albeit marginally 
so), the welfare of developing countries increases with agricultural full trade liberali- 
zation, whereas liberalized trade in industry has much more diverse effects.
Decomposition by instrument of intervention.    It is important to note the impact 
of each distorting instrument. Figures 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 indicate the impact of   
fully eliminating border protection, export subsidies, and domestic support, respec-
tively. These three figures have been constructed to the same scale to allow direct 
comparisons.
  Tariffs are by far the main source of distortions. Complete elimination of this 
instrument increases world welfare by 0.23 percent (see Appendix G). Elimina-
tion of domestic support and export subsidies has a small negative effect on world 
welfare. This conclusion is quite similar to the issue raised by Panagarya (2005). 
Elimination of domestic support and export subsidies raises world prices of food and 
affects negatively net food-importing countries, which represent the large majority 
of low-income countries: Panagarya (2005) concludes that as many as 48 out of 63 
low-income countries are net food importers. Even if the removal of these distor-
tions increases the welfare of countries where they are applied (this effect is minor, 
because price elasticities of agricultural supplies are small) and in food-exporting   
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50      chapter 3developing countries (such as Argentina and Brazil), it reduces welfare more sub-
stantially in these low-income net food importers. Thus, elimination of domestic 
support and export subsidies is not a first best policy, and at any rate its global ef-
fects may be minor.
  Exports subsidies are initially substantial for milk in the EU, Rest of OECD, 
and the United States; for rice, sugar, and meat in the EU; and for vegetables and 
fruit in Rest of OECD. In industry, export subsidies are only significant in Rest 
of Latin America, whereas for the textiles and wearing apparel industries, they are 
significant in SACU.
  Eliminating tariffs creates positive efficiency gains in countries where protec-
tion is initially high (Bangladesh, India, and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa) or exhibits 
peaks (Developed Asia and Rest of OECD). Tariff is a discriminatory instrument: 
its elimination has positive effects on terms of trade in Argentina, Brazil, Australia/
New Zealand, and SACU, whereas it entails loss of preferential access for Mexico, 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, and Zambia. In rich countries, domestic support is high 
for plant-based fibers, wheat, and other agricultural products. The elimination of 
a new assessment of impact of trade liberalization      51
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Allocation efficiency gains  Terms-of-trade gains Welfare this support causes a large increase in world prices of these commodities, which is 
quite beneficial to their main exporters (Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa).
In conclusion, full trade liberalization improves welfare and promotes development, 
because welfare enhancements are greater for developing than for developed coun-
tries, especially for LDCs. Nevertheless, some topics require further consideration:
•	 	 Full	liberalization	can	have	adverse	effects	on	individual	countries	because	of	
terms-of-trade losses; either they are net food-importing countries, so that in-
creased agricultural prices cut their real incomes or they have preferential access, 
which is eroded by multilateral liberalization. Furthermore, trade liberalization 
does not significantly improve access to foreign markets in the case of countries 
that export mainly oil, petroleum, and mineral products.
•	 	 Results	from	the	simulation	raise	a	supplementary	question:	is	specialization	
in agricultural activities a good strategy for development? The simulation in-
dicates that stimulating agricultural specialization entails a smaller expansion 
of industrial activity, that is to say, fewer economies of scale and less product 
variety. This conclusion has already been emphasized in the literature (Fran-
cois, Van Meijl, and Van Tongeren 2005) and has not been discussed at the 
political level.
  This study might slightly underestimate expected benefits, for at least three 
reasons. First, the study is based on a database on market access that fully incorpo-
rates regional agreements and preferential schemes. Implicitly, full utilization of this 
preferential access is supposed. Even if this methodology is better than no inclusion 
of preferences, it has been demonstrated that these preferences are not fully utilized. 
Thus, the expected benefits for countries receiving preferences, which are mostly 
developing countries, are underestimated.
  Second, the simulation is based on low trade elasticities. This choice can be 
justified. Recent econometric work by Hertel et al. (2000) gives a scientific basis 
for using these behavioral parameters. This element is primordial (the welfare effect 
is directly related to trade creation, which depends on the level of trade elasticities) 
and has to be kept in mind.
  Third, the study’s estimation is founded on decomposition into 17 sectors and 
20 geographic zones. This choice is quite representative compared to the literature 
and is also justified by the theoretical features. The model accounts for imperfect 
competition, horizontal and vertical differentiation, and imperfect mobility of un-
skilled labor between agricultural and nonagricultural activities. It is also dynamic. 
Thus, increasing the number of products and regions would have also augmented 
the number of equations and the calculation time. But a less detailed product and 
52      chapter 3geographic decomposition inevitably underestimates the distortions created by pro-
tection, because tariffs are unevenly distributed across products and regions.
  A 0.33 percent increase in real income represents a modest contribution to 
economic growth—surprisingly low when the East Asian miracle is considered, 
for example. Four reasons may contribute to this low result. First, trade liberaliza-
tion is not the only factor of economic growth, and domestic reform may have a 
huge impact on economic performance. Second, the experiment did not consider 
liberalization in services. Third, it also did not consider the dynamic effects of trade 
liberalization: as I discuss in Chapter 4, the ways in which dynamic relations are 
integrated into CGEMs are neither microeconomically founded nor useful from 
an empirical point of view. Finally, these benefits may have been underestimated 
because the methodology used supposes that preferential schemes are fully imple-
mented, and the trade elasticities used may be too low.
  It is necessary to gauge the extent to which the expected benefits from trade lib-
eralization can be underestimated. The review of the literature presented in Chapter 
4 was done to confirm that the results obtained from my study are not outliers.
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Modeling Trade Liberalization and 
Development Using CGEMs: A Survey
C
GEM assessments of trade liberalization have multiplied. There are several 
explanations, including increased access to economic data, increased com-
putational efficiencies, and development of the GTAP network. What is 
most surprising, however, is that the quantitative conclusions derived from CGEMs 
diverge.
Divergences among Assessments of Trade Liberalization 
Using CGEMs
Without being exhaustive, my survey covers 19 CGEM assessments of the impact 
of full trade liberalization on the world during the past 6 years1 and 9 assessments 
of the impact of a potential Doha agreement. Appendix H provides synoptic tables 
on the assessments of full trade liberalization and of the DDA on world welfare 
and poverty.2
Convergent Conclusions
Before pointing out the divergences in these assessments and explaining their source, 
it is worthwhile to put an emphasis on a set of convergent conclusions of all these 
studies (some of these conclusions are highlighted in Table 4.1):
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1The assessment carried out in Chapter 3 is included.
2In the case of World Bank (2004a; see Table H.1), it is a pro-poor scenario, which would imply the 
elimination of export subsidies, a decoupling of all domestic support, and a significant cut in tariffs: 
rich countries would be subject to a maximum tariff of 10 percent in agriculture (5 percent in indus-
try), with an average target of 5 percent (1 percent). For developing countries, the caps would be 15 
percent (10 percent), with an average of 10 percent (5 percent).1.    Full liberalization is beneficial. At the world level it increases welfare. This 
conclusion does not mean that all countries or all economic agents are better 
off. Liberalizing trade creates a “larger cake,” but some can get smaller pieces 
than others; if efficient redistribution mechanisms are put in place, all agents 
could experience increased welfare.
2.    Liberalizing agriculture is the main source of expected gains, accounting for 
about two-thirds of global gains. These gains come about because this sector 
contains a major part of current trade barriers. Furthermore, nearly all export 
subsidies and domestic support go to agriculture.3
3.    Tariffs are by far the main source of distortions. They account for more than 
90 percent of expected benefits in the case of full liberalization. This major 
political issue is confirmed by the assessment of the DDA. It prioritizes the 
elimination of export subsidies and a cut in domestic support, while pursuing 
modest objectives in terms of market access. For this reason, assessments of the 
DDA indicate only small welfare increases.
4.    Developing countries could be large beneficiaries of these reforms. As their 
GDPs are lower, they would experience a higher rate of increase in their real 
incomes than would developed countries. In this sense, trade reform is progres-
sive in that it increases real incomes of poor countries to a greater extent than 
those of other countries.
5.    Liberalizing trade policies of developing countries is a major issue. It contrib-
utes about half of the expected benefits. This observation leads to another criti-
cism of the DDA, because SDT could allow developing countries to liberalize 
less and LDCs to keep their trade policies unchanged.
  These convergent conclusions are extremely important. Although the picture 
drawn by these models is not as favorable as the one that emerged a few years ago, it 
remains true that the global net expected effect is positive: trade liberalization has to 
be done even if parallel policies have to be implemented simultaneously. The other 
points in the above list detail the contents of positive world trade reform: it has to 
focus on agriculture and market access, and developing countries must reform their 
own economies as well.
Trade Pessimism?
Tables H.1 and H.2 reveal a major divergence in CGEM assessments. As far as full 
trade liberalization is concerned, the increase in world welfare ranges from 0.2 to 
3.1 percent—a difference of a factor of 15! The impact on poverty headcount is 
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3Large gains in world welfare are expected from liberalization in services, but these estimates should 
be treated with great caution.also divergent, as the number of people lifted from poverty ranges from 72 million 
to 440 million (a ratio of 1 to 6.1!) with an average of 219 million.4 These numbers 
depict a rather contradictory picture of the effects of trade liberalization.5
  Figure 4.1 ranks the estimations of world benefits from full trade liberaliza-
tion in chronological order:6 on average, the expected world welfare gain exhibits 
continuous decrease.7 For example, from an average world welfare increase of 1.7 
percent in 1999, the average estimate is 1.5 percent in 2002, 1.3 percent in 2004, 
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Table 4.1    Computable general equilibrium model assessments 
of full trade liberalization: Convergent conclusions (percent)
      share of  role of
      developing  developing
  role of  role of  countries  countries’
  agriculture  tariffs  in benefits  policies
Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi (1999)  
  scenario 1  n.a.  n.a.  22  n.a.
Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi (1999)  
  scenario 2  n.a.  n.a.  43  45
Anderson et al. (2000)  65  n.a.  43  45
Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001) scenario 1  n.a.  n.a.    8  n.a.
Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001) scenario 2  n.a.  n.a.  38  n.a.
World Bank (2002) scenario 1  69  n.a.  52  55
World Bank (2002) scenario 2  71  n.a.  65  66
World Bank (2004a) scenario 1  66  n.a.  55  62
World Bank (2004a) scenario 2  69  n.a.  67  62
Cline (2004) scenario 1  57  n.a.  38  44
Cline (2004) scenario 2  n.a.  n.a.  47  n.a.
Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2003)  69  99  56  n.a.
Anderson, Martin, and  
  Van der Mensbrugghe, (2005a)  63  93  30  45
Francois, Van Meijl, and Van Tongeren (2005)  65  91    8  58
Hertel and Keeney (2005)  66  95  26  n.a.
Note: n.a., not available.
4In 2003, the number of people living in poverty (using the US$2.00 per day definition) was estimated 
at 2.8 billion (World Bank 2004b). Thus, the CGEM estimates suggest that full trade liberalization 
could decrease world poverty from 2.9 to 19.1 percent, with an average of 9.4 percent.
5In this survey, I do not include assessments of expected benefits from trade liberalization in services or 
from trade facilitation. These studies are rare, and although they shed light on a fundamental topic, the 
methodology needs further refinements. I included trade liberalization only in agriculture, as studied 
by Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001), but I did not use the results from Diao et al. (2005), because 
they account for the consequences for developing countries only.
6I excluded from this graphic the Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001) results, which focused only on 
agricultural liberalization.
7More precisely, the trend, calculated according to a linear regression, exhibits a decreasing slope.and 0.5 percent in 2005. Is the trade pessimism among trade economists getting 
ever stronger? If yes, is this conclusion justified?
  Obviously, these results are not totally comparable. Real incomes can be de-
fined in terms of either the 1997 dollar or the 2001 dollar. Furthermore, models 
can be static or dynamic. In the case of a dynamic model, the increase in supplies 
of productive factors are (endogenously or exogenously) taken into account, and in 
some simulations, even technical progress and related changes in factor productivity 
are included. Thus, the same rate of increase in real income, entailed by trade reform 
and applied to different bases, gives birth to different levels of assessments: compar-
ing studies by rate of change in real income is more appropriate. It is even more 
reliable to compare results coming from the same model: Hertel and Keeney (2005) 
to Hertel (2000), for instance, or Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 
(2005a) to the World Bank (2002, 2004a). This method of comparison results in 
a more accurate picture, but the main conclusion is the same: results are divergent, 
and the general trend is less trade optimism.
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Figure 4.1    Trade pessimism: Impact of full trade liberalization 
on world welfare
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Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2004)  Figure 4.2 shows the impact of trade reform on poverty headcount. In 2004, 
Cline carried out two estimations, the second one being especially optimistic. Put-
ting aside this second estimation, trade pessimism is rather confirmed. Finally,   
Table 4.2 indicates whether the assessments conclude that some regions or countries 
sustain welfare losses. Until 2000, most studies concluded that no nations suffered 
losses in terms of national real income from trade liberalization (a kind of Mon-
dialisation heureuse8). Beginning with Dee and Hanslow (2000), more and more 
studies demonstrate welfare losses for countries. It is noteworthy that these are 
nearly all developing countries (with the exception of Canada, based on an assess-
ment conducted in 2000).
  The potential implications of the DDA have been also scrutinized, as laid out 
in Table H.2. A comparison of Tables H.1 and H.2 leads to the conclusion that 
the potential impact of the DDA is much smaller than the one resulting from full 
trade liberalization, which is one of the main conclusions of all these studies.
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8A French expression for “fortunate globalization”; this qualification was made famous in France by 
an article by Alain Minc in the daily newspaper Le Monde in August 2001. It was a tentative descrip-
tion of globalization as a wonderful process giving benefits to everybody in all countries throughout 
the world.
Figure 4.2    Trade pessimism: Impact of full trade liberalization 
on poverty headcount 
Notes: AMVdM, Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe; FL, full liberalization; 
PPS, pro-poor scenario; WB, World Bank. Numbers 1 and 2 indicate the scenario 
number for Cline and the World Bank calculations.
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WB PPS (2004a)1 Cline FL (2004)1  Cline FL (2004)2 AMVdM (2004)   Assessing the impact of the DDA using CGEMs also gives rise to divergences (Fig-
ure 4.3). The range of welfare variations for an agricultural Doha round is from 0.08 
percent (Bouët et al. 2005) to 0.18 percent (Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mens- 
brugghe 2005a, scenario 1); it varies from 0.17 percent (Bouët, Mevel, and Orden 2005) 
to 0.51 percent (Fontagné, Guérin, and Jean 2005) for a complete round.
Why Do CGEM Assessments Diverge so Much?
Despite the similarities mentioned in the previous section, the divergences between 
these assessments and the increased pessimism about trade liberalization require 
further examination. It is easy to identify the potential sources of these divergences. 
Studies can differ by
1.    the experiment conducted,
2.    economic data used,
3.    behavioral parameters assumed, and
4.    theoretical features of the model.
The following sections examine each of these explanations in turn.
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Table 4.2    Trade pessimism: Potential losers from full  
trade liberalization
reference  potential loser
Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi (1999)  None
Dee and Hanslow (2000)  Canada, Mexico
Hertel (2000)  Other MENA countries
Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001) scenario 1  Mexico, Rest of the World
Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001) scenario 2  None
World Bank (2002) scenario 1  None
World Bank (2002) scenario 2  None
World Bank (2004a) scenario 1  None
World Bank (2004a) scenario 2  None
Cline (2004) scenario 1  Malaysia, Mexico
Cline (2004) scenario 2  China, Malaysia
Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2003)  None
Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005a)  None
Francois, Van Meijl, and Van Tongeren (2005)  China, India, South America
Hertel and Keeney (2005)  Bangladesh, Mozambique, Philippines, Rest of 
      Latin America, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
Bouët, Mevel, and Orden (2005)  Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, China, EU,  
      Mexico, Mozambique, Southern African  
      Customs Union, Venezuela, Zambia
Note: MENA, Middle East and North Africa.Experiments Are Not the Same
The first explanation concerns the experiments. It does not only consider designed sce-
nario but also the conduct of a pre-experiment and the offsetting of fiscal policies.
Full liberalization versus DDA.    Table H.1 considers only assessments of complete 
(in agriculture and industry) and full liberalization, with the exception of the study 
done by Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001), which assesses implications of liberalizing 
only agriculture. The experiments displayed in Table H.2 are tentative representa-
tions of a DDA only in industry, as examined by Bchir, Fontagné, and Jean (2005); 
in agriculture, as examined by Bouët et al. (2005); or in both sectors (Anderson, 
Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005a).
  Obviously, DDA experiments might diverge, because at the time they were 
done, no study had complete and definitive information on the conclusion of this 
agenda. Most of these studies utilize the Harbinson proposal of May 2003 in agri-
culture (see Table 4.3); some use the Girard formula in industry. For more than 2 
years after the start of the DDA, these formulas were the only quantitative proposals 
put forward by an official negotiator.
  The Harbinson proposal is explained in Table 4.3. It defines several tiers   
with increased reduction rates when applied to initial tariffs.9 For developed coun- 
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Figure 4.3    Trade uncertainty: Increase in world welfare for 
assessments of the Doha Development Agenda, 2005
9Recall that these reduction rates are applied to bound duties.
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0.40 0.50 0.60tries,10 for example, a tariff of 91 percent must be reduced by 60 percent, resulting in 
a tariff of 36.4 percent. The use of this formula is subject to criticism: in particular, 
it contains discontinuities. Some authors (such as Jean, Laborde, and Martin 2005) 
correct it, others (Bouët et al. 2005) apply it without any correction—which is the 
source of divergence in these assessments.
  In trade negotiations, it often appears that the “devil is in the details.” In other 
words, an ambitious package can be announced, but because it includes detailed 
and complicated clauses, its final impact on market access might be far from the 
one proclaimed. Three examples can illustrate this point:
1.    Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were implemented during the Uruguay Round to 
guarantee minimum access and safeguard the exports of some developing coun-
tries. There have been 1,371 TRQs implemented (for a complete presentation, 
see De Gorter and Sheldon 2000; Matthews and Laroche Dupraz 2001). A 
TRQ is composed of two tariffs (the inside quota tariff rate [IQTR] and the 
outside quota tariff rate [OQTR]) and a quota. Already difficult to ascertain the 
protective impact of a TRQ, it becomes even more hazardous to anticipate the 
way TRQs will be liberalized and the method by which countries will imple-
ment this reform. Trade negotiators could indeed decide to decrease TRQs, 
to expand quotas, or a combination of the two. At the national level, a gov-
ernment could modify the way quotas are administered,11 which could have 
significant consequences on some developing countries.
2.    The Geneva framework agreement, concluded on July 2004, includes a sensi-
tive products clause: “Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered 
approach, members may designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, 
of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive, taking account of existing commitments 
for these products” (see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e /draft_ 
text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm). This clause is so ambiguous that it is difficult 
to ascertain its consequences. Self-selection of tariff lines may imply that more 
protected products will be exempted from liberalization. Anderson, Martin, 
and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005a) demonstrated that even in the case of a 
low percentage of tariff lines admitted as sensitive products, these exceptions 
could considerably reduce the effects of liberalization. In Table H.2, the only 
difference between scenarios 1 and 2 carried out by Anderson, Martin, and Van 
der Mensbrugghe (2005a) is the inclusion of the sensitive and special products 
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10Recall that there is no formal WTO definition of developed or developing countries. Members an-
nounce for themselves whether they are developed or developing countries (see http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm).
11Quotas can be administered several ways: on a historical basis or on a first-come, first-served basis.clause on 2 percent of tariff lines. The associated world welfare gain is cut from 
US$75 billion to US$17 billion.
        The importance of such a clause comes from the convex form of tariff dis-
tributions in OECD countries. Figure 4.4 illustrates this point, showing a 
distribution of bound tariffs in Switzerland, ranked in increasing order. In this 
country, as in the EU, Iceland, Japan, and Norway, protection is highly con-
centrated on a few products. Exempting a few lines of liberalization may have 
significant consequences. In 2001, the average Swiss bound duty in agricul-
ture was 81.6 percent.12 When applying the Harbinson proposal without the 
sensitive products clause, this average falls to 34.1 percent. If, on the contrary, 
a sensitive products clause is applied, exempting 2 percent of tariff lines from 
liberalization, and if in Switzerland, this room for maneuver is used on the 
highest duties in agriculture, the new bound duty average is 64.8 percent!
3.    Specific tariffs, defined by monetary units per physical unit (U.S. dollars per 
ton or euros per kilogram), are numerous in rich countries’ agricultural sec-
tors. According to the MacMap-HS6 database, this trade barrier represents the 
totality of agricultural protection in Switzerland, and about three-quarters of 
it in the EU and Japan (see Bouët et al. 2008). If a proportional formula were 
applied, the existence of specific tariffs would not be a source of divergence. But 
it is all the more plausible that a progressive formula will be applied: larger cuts 
for higher initial tariffs, either by the Harbinson proposal or by a Swiss formula. 
It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate the ad valorem equivalent of a specific 
tariff. In the case of a tiered approach, this assessment is aimed at finding out 
which coefficient has to be applied. The transformation is also necessary in the 
case of a Swiss formula, as this approach only makes sense when applied to ad 
valorem duties.
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Table 4.3    The Harbinson proposal (percent)
  developed countries  developing countries
initial tariff  reduction rate  initial tariff  reduction rate
t > 90  60  t > 120  40
15 < t ≤ 90  50  60 < t ≤ 120  35
t ≤ 15  40  20 < t ≤ 60  30
   t ≤ 20  25
12This average duty is here especially high, because ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs, by far the 
most prominent instrument of protection in Switzerland, are calculated by dividing duties by world 
unit values, that is, relatively low unit values compared to national unit values of imports.        Calculating ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs may seem straightfor-
ward, as it is only necessary to divide the specific duty by a unit value. However, 
the question remains: which unit value is to be used? For one product defined 
at the HS6 level, unit values of trade flows may greatly diverge, depending on 
whether they are taken at the national or the world level. The European Com-
mission gives the example of fresh sausages, of which the unit value of European 
imports is €8/kg, while the world unit value is €2/kg (see Directorate General 
for Agricultural and Rural Development, European Commission 2005). The 
tariff applied by the EU is €1.5/kg; thus, the ad valorem equivalent is either 
19 percent (using the European unit value) or 75 percent (using the world unit 
value). Because developed countries mostly import products of high quality, 
using a world unit value to calculate ad valorem equivalent systematically in-
flates the rate of liberalization. The construction of the MacMap-HS6 database 
clearly highlights this major issue (see Bouët et al. 2006, 2008). This difference 
in calculation was the main source of contention for trade negotiators during 
the first part of 2005.
  From the above discussion, it clearly appears that a good assessment of the 
impact of the DDA must include consideration of not only the final agreement but 
the detailed way in which the agreement is implemented by each WTO member. 
Of course, it could be argued that in the case of full liberalization, this source of 
divergence disappears. Nevertheless, the need to define what full liberalization is and 
which distortions have to be eliminated remains. It may concern border measures 














Figure 4.4    Bound duties for Switzerland, 2001(import duties and export subsidies) or domestic distortions; in the latter case, the 
definition is less obvious. One can choose measures to be eliminated on an institu-
tional criterion, for example, those forbidden by the WTO. But it is also possible 
to include other programs that could have significant effects, contrary to what is ex-
pected from trade liberalization. For example the elimination of the European land 
set-aside program and the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program could contribute to 
a major expansion of land supply in these two countries and a substantial increase 
in their agricultural production.
  There are other issues that may explain why experiments are not the same 
among different assessments of the effects of full trade liberalization. These are 
discussed in the next two subsections.
The issue of the pre-experiment definition.    Almost all studies use the GTAP data-
base. The last available version (GTAP 6) is for 2001 and provides social accounting 
matrixes and trade flows for as many as 87 countries (or geographic zones) and 57 
activities. Previous assessments used the GTAP 5, valid for 1997.
  When studying trade liberalization, the reviewed studies usually suppose that 
it takes place in 2005 or 2006, implying an 8- or 9-year delay using the GTAP 5 
version and a 4- or 5-year delay using GTAP 6. Whatever the effective date of liber-
alization, trade barriers have been reduced since both 1997 and 2001: the Uruguay 
Round has been definitively implemented with the phasing out of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement, some countries have entered the WTO and consequently reduced 
their tariff barriers (for example, China), some preferences have been granted to 
developing countries (for example, EBA and AGOA), and new regional agreements 
have been negotiated (such as between the United States and Morocco, between 
Chile and Mexico) or modified (enlargement of the EU to include 25 countries).
  Applying a trade shock on a dataset that does not include all this information 
overstates the impact of full trade liberalization on trade flows, economic activ-
ity, and welfare. For this reason, most studies conduct a pre-experiment (for ex-
ample, Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe 2003; Anderson, Martin, and Van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005a; Bchir, Fontagné, and Jean 2005; Hertel and Keeney 2005). 
Several trade agreements, enforced during this transition, are simulated and applied 
to the initial database. Then the experiment involves simulating either full trade 
liberalization or the DDA on this modified database. Although concluding a full 
trade liberalization, implemented from 2005, would imply a world welfare gain of 
US$287 billion, Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005a) demon-
strate that the liberalization process that took place between 2001 and 2005 (the last 
implementation of the Uruguay Round, the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, 
the access of China to the WTO, the enlargement of the EU by 10 countries from 
Eastern and Central Europe, the implementation of EBA and AGOA, and so on) 
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estimated gain of US$287 billion.
  When modeling is done using recursive dynamics, a benchmark is determined: 
if the trade shock is applied over a period of 10 years, for example, the evolution of 
the world economy is simulated without any trade reform during this period, but 
with investments increasing the stock of capital and increases in labor supplies that 
are either exogenous (given a projected rate for that period) or endogenous (labor 
supply that is dependent on its real remuneration).13 By using different bench-
marks, however, the same trade reform will lead to different welfare gains. This 
sensitivity to the benchmark used is why comparing studies by rate of change (in 
percentages) is appropriate.
The issue of compensatory fiscal policies.    Alongside the elimination of trade distor-
tions, fiscal policies are frequently implemented in these assessments that could lead 
to divergent conclusions. Two reasons may be invoked for including fiscal reforms 
simultaneously with trade reforms in liberalization assessments:
1.    The fiscal issue is a major concern in developing countries, where corruption 
and tax evasion are prominent. As income and sales taxes do not yield sufficient 
public receipts, taxing imports has become a key source of revenue for the pub-
lic sector. Table I.1 in Appendix I indicates the importance of import taxes as a 
proportion of GDP in the 85 countries and/or zones of the GTAP 6 database. 
In developing countries, these taxes represent from 0.4 percent of the domestic 
GDP in Botswana up to 4.3 percent in Tunisia. When implementing full trade 
liberalization, it may be unrealistic to neglect any offsetting fiscal instruments 
(which can be more or less distorting). Even the implementation of the DDA 
could reduce fiscal receipts.
2.    For more than 60 years (the Stolper-Samuelson theorem was been published in 
1941), liberalizing trade was been considered to affect the income distribution 
inside a country. Thus, it can be argued that reducing trade barriers increases 
economic efficiency (it increases the size of the pie) but it also modifies the way 
in which income is distributed (the way the pie is split). As a matter of fact, 
it could be argued that the effects of free trade have to be corrected by fiscal 
policy. This issue is all the more important now, because the stated objective 
of the current round of negotiation is poverty alleviation. Poverty results from 
low factor remuneration and/or high consumer prices. If prices of commodi-
ties, the production of which requires an intensive utilization of unskilled labor, 
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13Land supply can also be modified as its real remuneration changes.are increased, the activity in this sector is enhanced and the demand for and 
remuneration of this factor is elevated; this last result contributes to poverty 
alleviation. On the other hand, augmented consumer prices have adverse effects 
on the poor people who buy these commodities. One way of tackling this issue 
is to use fiscal instruments.
The idea that trade liberalization should be accompanied by a fiscal policy is con-
sistent. But it represents yet another source of divergence among the assessments 
of expected benefits.
Data Are Not the Same
The utilization of different data leads logically to different assessments. Nearly all 
assessments use the GTAP database on consumption, production, and international 
trade. But divergences may stem from the use of different databases on market ac-
cess and domestic support, even though today modelers are increasingly using the 
same information.
Data on market access.    Data on market access have greatly evolved within a few 
years. It might be one of the major sources of reduced optimism about the expected 
benefits from trade liberalization. Three improvements are significant:
1.    The main databases take into account trade preferences and regional agree-
ments.
2.    Ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs and tariff rate quotas are calculated.
3.    Simulation of multilateral trade negotiation accounts for the interaction of 
bound and applied duties.
  MacMap-HS6 is a four-dimensional database on market access (importing 
country, products, exporting country, and instrument of protection). It includes 
all preferential schemes and regional agreements between different countries.14 
The base period for MacMap-HS6 is 2001, and the commodity coverage includes 
5,111 products (Harmonized System at the 6-digit level, or HS6). It includes ad 
valorem duties, specific duties, compound duties, TRQs, and antidumping duties, 
and calculates ad valorem equivalents of all these protective instruments. It measures 
market access to 163 countries by 208 partners.
  The objective of global trade negotiations is the reduction of bound duties. 
Thus, an accurate assessment of the impact of a multilateral trade reform must take 
into account the interplay among bound, most-favored-nation (MFN) applied, 
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14For a complete description of the MacMap-HS6 database, see Bouët et al. (2006, 2008).and preferential duties. To complement MacMap-HS6, the CEPII has recently 
constructed a dataset on bound duties for 2001. The data on market access from 
MacMap-HS6 have been included in the GTAP database.15
  The MacMap-HS6 database is now the main reference for measuring market 
access in general equilibrium analyses; it has resulted in a downward assessment of 
the level of protection throughout the world, because it includes all preferential 
schemes and regional agreements, instead of basing border protection uniquely on 
MFN tariffs. Obviously, this methodology implies that trade preferences are fully 
utilized, whereas such preferential schemes (and to a lesser extent, free trade agree-
ments) have been frequently criticized because of their lack of efficiency. These 
agreements always include rules of origin to avoid trade deflection. The stringency 
of these rules has been pointed out. Initial empirical assessments were very pes-
simistic about the rate of utilization of these schemes (Brenton 2003; Brenton and 
Manchin 2003; Brenton and Ikezuki 2004), but new methodologies and studies 
have recently demonstrated that these preferences are rather well utilized by export-
ers from developing countries, especially in agriculture (Wainio and Gibson 2003; 
Candau, Fontagné, and Jean 2004; Candau and Jean 2005).
  Assessing the impact of trade liberalization requires taking into account the 
interplay between MFN duties and preferential duties and, as far as the DDA is 
concerned, the interactions between these duties and bound tariffs. This consid-
eration results in a reduced estimation of the expected benefits of liberalization. 
Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2005) calculate that taking into account applied tariffs 
instead of MFN tariffs in agriculture decreases border protection by 30 percent 
(calculated as (24–17)/24; see Figure 4.5), whereas the binding overhang is greater 
than 13 percent. Preferences (difference between MFN-applied and applied tariffs) 
are large in developed countries, whereas they are very small in LDCs. In fact, the 
gap between bound and MFN duties is large in the latter and small in the former 
(it is even larger in LDCs than in middle-income countries).
Data on domestic support.    Data on domestic support can also greatly differ across 
studies. Domestic support is a distortion, the definition and economic impact of 
which varies much more than that of tariffs: it can act on production, on intermedi-
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15The GTAP data on protection are based on MacMap data at the HS6 level, but the way data are 
aggregated up to the GTAP disaggregation level is different from the MacMap methodology. GTAP 
uses a system of weights based on national imports, whereas the MacMap weighting system is based 
on imports from a reference group. As a result, GTAP understates the actual level of protection but 
includes consistent data with respect to tariff receipts. This difference is of course another source of 
divergence between assessments using the GTAP method of tariff aggregation (Anderson, Martin, 
and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005a,b; Hertel and Keeney 2005) and evaluations using the MacMap 
method (Bouët et al. 2005).ate inputs, on farmers’ income, on capital or land, and so forth; it can have a direct 
or indirect effect on production (coupled or decoupled); it can be bound or not.
  Bouët et al. (2005) distinguish among market price support, output subsidies, 
capital subsidies, variable input subsidies, land subsidies, and decoupled subsidies 
in OECD countries and China. Even if decoupled subsidies are modeled to have 
an indirect effect on production, taking into account this form of domestic support 
reduces the impact of liberalization on world prices. Some programs even have a 
negative impact on production (such as the land set-aside program in Europe, Con-
servation Reserve Program in the United States), so that their elimination would 
entail an increase in domestic production.
  Recent research has also pointed to a “binding overhang” phenomenon in 
domestic support programs as developed countries’ governments have consolidated 
these measures and effective subsidies are deemed inferior. Anderson, Martin, and 
Van der Mensbrugghe (2005a,b) demonstrated that very large reductions in bound 
support are needed before any reduction in actual support would take place.
Different decompositions by sector and trading zone.    CGEMs are sophisticated rep-
resentations of the world economy. Modeling consumption, production, and trade 
of several products in several trading zones requires solving a very large system of 











































Figure 4.5    Bound and applied agricultural tariff rates, by  
region, 2001
Source: Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2005).
Note: LDCs, least-developed countries.equations. Thus, it is necessary to identify a limited number of sectors and trading 
zones, because the number of equations increases exponentially when these param-
eters are increased: some equations have up to four dimensions.
  But reducing the number of sectors and trading zones is costly: if the size of the 
distortion differs among sectors or trading zones, it decreases the cost of protection, 
because this cost is proportional to the square of the tariff. Thus, two studies assess-
ing the impact of the same trade reform with the same model and the same data, 
but with different product and geographic decompositions will produce different 
welfare results. The choice of geographic and sector decompositions depends largely 
on the questions being analyzed.
Behavioral Parameters Are Not the Same
Welfare effects created by liberalization depend crucially on the elasticity of sub-
stitution between domestic and imported goods and on elasticities of substitution 
among imports from different sources. Let us consider first the case of unilateral 
liberalization. This case is modeled in a partial equilibrium analysis in Figure 4.6. 
In the left panel, domestic supply and demand are represented. Initially, the world 
price is p1, and the study country imposes an ad valorem import duty t1. The do-
mestic price is therefore p1(1 + t1), leading to a domestic supply O1 and a domestic 
demand D1. This gap (D1 – O1) creates imports, represented in the right panel, 
where the initial equilibrium is at A, the intersection of import demand for a t1 tariff 
M(t1) and export supply X.
  Cutting import tariff implies an upward shift in import demand M(t2). The 
new equilibrium is at B. The net effect is the difference between the gray areas (al-
locative efficiency gains) and the black area in the graph (terms-of-trade loss—in 
this case, it is a terms-of-trade loss because import prices are raised). In Figure 4.6, 
because of a highly elastic export supply, the world price increases little. This result 
is very beneficial for the importing country, because the negative impact of liberal-
ization for this country is small. Initial imports are paid by the country at a higher 
price: this loss is equal to the black area (p2 – p1)(D1 – O1).
  Consider the case of a decrease in trade elasticity. In Figure 4.6, if the slope 
of X is made more vertical, domestic liberalization implies a smaller increase in 
imports and a higher increase in world price. Gains in domestic welfare are smaller. 
So in the case of unilateral liberalization, the effects on welfare are twofold. First, 
they are caused by an increase in domestic imports, which reflects the replacement 
of domestic production by more competitive foreign supply, and domestic con-
sumption profits from lower consumption prices. Simultaneously, tariff revenue is 
modified by an increase in imports (positive effect) and a decrease of the taxation 
rate (negative). Second, they are a result of the change in the world price; when a 
commodity is imported, a cut in tariff increases the world price, leading to negative 
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smaller augmentation of world price, and thus, larger welfare effects.
  In the case of multilateral liberalization, terms-of-trade effects can be obtained 
on exports as access to foreign markets is modified. Exporters clearly receive a higher 
price for their exports from the liberalization of foreign economies. This result is of 
course a positive evolution of terms of trade. But liberalization can decrease export 
prices: for example, if initially preferences have been granted for a market in specific 
countries, erosion of these preferences implies lower export prices for these erstwhile 
preferred exporters, stemming from increased competition.
  Finally, at the world level, terms-of-trade effects eliminate one another, and 
welfare effects only come from the elimination of domestic distortions (in a frame-
work of perfect competition). Eliminating distortions has large welfare effects when 
import demands are highly elastic.
  In conclusion, trade elasticities are key parameters in global trade modeling. 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on their value; moreover, they vary with the 
level of product disaggregation. On average, the GTAP network provides relatively 
low trade elasticities, even if recent developments have provided higher estimations 
of these parameters (see Hertel et al. 2003). In contrast, Harrison, Rutherford, and 
Tarr (henceforth the HRT model; see, for example, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 
1997, 2001) use much higher trade elasticities than the GTAP (see, for example, 
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Figure 4.6    A partial equilibrium representation of unilateral 
liberalization









�2 �1Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 2001). LINKAGE elasticities are intermediate: on 
average they are 35 percent higher than the GTAP values but are 75 percent higher 
in agriculture. This point is a direct and important explanation of the divergences 
highlighted in Appendixes A and B. Cline’s (2004) study uses the HRT model and 
obtains, therefore, higher welfare effects from full trade liberalization. Anderson, 
Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005a,b) obtain intermediate results; using 
GTAP elasticities, they even demonstrate that the utilization of various trade elas-
ticities is the main explanation for differences in assessing welfare effects.
Theoretical Assumptions Are Not the Same
The final source of divergence concerns theoretical features of the model. It is nearly 
impossible to be exhaustive on this topic, because modelers have to make numerous 
theoretical choices. This section focuses on the main theoretical assumptions used 
in assessing the impact of trade liberalization.
Perfect versus imperfect competition.    CGEM can adopt either a perfect or imperfect 
competition framework, or a combination of these two features in different produc-
tive sectors. In the latter case, industry and services are very often characterized by 
imperfect competition, whereas in agriculture it is assumed to be perfect.
  Imperfect competition implies new sources of welfare gains from trade liber-
alization. Selling on a larger market, economies of scale are better utilized. Prices 
decrease. Furthermore, there is greater product variety in a larger market, meaning 
that consumers are better off. Nevertheless, imperfect competition is more difficult 
to model. First, when using the traditional CES function, the price elasticity of de-
mand is not constant, and specifications of markup are complex. Second, imperfect 
competition with horizontal product differentiation requires a lot of information, 
particularly on product substitutability, scale economies, and competition intensity. 
Because these parameters are linked by the zero-profit condition in each sector, only 
two of these parameters are required from an external source, the third one being 
calibrated. It nevertheless demands detailed information about the economic struc-
ture in a multicountry multiproduct model. The intensive demand for information 
explains why this feature is not systematically adopted in all CGEMs, even though 
it is clearly more realistic.
Modeling the factor market.    A key feature of CGEMs is the assumptions attached 
to the productive factor markets. In a model designed to describe short-term con-
sequences of trade liberalization, factors are often supposed to be immobile across 
sectors. When, conversely, the long-term consequences of openness are assessed, 
perfect mobility is often assumed. Between these two extremes, numerous assump-
tions are feasible: some primary factors (for example, land, natural resources) are 
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across studies, because one can suppose either complete sector immobility of land 
or mobility across agricultural activities.
  A key issue is labor mobility: it can be supposed that labor is either perfectly 
mobile (only one price of labor in the entire economy); perfectly immobile (as many 
wages as the number of sectors in the economy); or that there is an imperfect mobil-
ity of labor between agricultural and nonagricultural activities,16 but that mobility 
is perfect within each activity.
  Trade liberalization implies a change in the relative prices of goods in an econ-
omy. Thus, it must entail a reallocation of productive factors from those sectors 
whose relative prices are declining to sectors whose prices are increasing. In doing 
so, the economy is becoming specialized in activities where it has a comparative 
advantage—it increases its real income. This reallocation is all the more efficient 
if factors are mobile. So studies with different assumptions on productive factor 
markets yield different results on welfare and real income augmentations.
Static versus dynamic modeling.    A central feature that distinguishes the various 
CGEMs is whether they are static or dynamic. When accounting for dynamics, 
trade liberalization might affect income, saving and investment, and capital (or 
other primary factors, such as skilled labor or land) accumulation rate. The rate at 
which these factors grow can be exogenously determined, or this mechanism can be 
endogenously defined: the split of active population between skilled and unskilled 
can be determined, for example, by the ratio of real remunerations or can be fixed 
by simple extrapolation. Technical progress can be accounted for; factor produc-
tivity can increase exogenously or total factor productivity can depend on specific 
variables (trade openness) and the like. Finally, either the dynamics can be recursive 
(the model is solved for consecutive periods, the resultant value of each variable 
from one period is included as the initial value of the next period, and there are no 
expectations) or it can be fully dynamic with intertemporal specifications (economic 
agents anticipate incomes and prices of subsequent periods, and these expectations 
influence the way in which markets are equilibrated in the current period).
  In a dynamic CGEM, a baseline is simulated: the model is solved without any 
trade reform for the chosen number of periods, with accumulation of production 
factors. Then the trade reform is simulated: trade reform is assessed by comparison 
between the baseline and the simulation. Dynamic modeling can greatly affect the 
way trade liberalization is assessed. First, the dynamic mechanism increases the size 
of the world economy, such that one must compare the rates of changes in welfare 
modeling trade liberalization and development using cgems      73
16To represent this imperfect immobility, a CET is often assumed between these different types of ac-
tivities. Thus, labor is allocated among the different activities according to the ratio of remunerations.(and not monetary amounts) among several studies. Second, trade reform may have 
a direct effect on the accumulation of productive factors. Traditionally, investment 
is determined by savings. The savings rate can be fixed, in which case investment 
increases when real income increases. This result is a positive effect of trade reform 
on capital accumulation and welfare. The savings rate can otherwise be determined 
by the real remuneration of capital. In this case, trade reform has a magnified impact 
on economies in which this remuneration is augmented either by a specialization 
effect in capital-intensive sectors or by an increased profitability stemming from 
better exploitation of scale economies. Otherwise, trade liberalization can affect the 
real remuneration of land (and thus the land supply; for example, in LINKAGE and 
MIRAGE) and the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages (and thus the split of active 
population between skilled and unskilled labor).
  A key assumption explaining divergence among studies (displayed in Tables 
H.1 and H.2) certainly comes from the relation between total factor productivity 
and trade openness. Recalling the specification adopted in the World Bank’s Global 
Economic Prospects (World Bank 2002, 2004a) and in Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi 
(1999), let gi
e be the growth in the sector’s productivity stemming from the change 
in openness, Ei be the exports of sector i, and Xi output. The relation is assumed to 
take the form:






0 is calibrated using a specific rule17 and hi is the elasticity. This relation 
mechanically amplifies the expected benefits of trade liberalization.
  Several mechanisms are supposed to operate positively on factor productivity 
when an economy is progressively exposed to international competition. As firms 
export more, they are supposed to learn new technologies through comparison with 
foreign competitors and to improve their production process to match international 
standards. Moreover, firms can react to more competition by increasing their efforts 
in research and development (R&D), which affects positively the productivity of all 
factors.
  Are these assumptions pertinent, and is it reasonable to include them in global 
trade modeling? In fact, these mechanisms are realistic. Enhanced competition in-
creases X efficiency and might be a direct incentive to do more R&D. Comparison 
of different production processes is a good way to improve efficiency. So trade open-
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openness explains 40 percent of total factor productivity growth.ness should increase factor productivity. But the way in which this relation has been 
introduced in CGEMs may be subject to criticism for several reasons.
  First, equation (26) has no microeconomic foundations, as opposed to all 
other elements in a CGEM.18 Microeconomic models of international trade under 
oligopolistic competition can imply adverse effects; for example, Reitzes (1991) 
and Bouët (2001) demonstrate that protectionism can increase domestic R&D, 
depending on the instrument utilized (tariff versus quota).
  Second, it can be considered as an ad hoc element introduced in a CGEM that 
studies the impact of trade liberalization. Obviously, introducing a function that 
is not microeconomically founded in such an evaluation leads to increasing factor 
productivity with trade openness and automatically amplifies the efficiency effect 
of trade openness.
  Third, this relation is ad hoc; it does not allow any conclusion on which coun-
tries, sectors, or productive factors could be the first beneficiaries of trade liberaliza-
tion or of a potentially positive impact on productivity. After all, if greater openness 
increases factor productivity, it makes sense that this relation is not the same for 
all countries, all sectors, and all factors. For example, the extent to which openness 
increases a country’s productivity may depend on the domestic endowment in hu-
man capital.
  A CGEM studying the impact of trade liberalization delivers plenty of informa-
tion: the impacts of domestic reform on domestic efficiency, of modified import 
prices, of changes in market access on export prices, of changes in real remunerations 
of factor prices on their accumulation, of trade liberalization on economies of scale 
and differentiation of products, and so forth. These mechanisms (and their inter-
play) represent the most interesting relations in a CGEM. On these topics, equation 
(26) does not supply information, because it does not include any contrasting effect 
or differentiated impact of trade openness on factor productivity. Furthermore, it 
can be sufficiently strong to offset all negative mechanisms previously cited.
  Another way of modeling dynamic effects is the steady state version of the 
HRT model (see Cline 2004). The idea is to increase the stock of capital until the 
rate of return is back to its preliberalization level. This method can be justified by 
the following idea. In the long term, firms are supposed to benefit from the new 
opportunities created by a much larger market, so that they invest until the rate 
of return comes back to a normal level. This idea makes sense, but, obviously, 
augmented capital creates more activity and increases the real remuneration of all 
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the literature. For example, in the Carnegie model (see Polaski 2006), there is a specification that links 
imported technology transfer (via imports of capital goods and intermediate inputs from rich countries 
to poor ones) and total factor productivity.other factors. It automatically amplifies expected benefits from liberalization, and 
the microeconomic behavior of firms is not explicitly modeled.
  Adopting specific theoretical assumptions can lead to very specific results. The 
Carnegie model (Polaski 2006) supposes that in developing countries’ industrial 
sectors, real unskilled labor’s remuneration is fixed (because of unemployment), 
whereas agricultural wages are perfectly flexible and ensure full employment. A 
migration function describes the rural–urban reallocation of this productive factor, 
and its intensity depends on the difference between agricultural and urban wages.
  When a developing country participates in a liberalization agreement, industry 
can be negatively shocked by the increased openness. Less demand for domestic in-
dustrial products leads to less demand for labor in this sector. This reduction in turn 
implies migration and, in agriculture, an increase in the labor supply means, other 
things being equal, a reduction in the equilibrium wage. Thus in this developing 
country, trade liberalization leads to less employment in the industrial sector and 
reduced wages in agriculture. But if the industrial sector expands because of aug-
mented exports, employment is increased and a migration from rural areas to urban 
areas occurs, decreasing labor supply in agriculture and so pushing up agricultural 
wages. Trade liberalization results in more industrial employment and increased 
agricultural wages in this country.
  These scenarios result in highly contrasting fortunes for developing countries, 
depending on the impact of trade reform on demand for domestic industrial prod-
ucts. Furthermore, there is no equilibrating force, because the model is calibrated 
to perpetuate fixed real wages in industry. In contrast, in a flexible wage model,   
competitiveness in the industrial sector is progressively eroded as industrial wages 
are increased.
Evaluating the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Poverty
Evaluating the potential impact of trade liberalization on poverty has been done ac-
cording to various methodologies. The first method is the one referenced in World 
Bank (2002, 2004a) and in Cline (2004). It allows for worldwide assessments of the 
impact on poverty. It estimates (or uses) a parameter known as poverty elasticity: 
this parameter is supposed to express how poverty incidence is reduced when an 
index representative of what poor people gain is augmented.
  For example, the World Bank (2002, 2004a) assessments utilize results from a 
CGEM to calculate an index representative of poor people’s real incomes; it is the 
remuneration of unskilled labor deflated by a consumption price index composed 
of food products and clothing. At the world level, the same elasticity is applied to 
calculate the impact on poverty headcounts. World Bank (2002) concluded that 
full trade liberalization would imply an increase of x = 8.4 percent in the real wages 
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report concluded that the poverty headcount in this region would decrease by 16.8 
percent (that is, 2x) if full trade liberalization were to be applied.
  This framework can only approximate the relation between trade liberalization 
and poverty for two reasons. First, the incomes of poor people are affected not only 
by remuneration of unskilled labor, but also by remuneration of skilled labor, capi-
tal, land, natural resources, and transfers. Applying the same elasticity at the world 
level is questionable. The relation between trade reform and poverty depends on 
the distribution of income among the population, the source of income at different 
levels of income, the reaction of economic agents to trade shocks, and so forth. Each 
of these relations is country specific. This criticism has been taken into account by 
the World Bank, which is now using country-specific poverty elasticity to assess the 
impact of liberalization. It partly explains why the recent assessment by Anderson, 
Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005c) is less optimistic in terms of poverty 
alleviation (see Figure 4.2).
  The second reason is that because variation in the real wages of unskilled la-
bor is calculated for every trading region of the CGEM, these regions have to be 
defined carefully so that they are homogenous as far as this relation is concerned. 
Furthermore, applying the concept of poverty elasticity gives the impression that the 
relation between trade openness and poverty alleviation is mechanical. According to 
this scheme, once liberalization is implemented, an increase in the real remuneration 
of unskilled labor occurs, and poverty is reduced to an extent that depends only on 
the strength of the shock.
  Evidently, this scenario is not the case. Trade openness has contrasting dis-
tributive effects. Traditionally, it increases real remuneration of unskilled labor in 
developing countries, as their endowment of this factor is abundant. But other com-
ponents of poor people’s incomes can be negatively affected, particularly transfers 
stemming from shrinking tariff receipts. Furthermore, factors are not, especially in 
the short term, perfectly mobile across sectors. For example, unskilled labor can be 
imperfectly (or not at all) mobile between agricultural and nonagricultural activities. 
This variability in mobility gives rise to differences in remuneration of unskilled 
labor in a developing country. In this case, trade liberalization may have adverse 
effects on unskilled labor, depending on the sector where it is utilized. For example, 
Cororaton and Cockburn (2004) demonstrate that opening the Philippines to world 
competition can be beneficial to urban poor households and harmful for rural poor 
households.
  Finally, stating that x million people are lifted out of poverty could be under-
stood as both a quantitative and qualitative statement. Quantitatively, it means that 
x percent fewer persons have an income of less than US$2.00 per day. Qualitatively, 
the end of poverty might mean a profound change in the way of life. Even if the 
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the reader should keep in mind that this qualitative aspect might be neglected for 
people whose income just passes over this threshold.
  Cline (2004) utilizes a marginally improved methodology aimed at evaluating 
country-specific poverty elasticities. He supposes that:
1.    In all developing countries the income distribution is lognormal.
2.    Full trade liberalization implies economic growth that is neutral from the point 
of view of the income distribution: it changes the average income but has no 
effect on income dispersion.
3.    Poor people’s incomes are composed of 90 percent remuneration of unskilled 
labor and 10 percent transfers.
4.    The evolution of transfers is strictly parallel to the evolution of domestic wel-
fare.
5.    Poor people have the same consumption basket as the general population.
The first two hypotheses imply that the share of poor people in a population can be 
expressed as a function of the ratio of poor people’s income to the average income 
and of the dispersion parameter (which is constant). The last three assumptions 
provide an expression of this ratio.
  Note that economic growth changes income inequality,19 and poor people’s 
incomes are also affected by change in the remuneration of capital, land, natural 
resources, and skilled labor. Furthermore, there is no systematic reason to think that 
evolution of transfers is parallel to the evolution of national welfare, and consump-
tion baskets depend on income levels: thus, assumptions 4 and 5 are not justified. 
Finally, as for the World Bank (2002, 2004a), Cline’s (2004) method also posits a 
mechanical relation between trade openness and poverty.
  The steady state model used by Cline (2004) automatically amplifies the im-
pact of trade liberalization on poverty. As capital is raised, real remuneration of all 
other productive factors is augmented (in particular, unskilled labor’s wages). Given 
that unskilled labor’s wages represent 90 percent of poor people’s incomes, the effect 
on poverty in this case is greatly reinforced.
  There are other ways in which CGEMs can be utilized to study the relationship 
between trade liberalization and poverty. Traditionally, to obtain information on 
final consumption, CGEMs depict the behavior of a single household. Household 
disaggregation allows the study of how income distribution is affected by (trade) 
reform. The simplest way to do this is to model the behavior of several households 
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tion, whereas Hertel et al. (2000) emphasize the main sources of income (unskilled 
labor, skilled labor, and capital). Traditionally, the number of households is limited, 
from 10 (Levin 2000) to 24 (Devarajan and Van der Mensbrugghe 2000), and a 
distribution of income for each representative household is postulated. The mean 
and total incomes of a household group are explained by the model, and disper-
sion is assumed to be constant. The adopted distribution functions are usually the 
lognormal or the Paretian distributions, even if they are of little empirical value.
  Recent developments have prioritized two dimensions:
1.    Thousands of households may be introduced in a CGEM (Cogneau and Robil-
liard 2000; Cockburn 2001; Cororaton and Cockburn 2004). This practice 
allows all information from household surveys to be retained and avoids the 
necessity of a theoretical simplification (treating within-group income disper-
sion as constant). But CGEM microsimulation is often done at the expense of 
other simplifications, such as a reduced number of sectors.
2.    Hertel et al. (2000) utilize results coming from a multicountry CGEM on com-
modity and factor prices to feed a postsimulation framework that uses informa-
tion on prices and income and simulates the demand response to these changes. 
These simulation techniques are very useful, because they account for a multi-
sector, multifactor framework where agents’ reactions to reform are simulated 
and the general equilibrium effect is taken into account. Furthermore, a policy 
study can be designed to describe the conditions under which losers can be 
compensated (see, for example, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 2001).
  These studies show that trade liberalization might have a positive effect on na-
tional welfare while having contrasting effects on domestic agents. Trade liberaliza-
tion might alleviate poverty, but in several cases it increases it. Hertel et al. (2000), 
for example, show that if multilateral trade liberalization decreases poverty in several 
developing countries, it has the opposite effect in Brazil, Chile, and Thailand. Un-
fortunately, they cannot provide a worldwide estimation of the impact of full trade 
liberalization on poverty, unless results are extrapolated across developing countries. 
Thus, assessing the impact of trade liberalization on poverty is a very difficult task, 
which needs to account for the impact on commodity prices and factor incomes at 
a very detailed level.
  For the effect of trade liberalization on real income, four explanations of diver-
gences on how trade liberalization increases world real income have been presented. 
Pre-experiments are now systematically integrated into studies, and measurement 
of market access always accounts for preferential schemes and regional agreements. 
Two methodological choices—sources of major divergence—remain: the level of 
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openness and total factor productivity. There may be other sources of divergence 
(such as data on market access or the conducting of a pre-experiment), but these 
sources have a smaller impact. To test these explanations of diverging results, a 
sensitivity analysis is carried out using the CGEM framework of Chapter 3.
A Sensitivity Analysis
Here I test the plausibility of the four rationales presented in this study to explain 
why literature on the impact of trade liberalization produces divergent conclusions. 
These rationales have already been discussed in detail earlier in this chapter: (1) ex-
periments are not the same; (2) data are not the same; (3) behavioral parameters are 
not the same; and (4) theoretical features are not the same. To test these rationales, 
this section describes new simulations of full trade liberalization, each with one 
modification (see also Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005a).
  Figure 4.7 shows the main conclusion of this section. The central experi- 
ment, as described in the previous section, concluded that full trade liberalization 
would entail a 0.33 percent increase in world real income. The four modeling op-
tions shown in Figure 4.7 produced the following results. (1) Neglecting the pre-
experiment (that is, not accounting for the trade liberalization that occurred from 
2001 to 2005 before testing the impact of full trade liberalization) raises this rate of 
change by 36 percent (up to 0.45 percent). (2) Basing the simulations on a database 
with no preferential schemes, results in a 24 percent higher increase in world welfare 
(up to 0.41 percent). (3) Using the LINKAGE trade elasticities augments world real 
income by 33 percent (up to 0.44 percent). (4) Finally, including a positive relation 
between trade openness and total factor productivity raises the rate of change in 
the world welfare by 79 percent (up to 0.59 percent). Later in this chapter I check 
whether other theoretical features (such as exogenous or endogenous land supply, 
imperfect or perfect competition) or empirical choices (such as a different database 
for distortions, different product and sector disaggregations) also have an impact. 
Appendixes J–M contain detailed information about the results obtained from these 
alternative simulations.
Different Experiments: No Pre-Experiment
If a pre-experiment had not been implemented in the central experiment, the results 
would show a 0.45 percent augmentation in world real income implied by full trade 
liberalization (see Appendix J). Figure 4.8 highlights the welfare gains or losses by 
zones. The broad picture is unchanged; nevertheless, taking into account the end of 
the Uruguay Round raises allocation efficiency gains in numerous countries (such as 
Argentina, Canada, and India). The main difference comes from China’s accession 
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tion efficiency gains (1.6 percent instead of 0.8 percent). Furthermore, the end of 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement opens access to American, Canadian, and European 
markets. It entails a reduction in export prices for countries that were beneficiaries 
of preferential access in the textiles and wearing apparel sectors.
  As the reductions in tariff protection become larger, world agricultural prices 
increase. This trend accentuates contrasts in terms of trade, with larger gains for 
some (Argentina, Australia/New Zealand, and Brazil) and larger losses for others 
(India and Zambia).
Different Data: MFN versus Preferential Duties
The second sensitivity analysis measures the extent to which the complete inclu-
sion of preferential schemes modifies expected benefits. To study this aspect, tariffs   
are changed in the initial database so that nonreciprocal preferences granted by 
Canada, Developed Asia, the EU, Rest of OECD, and the United States to devel-
oping countries are removed. In other words, only regional agreements and MFN 
tariffs are kept.
  As expected, the positive impact on world welfare is bolstered: from 0.33 per-
cent with preferential duties to 0.41 percent without (see Appendix K). Developing 
countries are the main beneficiaries (Figure 4.9). This gain is large in the case of 
Tunisia (which has preferential access to the European market in industry) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (including SACU and Zambia).
  Why? As previously explained, eroded preferences mean deterioration in terms 
of trade. In the absence of preferences, these countries profit from terms-of-trade 
gains or reduced deterioration (see the cases of Bangladesh, Brazil, Mexico, Rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, SACU, and Zambia by comparing Table 3.5 and Table K.2 
in Appendix K).
  In the case of Tunisia, allocation efficiency gains and welfare increase are much 
larger. When the Euro–Mediterranean partnership is not taken into account, full 
liberalization entails a significant increase in textiles and wearing apparel exports to 
Europe. Reallocation of productive factors is needed to carry out this augmented 
industrial production, while domestic prices have to increase to keep the current 
account constant. Domestic agricultural liberalization completes this picture, and 
increases in domestic agrifood imports are much larger than in the case of the main 
experiment. Thus, there are greater gains in allocation efficiency for the same degree 
of tariff elimination.20
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20Allocation efficiency gains are proportional to the square of the tariff and the variation in imports.  The only developing countries that now lose from full trade liberalization are 
Argentina (because of overspecialization in agriculture) and Mexico (whose pre- 
ferential access to the United States is still eroded, because NAFTA is a reciprocal 
agreement).
Different Behavioral Parameters: Trade Elasticities
The utilization of LINKAGE trade elasticities instead of GTAP elasticities has a very 
positive impact on trade: for example, under full trade liberalization, international 
trade of agricultural products is augmented by 57 percent with LINKAGE com-
pared to 34 percent with GTAP trade elasticities. Consequently, the rate of increase 
in world welfare is 0.44 percent versus 0.33 percent in the central experiment (world 
welfare gains depend directly on trade increase).
  Is this beneficial for developing countries? Yes, because all developing zones 
benefit from a higher welfare gain except Tunisia, whose welfare increases by 0.3 
percent instead of 0.4 percent. The gain is impressive for Rest of Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, Rest of Middle East and North Africa, and Zambia (Figure 4.10).
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Figure 4.9    Welfare gains by region: Full trade liberalization 
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Allocation efficiency gains  Terms-of-trade gains Welfare Different Modeling Features: Trade and Global Factor Productivity
As discussed in the previous section, trade openness may have a positive impact 
on total factor productivity. This relation can be presented in a simplistic way in a 
CGEM. Equation (26) is used in this case, which links directly total factor produc-
tivity in a sector to the ratio between sector exports and sector output. The relation 
is implemented in MIRAGE for all sectors and countries. The constant elasticity, 
relating global factor productivity to the ratio between exports and output, is fixed 
at 0.055, which is comparable to LINKAGE’s elasticity but less than the one ad-
opted by Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi (1999). This relation is equally applied to 
all sectors, agriculture included: Martin and Mitra (2001) show that the relation is 
even higher in agriculture.
  With this relation between trade openness and total factor productivity, ex-
pected benefits of full trade liberalization are much amplified, even more than those 
resulting from the other three sensitivity analyses. The gain in world welfare is now 
0.59 percent (Figure 4.11), which represents an augmentation by nearly 80 percent 
compared to the central experiment.
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Figure 4.10    Welfare gains by region: Full trade liberalization 
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Allocation efficiency gains  Terms-of-trade gains Welfare   The issue remains of how liberalization benefits are distributed. Compared to 
the central experiment, the welfare change is smaller for Argentina, Australia/New 
Zealand, and Brazil (the loss is larger in the Argentinean case, whereas Brazil has a 
small loss instead of a small gain); Bangladesh, China, India, Mexico, and Rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa exhibit higher rates of growth.
  In this matter, agricultural countries can clearly be distinguished from indus-
trial countries. Agricultural specialization is costly because of the absence of econo-
mies of scale and horizontal differentiation in this sector: when trade is liberalized, 
an agricultural country (such as Argentina, Australia, or New Zealand) shows de-
creased activity in industrial sectors compared to the baseline, which means fewer 
economies of scale and less horizontal differentiation. The positive relation linking 
openness and factor productivity amplifies the opportunity cost. In these three 
agricultural countries, under full trade liberalization, the ratio exports on output 
calculated at the sector level increases more in agricultural sectors, thus amplifying 
country specialization in this activity stemming from increased factor productivity 
and higher competitiveness. The global disengagement of these economies from 
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Figure 4.11    Welfare gains by region: Full trade liberalization 
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Allocation efficiency gains  Terms-of-trade gains Welfare industry is more pronounced, and the opportunity cost in terms of economies 
of scale and variety of product is higher. The opposite process works in countries 
whose comparative advantage is in industry: it explains the higher welfare gains seen 
for Bangladesh, China, India, and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Different Modeling Features: Other Choices
As a multicountry, multisector trade model requires numerous theoretical choices, 
this sensitivity analysis might be extended much further. I limit this extension, 
however, to three theoretical variations (Table 4.4). The first implements perfect 
competition in industry and services instead of imperfect competition; the second 
eliminates the North/South distinction in the model (that is, the vertical differen-
tiation); the third assumes perfect mobility of unskilled labor between agricultural 
and industrial activities.
  Whereas the last two sensitivity analyses do not change the picture, the as-
sumption of perfect competition increases substantially the rate of change in world 
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Table 4.4    World welfare gains by zone: Full trade liberalization 
using different theoretical variations (percent)
  central  perfect  no vertical  perfect labor 
country/zone  model  competition  differentiation  mobility
World  0.33  0.44  0.31  0.33
Australia/New Zealand  0.9  1.4  0.8  0.7
Canada  –0.1  0.0  0.0  –0.1
Developed Asia  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5
EU 25  –0.1  0.1  –0.1  –0.1
Rest of OECD  1.0  0.8  1.1  1.1
United States  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1
Argentina  –0.1  1.0  –0.3  –0.2
Brazil  0.2  0.9  0.1  0.1
China  0.6  –0.2  0.8  0.7
Developing Asia  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.4
India  0.7  0.4  0.6  0.7
Mexico  –0.3  0.3  –0.4  –0.3
Rest of Latin America  0.0  0.6  –0.1  0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.9  0.7  0.9  1.0
Rest of the World  0.1  1.1  0.0  0.2
Southern African Customs Union  –0.2  0.5  –0.2  –0.3
Tunisia  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.4
Bangladesh  1.5  1.3  1.5  1.6
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.7
Zambia  0.3  –1.2  0.5  0.4
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.welfare (from 0.33 percent up to 0.44 percent). Furthermore, the distribution of the 
pie is modified. In fact, under imperfect competition in industry and services, world 
real income appears to move upward for 10 years, both in the baseline scenario and 
for full trade liberalization. Perfect competition in the baseline scenario, however, 
pulls down to a larger extent the world economy’s path, as it is more specialized in 
industry. Adopting full trade liberalization implies more productive factors in the 
agricultural activity at the worldwide level, because initially this activity is more 
protected than industry is. Therefore, the opportunity cost of perfect competition 
in all sectors is smaller.
  As far as the distribution of welfare gains among countries and/or zones is 
concerned, the picture is fairly unchanged in the last two simulations, but not for 
perfect competition. As expected, the change in the theoretical features of the model 
implies more welfare gains for zones with an initial comparative advantage in agri-
culture (such as Argentina, Australia/New Zealand, Brazil, Rest of Latin America, 
and SACU) and less welfare gains for countries specializing in industry (including 
Bangladesh, China, India, and Tunisia).
  For Canada, Mexico, and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, eroded preferences con-
tribute to a contraction of both agricultural and industrial activities, which were 
particularly negative in case of imperfect competition. Therefore, when competition 
is perfect, the erosion of preferences entails fewer negative consequences.
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Conclusions
R
ecent studies have noted lower expectations regarding the potential impact 
of trade liberalization on development (see Ackerman 2005; Piermartini 
and Teh 2005). These reduced forecasts are due to improved assessments 
of existing trade distortions. Regional agreements, preferential schemes, and recent 
policy changes in trade and agricultural policies make for a more globalized world 
than was previously thought. Furthermore, fewer benefits stemming from a po-
tential DDA are expected, as assessments take into account the interplay between 
bound and applied distortions (on tariffs and domestic support).
  Nevertheless, the expected effects from trade liberalization are positive, if very 
small. My assessment concludes that a gain of US$100 billion in world welfare would 
occur, mainly as a result of elimination of agricultural distortions. This welfare gain 
could be amplified by up to 80 percent if openness increases factor productivity. 
At the same time, liberalization should generally contribute to poverty alleviation, 
because remuneration of unskilled labor is expected to rise in numerous developing 
countries, especially in South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Developing Asia. 
Finally, liberalization may only marginally reduce inequality among countries.
  This assessment, however, underestimates the positive impact of trade liberali- 
zation on world welfare for two reasons:
•	 	 It	does	not	include	liberalization	in	services.
•	 	 It	does	not	include	trade	facilitation	and	elimination	of	some	nontariff	barriers	
(technical, sanitary, and phytosanitary norms).
  One of the major objectives of this study was to explain divergent results in 
the literature. The first explanation comes from different assessments of the current 
89level of trade distortions: it is now widely recognized that these assessments have 
to take into account preferential schemes and regional agreements. By doing so, 
assessments have begun to converge, but not fully.
  Today, the main source of divergence is the level of trade elasticities and the 
implementation of dynamic relations. There is no consensus yet on the magnitude 
of behavioral parameters. Moreover, the link between openness and factor produc-
tivity might be strong, but it is not fully understood or precisely estimated.
  To understand the impact of nontariff barriers or the nature of dynamic rela-
tion, shortcuts are possible: one can evaluate the impact of trade facilitation by as-
suming that border controls and administrative rules are equivalent to an x percent 
tariff. One can also suppose that trade openness increases global factor productivity. 
These options automatically amplify expected benefits from trade liberalization, but 
they do not improve understanding of the impact of globalization. Furthermore, 
there may appear benefits from liberalization in areas or activities where they do not 
now exist. For example, implementing a positive relation between trade openness 
and global factor productivity could generate very positive results in all developing 
countries; nevertheless, the strength of this relation is questionable in some LDCs. 
Capturing the technical progress incorporated in goods requires machinery, skill, 
and	competence.	In	addition,	trade	openness	may	have	much	greater	effects	on	
capital and skilled labor productivity than on unskilled labor; if so, the introduction 
of this relation could introduce a systematic bias in the assessment of the impact of 
trade liberalization on poverty.
	 It	could	be	argued	that	all	CGEMs	are	structurally	identical	(they	are	all	Wal-
rassian models), and that their proliferation is not necessary. From the method-
ological conclusions outlined here, however (convergence on market access data 




progress in the understanding of dynamic relations, trade in services, the impact of 
nontariff barriers, and so forth.
	 IFPRI	has	a	role	to	play	by	providing	consistent	analysis	of	international	trade	
and trade negotiations and agreements. As a nonlending institution, its role could 
appear	especially	credible	for	developing	countries.	Multicountry	CGEMs	are	only	
one analytical instrument, one particularly appropriate for assessing the impact of 
multilateral or regional agreements on trade flows and macroeconomic variables. 
A complete evaluation of the benefits of trade reform for developing countries re-
quires the addition of other instruments, such as single-country trade models that 
allow for microsimulations aimed at evaluating the precise impact of trade liber-




improve welfare and have a positive impact on development. The DDA will not 
entail an implementation of full trade liberalization. On the contrary, it will lead to a 
more-or-less ambitious package; recent assessments of trade liberalization scenarios 
by	CGEMs	have	been	successful	in	showing	that	the	“devil	could	be	in	the	details.”	
Several policy recommendations emerge clearly from these studies:
1.	 	 Tariff	cuts	have	to	be	large	and	“progressive”	(higher	rates	of	reduction	on	
higher tariffs). On the tariff issue, a sensitive products clause could have highly 
negative consequences on the extent of liberalization, even if it concerns a lim-
ited number of products. Furthermore, implementing a cap on tariffs, even at a 
relatively high level (200 percent), could be a measure fostering liberalization.
2.    Agriculture is the main area where distortions have to be reduced.
3.    Developing countries have to liberalize their own economies. The SDT that 
the	WTO	offers	gives	these	countries	flexibility,	but	it	may	have	negative	con-
sequences on them, because it reduces pressure for critical domestic reforms.
  From this modeling exercise and recent studies in the literature, it appears that 
expected	benefits	from	trade	liberalization	are	surprisingly	low.	In	fact,	the	conse-
quences of trade liberalization for world real income are modest, because rich coun-
tries compose a major part of this income, and they are already close to free trade. 
Trade liberalization may have a more substantial impact on developing countries. 
Of course, by comparison, the Asian miracle, Chile’s experience, and Chinese and 
Indian	liberalization	all	brought	high	growth	rates	per	year,	whereas	CGEM	results	
show an increase of less than 3 percent in total real income. This disparity could 
mean either that dynamic gains are not well captured by global trade modeling or 
that these gains come from the domestic reform accompanying trade liberalization. 
Furthermore, the consequences of liberalization in the services sector have to be 
better understood.
  These conclusions define five priorities in the research agenda:
1.    a better understanding and inclusion of nontariffs barriers, administrative con-
trols, and lack of infrastructure;
2.    a better understanding of trade and trade barriers in services;
3.    a better understanding of dynamic relations and the way in which trade liber-
alization affects factor productivity and capital accumulation;
conclusions      914.    knowledge of the nature and the exact content of domestic reforms that could 
amplify expected benefits from trade liberalization; and
5.    a detailed examination of the link between trade and poverty.
For the fifth priority, although the effects of liberalization on average national prod-
uct and factor prices are quite well established, there is still limited knowledge 
on price transmission and consumption decisions at the microeconomic level. Re-
searchers have made important progress on this fifth priority in recent years, which 
is particularly significant, because poverty alleviation remains the ultimate objective 
of this debate.
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Arable Land per Person, by Country
Table A.1    Arable land per person, 2003 (hectares per person)











United States  0.60
Belarus  0.56
Paraguay  0.52


















Burkina Faso  0.39
Cameroon  0.38












South Africa  0.32
France  0.31






Macedonia, Former  
    Yugoslavian Republic  0.28
Cambodia  0.27
Cuba  0.27
(continued)Country  Arable land  Country  Arable land
Equatorial Guinea  0.27
Kyrgyz Republic  0.26
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0.26
Belize  0.26
Syrian Arab Republic  0.25
Zimbabwe  0.25
Greece  0.24




























Laos People’s Democratic  






Saudi Arabia  0.15
Portugal  0.15
India  0.15














Republic of Congo  0.13
Pakistan  0.13
Suriname  0.13




Democratic Republic of Congo  0.12
Cyprus  0.12
Guinea  0.12








Antigua and Barbuda  0.10
El Salvador  0.10
Vanuatu  0.10
Indonesia  0.10
Cape Verde  0.10












Faeroe Islands  0.06
Barbados  0.06
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  0.06
Bangladesh  0.06
Trinidad and Tobago  0.06
Netherlands  0.06
Switzerland  0.06Country  Arable land  Country  Arable land
Jordan  0.06
Costa Rica  0.05




Sri Lanka  0.05
Netherlands Antilles  0.04
Arab Republic of Egypt  0.04
Papua New Guinea  0.04
Solomon Islands  0.04
Federal States of Micronesia  0.04
San Marino  0.04
American Samoa  0.04
Japan  0.03
Republic of Korea  0.03
Marshall Islands  0.03
Brunei  0.03
New Caledonia  0.03
The Bahamas  0.03
Malta  0.03
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St. Lucia  0.02
Qatar  0.02
Iceland  0.02




Virgin Islands (U.S.)  0.02







French Polynesia  0.01





Source: World Bank (2003).Appendix B
Correspondence Tables
Table B.1    Correspondence, sector
GTAP code  Label  Aggregation code
pdr  Paddy rice  Otag
wht  Wheat  Whet
gro  Cereal grains nec  Otag
v_f  Vegetables, fruits, and nuts  VgFr
osd  Oil seeds  Otag
c_b  Sugar cane and sugar beet  Otag
pfb  Plant-based fibers  Plfb
ocr  Crops nec  Otag
ctl  Cattle, sheep, goats, and horses  Meat
oap  Animal products nec  Meat
rmk  Raw milk  Otag
wol  Wool, silkworm cocoons  Oprm
frs  Forestry  Oprm
fsh  Fishing  Oprm
coa  Coal  Oprm
oil  Oil  Oprm
gas  Gas  Oprm
omn  Minerals nec  Oprm
cmt  Meat: cattle, sheep, goat, horse  Meat
omt  Meat products nec  OtFP
vol  Vegetable oils and fats  OtFP
mil  Dairy products  Milk
pcr  Processed rice  Rice
sgr  Sugar  Sugr
ofd  Food products nec  OtFP
b_t  Beverages and tobacco products  OtFP
tex  Textiles  Text
wap  Wearing apparel  Weap
(continued)
97GTAP code  Label  Aggregation code
lea  Leather products  Weap
lum  Wood products  Omnf
ppp  Paper products and publishing  Omnf
p_c  Petroleum and coal products  Mich
crp  Chemical, rubber, and plastic products  Mich
nmm  Mineral products nec  Mich
i_s  Ferrous metals  Mich
nfm  Metals nec  Mich
fmp  Metal products  Mich
mvh  Motor vehicles and parts  Veeq
otn  Transport equipment nec  Veeq
ele  Electronic equipment  Veeq
ome  Machinery and equipment nec  Veeq
omf  Manufactures nec  Omnf
ely  Electricity  Omnf
gdt  Gas manufacture and distribution  Omnf
wtr  Water  OtSr
cns  Construction  OtSr
trd  Trade  TrT
otp  Transport nec  TrT
wtp  Sea transport  TrT
atp  Air transport  TrT
cmn  Communication  OtSr
ofi  Financial services nec  OtSr
isr  Insurance  OtSr
obs  Business services nec  OtSr
ros  Recreation and other services  OtSr
osg  Public administration, defense, health, and education  OtSr
dwe  Dwellings  OtSr
aus  Australia  AUNZ
nzl  New Zealand  AUNZ
xoc  Rest of Oceania  RofW
chn  China  Chin
hkg  Hong Kong  DvdA
jpn  Japan  DvdA
kor  Korea  DvdA
twn  Taiwan  DvdA
xea  Rest of East Asia  DvgA
idn  Indonesia  DvgA
mys  Malaysia  DvgA
phl  Philippines  DvgA
sgp  Singapore  DvgA
tha  Thailand  DvgA
vnm  Vietnam  DvgA
xse  Rest of Southeast Asia  DvgA
bgd  Bangladesh  Bgld
ind  India  Indi
lka  Sri Lanka  DvgA
xsa  Rest of South Asia  DvgA
can  Canada  Cana
98      APPendix bGTAP code  Label  Aggregation code
usa  United States  USAm
mex  Mexico  Mexi
xna  Rest of Latin America  Rame
col  Colombia  Rame
per  Peru  Rame
ven  Venezuela  Rame
xap  Rest of Andean Pact  Rame
arg  Argentina  Arge
Note: GTAP, Global Trade Analysis Project; nec, not elsewhere classified.
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Table B.2    Correspondence, country/zone
GTAP code  Label  Aggregation code
bra  Brazil  Braz
chl  Chile  Rame
ury  Uruguay  Rame
xsm  Rest of Latin America  Rame
xca  Central America  Rame
xfa  Rest of FTAA  Rame
xcb  Rest of the Caribbean  Rame
aut  Austria  EU25
bel  Belgium  EU25
dnk  Denmark  EU25
fin  Finland  EU25
fra  France  EU25
deu  Germany  EU25
gbr  United Kingdom  EU25
grc  Greece  EU25
irl  Ireland  EU25
ita  Italy  EU25
lux  Luxembourg  EU25
nld  Netherlands  EU25
prt  Portugal  EU25
esp  Spain  EU25
swe  Sweden  EU25
che  Switzerland  Roec
xef  Rest of EFTA  Roec
xer  Rest of Europe  Roec
alb  Albania  RofW
bgr  Bulgaria  RofW
hrv  Croatia  RofW
cyp  Cyprus  EU25
cze  Czech Republic  EU25
(continued)GTAP code  Label  Aggregation code
hun  Hungary  EU25
mlt  Malta  EU25
pol  Poland  EU25
rom  Romania  RofW
svk  Slovakia  EU25
svn  Slovenia  EU25
est  Estonia  EU25
lva  Latvia  EU25
ltu  Lithuania  EU25
rus  Russian Federation  RofW
xsu  Rest of Former Soviet Union  RofW
tur  Turkey  Rmen
xme  Rest of Middle East  Rmen
mar  Morocco  Rmen
tun  Tunisia  Tuni
xnf  Rest of North Africa  Rmen
bwa  Botswana  RSSA
zaf  South Africa  SACU
xsc  Rest of Southern African Customs Union  SACU
mwi  Malawi  RSSA
moz  Mozambique  RSSA
tza  Tanzania  RSSA
zmb  Zambia  Zamb
zwe  Zimbabwe  RSSA
xsd  Rest of SADC  RSSA
mdg  Madagascar  RSSA
uga  Uganda  RSSA
xss  Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  RSSA
Notes: EFTA, European Free Trade Area; FTAA, Free Trade Area of the Americas; GTAP, Global Trade Analysis Project; 
SADC, Southern African Development Community.
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Initial Patterns of World Trade
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Table C.1    Initial pattern of protection, by trade partner, 2005  
(level of tariff, percent)
                          Rest of    Rest      Rest of 
  australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing      Latin  Rest of  of the      Sub-Saharan 
  new Zealand  canada  asia  eU 25  Oecd  States  argentina  Brazil  china  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  World  SacU  Bangladesh   africa  Zambia  average
Australia/New Zealand  1.2  3.5  5.2  5.3  2.8  3.1  2.2  3.0  6.0  3.5  7.5  6.6  4.7  5.1  3.7  4.1  15.1  3.6  0.3  4.8
Canada  6.7  n.a.  2.9  4.6  2.2  0.5  2.1  4.3  4.8  2.7  5.8  0.2  2.8  2.1  2.0  1.9  14.3  0.8  0.2  3.4
Developed Asia  9.2  5.2  4.0  5.3  2.6  4.6  13.5  11.1  4.4  4.3  10.6  4.4  6.6  3.2  4.0  5.0  3.9  4.0  1.9  4.9
EU 25  10.8  4.6  3.5  n.a.  0.4  3.5  6.4  6.9  4.0  3.0  5.4  1.4  5.1  0.6  1.3  3.0  0.0  1.3  1.1  3.2
Rest of OECD  23.2  6.3  1.4  4.6  0.7  5.7  17.5  13.9  2.2  2.6  5.2  5.1  6.2  1.9  3.5  3.9  0.4  2.0  1.7  4.3
United States  2.4  0.1  2.1  2.7  1.4  n.a.  3.4  2.9  4.4  2.3  4.4  0.0  2.3  1.5  1.6  0.8  11.4  1.0  0.9  2.3
Argentina  11.7  12.5  13.4  13.7  11.4  13.2  n.a.  4.7  15.4  11.2  13.9  9.7  8.1  8.3  10.9  13.0  16.0  5.6  10.6  12.5
Brazil  9.7  8.8  13.9  13.9  9.4  10.6  3.3  n.a.  15.2  11.0  11.6  13.4  9.8  6.0  7.3  11.8  13.5  2.4  7.5  11.8
China  7.4  5.5  8.7  8.3  7.0  5.8  7.9  8.6  n.a.  7.2  7.8  7.7  7.7  5.2  7.7  7.8  7.3  2.8  2.9  7.6
Developing Asia  7.0  3.5  7.4  5.7  2.8  7.8  11.1  14.7  6.4  5.4  9.2  3.9  8.3  4.4  6.9  8.6  2.7  6.8  6.5  6.5
India  34.0  37.2  31.8  30.5  32.8  28.5  48.1  34.2  33.8  35.7  n.a.  27.9  31.2  28.0  31.7  34.6  13.2  22.8  34.4  31.8
Mexico  17.9  1.6  13.1  17.0  11.9  1.1  18.9  24.4  21.3  12.2  20.8  n.a.  7.4  14.1  17.8  16.9  24.7  14.9  14.5  10.8
Rest of Latin America  9.8  13.4  8.6  10.5  11.3  8.0  9.2  10.1  11.2  8.7  9.8  15.1  9.6  12.9  8.6  9.3  12.2  10.9  6.9  9.6
Rest of MENA  14.0  6.0  9.4  7.5  5.7  9.6  14.8  13.7  13.6  9.7  14.4  8.3  14.7  7.2  9.8  12.8  19.5  8.5  9.1  9.2
Rest of the World  12.6  11.3  8.1  8.6  7.9  9.5  12.2  13.0  11.8  8.2  10.4  9.3  11.1  7.2  4.7  12.3  10.0  5.0  6.0  8.9
SACU  16.3  9.9  7.0  8.1  3.3  7.9  8.8  17.2  12.2  5.9  13.4  6.2  11.3  6.1  8.0  0.0  16.8  3.3  3.3  8.2
Bangladesh  10.7  10.1  19.0  14.9  7.4  15.8  17.3  19.2  20.5  19.8  17.2  27.2  25.4  17.0  15.4  12.1  n.a.  29.0  17.5  17.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan  
    Africa  11.6  14.2  13.0  16.3  12.2  15.6  16.5  20.4  21.9  20.6  20.9  13.8  14.9  17.4  12.6  19.5  18.7  18.7  12.6  16.9
Zambia  7.6  8.2  15.1  11.6  11.0  7.2  8.3  18.9  13.8  14.9  10.7  15.1  10.6  11.3  9.5  11.5  23.7  6.5  n.a.  11.8
Average  9.7  3.9  5.4  5.6  2.4  5.2  10.5  10.1  5.6  5.1  8.3  2.2  6.6  3.0  4.9  7.7  4.9  4.4  4.7  n.a.
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Notes: Importing countries are listed in rows, exporting countries in columns. Diagonal values indicate inter-zone protection. MENA,  
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Table C.1    Initial pattern of protection, by trade partner, 2005  
(level of tariff, percent)
                          Rest of    Rest      Rest of 
  australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing      Latin  Rest of  of the      Sub-Saharan 
  new Zealand  canada  asia  eU 25  Oecd  States  argentina  Brazil  china  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  World  SacU  Bangladesh   africa  Zambia  average
Australia/New Zealand  1.2  3.5  5.2  5.3  2.8  3.1  2.2  3.0  6.0  3.5  7.5  6.6  4.7  5.1  3.7  4.1  15.1  3.6  0.3  4.8
Canada  6.7  n.a.  2.9  4.6  2.2  0.5  2.1  4.3  4.8  2.7  5.8  0.2  2.8  2.1  2.0  1.9  14.3  0.8  0.2  3.4
Developed Asia  9.2  5.2  4.0  5.3  2.6  4.6  13.5  11.1  4.4  4.3  10.6  4.4  6.6  3.2  4.0  5.0  3.9  4.0  1.9  4.9
EU 25  10.8  4.6  3.5  n.a.  0.4  3.5  6.4  6.9  4.0  3.0  5.4  1.4  5.1  0.6  1.3  3.0  0.0  1.3  1.1  3.2
Rest of OECD  23.2  6.3  1.4  4.6  0.7  5.7  17.5  13.9  2.2  2.6  5.2  5.1  6.2  1.9  3.5  3.9  0.4  2.0  1.7  4.3
United States  2.4  0.1  2.1  2.7  1.4  n.a.  3.4  2.9  4.4  2.3  4.4  0.0  2.3  1.5  1.6  0.8  11.4  1.0  0.9  2.3
Argentina  11.7  12.5  13.4  13.7  11.4  13.2  n.a.  4.7  15.4  11.2  13.9  9.7  8.1  8.3  10.9  13.0  16.0  5.6  10.6  12.5
Brazil  9.7  8.8  13.9  13.9  9.4  10.6  3.3  n.a.  15.2  11.0  11.6  13.4  9.8  6.0  7.3  11.8  13.5  2.4  7.5  11.8
China  7.4  5.5  8.7  8.3  7.0  5.8  7.9  8.6  n.a.  7.2  7.8  7.7  7.7  5.2  7.7  7.8  7.3  2.8  2.9  7.6
Developing Asia  7.0  3.5  7.4  5.7  2.8  7.8  11.1  14.7  6.4  5.4  9.2  3.9  8.3  4.4  6.9  8.6  2.7  6.8  6.5  6.5
India  34.0  37.2  31.8  30.5  32.8  28.5  48.1  34.2  33.8  35.7  n.a.  27.9  31.2  28.0  31.7  34.6  13.2  22.8  34.4  31.8
Mexico  17.9  1.6  13.1  17.0  11.9  1.1  18.9  24.4  21.3  12.2  20.8  n.a.  7.4  14.1  17.8  16.9  24.7  14.9  14.5  10.8
Rest of Latin America  9.8  13.4  8.6  10.5  11.3  8.0  9.2  10.1  11.2  8.7  9.8  15.1  9.6  12.9  8.6  9.3  12.2  10.9  6.9  9.6
Rest of MENA  14.0  6.0  9.4  7.5  5.7  9.6  14.8  13.7  13.6  9.7  14.4  8.3  14.7  7.2  9.8  12.8  19.5  8.5  9.1  9.2
Rest of the World  12.6  11.3  8.1  8.6  7.9  9.5  12.2  13.0  11.8  8.2  10.4  9.3  11.1  7.2  4.7  12.3  10.0  5.0  6.0  8.9
SACU  16.3  9.9  7.0  8.1  3.3  7.9  8.8  17.2  12.2  5.9  13.4  6.2  11.3  6.1  8.0  0.0  16.8  3.3  3.3  8.2
Bangladesh  10.7  10.1  19.0  14.9  7.4  15.8  17.3  19.2  20.5  19.8  17.2  27.2  25.4  17.0  15.4  12.1  n.a.  29.0  17.5  17.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan  
    Africa  11.6  14.2  13.0  16.3  12.2  15.6  16.5  20.4  21.9  20.6  20.9  13.8  14.9  17.4  12.6  19.5  18.7  18.7  12.6  16.9
Zambia  7.6  8.2  15.1  11.6  11.0  7.2  8.3  18.9  13.8  14.9  10.7  15.1  10.6  11.3  9.5  11.5  23.7  6.5  n.a.  11.8
Average  9.7  3.9  5.4  5.6  2.4  5.2  10.5  10.1  5.6  5.1  8.3  2.2  6.6  3.0  4.9  7.7  4.9  4.4  4.7  n.a.
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Notes: Importing countries are listed in rows, exporting countries in columns. Diagonal values indicate inter-zone protection. MENA,  
Middle East and North Africa; SACU, Southern African Customs Union.104      appendix c
Table C.2    Initial pattern of protection, by product, 2005  
(level of tariff, percent)
  Meat:                        Metal,       
  cattle,                        mineral,   
  sheep,    plant-          Other  Other  Other      petroleum,  Vehicles  Other
  goat,  Milk  based  Rice  Sugar  Vegetables    agricultural  food  primary    Wearing  and chemical  and  manufacturing 
  horse  (processed)  fibers  (processed)  (processed)  and fruit  Wheat  products  products  products  textile  apparel  products  equipment  products  average
Australia/New Zealand  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.0  2.1  0.5  0.0  0.1  3.9  3.2  12.7  16.8  3.0  4.9  3.4  4.8
Canada  7.9  103.2  0.0  0.0  3.7  2.1  1.7  1.1  10.9  0.1  10.4  13.5  2.0  1.7  1.5  3.4
Developed Asia  21.5  46.1  0.2  614.7  139.5  18.4  79.8  38.3  15.8  1.6  6.0  8.7  2.5  3.1  1.5  4.9
EU 25  39.7  47.0  0.0  138.6  128.6  17.9  0.5  7.5  11.1  0.1  5.8  7.1  2.1  2.2  1.0  3.2
Rest of OECD  102.3  88.1  0.0  13.3  44.0  31.5  108.4  32.9  37.0  0.2  3.6  2.7  0.7  0.5  1.1  4.3
United States  1.7  18.8  1.6  4.9  34.9  2.7  2.4  2.8  3.7  0.0  9.0  10.9  2.1  1.3  0.6  2.3
Argentina  8.6  16.8  7.4  12.2  17.5  10.4  5.7  7.4  14.1  0.8  18.3  19.7  12.1  12.8  13.7  12.5
Brazil  6.0  19.7  8.8  14.5  17.5  8.8  4.6  6.7  13.3  0.8  18.1  18.2  10.7  13.4  12.5  11.8
China  9.9  11.4  1.1  1.0  19.8  11.9  1.0  11.1  15.5  1.2  11.3  13.2  7.9  7.3  5.4  7.6
Developing Asia  3.8  5.5  1.6  16.8  19.4  10.1  7.7  20.5  12.1  1.4  10.3  7.5  5.8  6.4  5.6  6.5
India  24.2  51.4  5.6  72.8  59.5  41.4  100.0  46.1  63.1  19.5  29.4  32.7  32.4  25.3  27.4  31.8
Mexico  14.3  32.6  5.2  17.4  20.8  22.8  28.2  29.5  29.9  10.3  14.5  24.0  9.3  7.7  10.6  10.8
Rest of Latin America  10.3  19.2  5.1  31.2  29.4  14.1  5.9  8.4  16.5  13.2  11.7  14.5  8.1  8.4  10.0  9.6
Rest of Middle East and  
    North Africa  26.4  40.8  3.7  19.3  30.7  26.7  17.1  18.2  21.7  4.8  14.3  25.6  7.4  6.8  8.6  9.2
Rest of the World  14.5  27.4  1.1  9.6  36.5  20.3  22.8  7.5  23.4  2.5  11.0  16.3  7.9  7.4  10.1  8.9
Southern African Customs Union  12.5  38.3  13.5  0.0  97.3  7.3  36.3  9.6  14.3  0.3  21.5  31.3  5.4  6.2  8.0  8.2
Bangladesh  17.7  34.8  0.2  5.0  25.2  16.8  5.0  15.9  26.5  22.0  29.7  28.7  16.8  11.8  21.8  17.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  16.9  19.7  6.1  32.1  23.1  32.3  10.6  20.5  33.4  7.1  29.4  36.0  15.4  12.1  19.9  16.9
Zambia  9.3  13.8  5.5  4.9  23.7  16.7  5.0  8.0  19.0  7.3  16.5  24.4  8.6  11.0  16.2  11.8
Average  21.4  33.1  2.3  71.9  52.2  14.2  16.1  14.5  13.9  1.3  9.5  10.3  4.4  3.8  2.9 
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
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Table C.2    Initial pattern of protection, by product, 2005  
(level of tariff, percent)
  Meat:                        Metal,       
  cattle,                        mineral,   
  sheep,    plant-          Other  Other  Other      petroleum,  Vehicles  Other
  goat,  Milk  based  Rice  Sugar  Vegetables    agricultural  food  primary    Wearing  and chemical  and  manufacturing 
  horse  (processed)  fibers  (processed)  (processed)  and fruit  Wheat  products  products  products  textile  apparel  products  equipment  products  average
Australia/New Zealand  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.0  2.1  0.5  0.0  0.1  3.9  3.2  12.7  16.8  3.0  4.9  3.4  4.8
Canada  7.9  103.2  0.0  0.0  3.7  2.1  1.7  1.1  10.9  0.1  10.4  13.5  2.0  1.7  1.5  3.4
Developed Asia  21.5  46.1  0.2  614.7  139.5  18.4  79.8  38.3  15.8  1.6  6.0  8.7  2.5  3.1  1.5  4.9
EU 25  39.7  47.0  0.0  138.6  128.6  17.9  0.5  7.5  11.1  0.1  5.8  7.1  2.1  2.2  1.0  3.2
Rest of OECD  102.3  88.1  0.0  13.3  44.0  31.5  108.4  32.9  37.0  0.2  3.6  2.7  0.7  0.5  1.1  4.3
United States  1.7  18.8  1.6  4.9  34.9  2.7  2.4  2.8  3.7  0.0  9.0  10.9  2.1  1.3  0.6  2.3
Argentina  8.6  16.8  7.4  12.2  17.5  10.4  5.7  7.4  14.1  0.8  18.3  19.7  12.1  12.8  13.7  12.5
Brazil  6.0  19.7  8.8  14.5  17.5  8.8  4.6  6.7  13.3  0.8  18.1  18.2  10.7  13.4  12.5  11.8
China  9.9  11.4  1.1  1.0  19.8  11.9  1.0  11.1  15.5  1.2  11.3  13.2  7.9  7.3  5.4  7.6
Developing Asia  3.8  5.5  1.6  16.8  19.4  10.1  7.7  20.5  12.1  1.4  10.3  7.5  5.8  6.4  5.6  6.5
India  24.2  51.4  5.6  72.8  59.5  41.4  100.0  46.1  63.1  19.5  29.4  32.7  32.4  25.3  27.4  31.8
Mexico  14.3  32.6  5.2  17.4  20.8  22.8  28.2  29.5  29.9  10.3  14.5  24.0  9.3  7.7  10.6  10.8
Rest of Latin America  10.3  19.2  5.1  31.2  29.4  14.1  5.9  8.4  16.5  13.2  11.7  14.5  8.1  8.4  10.0  9.6
Rest of Middle East and  
    North Africa  26.4  40.8  3.7  19.3  30.7  26.7  17.1  18.2  21.7  4.8  14.3  25.6  7.4  6.8  8.6  9.2
Rest of the World  14.5  27.4  1.1  9.6  36.5  20.3  22.8  7.5  23.4  2.5  11.0  16.3  7.9  7.4  10.1  8.9
Southern African Customs Union  12.5  38.3  13.5  0.0  97.3  7.3  36.3  9.6  14.3  0.3  21.5  31.3  5.4  6.2  8.0  8.2
Bangladesh  17.7  34.8  0.2  5.0  25.2  16.8  5.0  15.9  26.5  22.0  29.7  28.7  16.8  11.8  21.8  17.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  16.9  19.7  6.1  32.1  23.1  32.3  10.6  20.5  33.4  7.1  29.4  36.0  15.4  12.1  19.9  16.9
Zambia  9.3  13.8  5.5  4.9  23.7  16.7  5.0  8.0  19.0  7.3  16.5  24.4  8.6  11.0  16.2  11.8
Average  21.4  33.1  2.3  71.9  52.2  14.2  16.1  14.5  13.9  1.3  9.5  10.3  4.4  3.8  2.9 
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table C.3    Initial pattern of trade, by importing country, 2005 (percent)
                          Rest of          Rest of    Rest  
  australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing      Latin  Rest of        Sub-Saharan    of the
  new Zealand  canada  asia  eU 25  Oecd  States  argentina  Brazil  china  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  SacU  tunisia  Bangladesh    africa  Zambia  World  total
Australia/New Zealand  5.8  2.0  28.2  19.2  0.9  12.2  0.2  0.5  6.6  10.4  1.7  0.9  1.2  6.0  0.9  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.0  2.3  100.0
Canada  0.5  0.0  4.9  10.5  0.7  74.6  0.1  0.4  1.8  1.3  0.3  1.1  1.7  1.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.5  100.0
Developed Asia  1.8  2.0  14.6  19.0  0.9  25.3  0.2  0.8  13.4  12.0  0.7  1.2  2.4  3.5  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.8  0.0  0.9  100.0
EU 25  0.9  1.4  5.3  59.7  4.0  11.2  0.3  0.9  1.8  2.6  0.6  0.8  1.3  4.4  0.5  0.3  0.0  1.0  0.0  2.9  100.0
Rest of OECD  0.8  2.0  6.4  60.2  1.2  12.8  0.2  0.8  1.5  3.2  0.5  0.8  1.6  5.0  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.0  1.8  100.0
United States  1.8  16.2  15.2  30.3  1.6  0.0  0.6  1.9  3.3  6.1  0.7  10.2  4.6  4.7  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.8  0.0  1.4  100.0
Argentina  0.5  1.1  4.4  21.8  0.7  10.7  0.0  19.9  4.4  3.8  1.8  1.6  17.8  7.4  1.1  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.0  1.0  100.0
Brazil  0.5  1.5  7.6  28.7  1.3  23.3  7.4  0.0  3.6  2.7  0.6  3.0  10.0  5.1  0.7  0.1  0.2  1.1  0.0  2.5  100.0
China  1.7  2.2  30.4  20.0  0.7  28.5  0.3  0.4  0.0  6.6  0.7  0.8  1.7  2.9  0.3  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.0  1.3  100.0
Developing Asia  2.1  1.3  21.1  20.5  0.7  19.7  0.2  0.5  6.4  18.2  1.9  0.9  0.9  3.1  0.3  0.0  0.4  0.9  0.0  0.8  100.0
India  1.1  1.7  9.3  29.6  1.3  19.9  0.3  1.4  3.5  9.9  0.0  0.7  1.4  10.8  0.7  0.1  2.0  3.7  0.0  2.6  100.0
Mexico  0.3  3.3  2.2  6.9  0.4  78.6  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.0  4.1  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  100.0
Rest of Latin America  0.5  2.8  7.2  22.7  1.9  33.1  1.1  2.8  2.1  1.9  2.8  2.7  14.6  1.6  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  1.5  100.0
Rest of MENA  0.8  0.9  20.2  31.8  0.9  17.5  0.2  1.0  3.1  7.6  2.2  0.4  0.7  8.9  0.5  0.2  0.2  1.0  0.0  1.9  100.0
Rest of the World  0.6  0.5  5.3  44.0  3.6  7.1  0.1  0.5  5.6  2.1  0.7  0.3  1.5  7.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.0  20.2  100.0
SACU  1.3  0.9  10.6  36.5  1.6  12.5  0.2  1.0  2.7  2.7  3.3  0.7  0.8  4.5  9.9  0.0  0.0  8.1  1.3  1.3  100.0
Tunisia  0.5  0.8  3.1  71.5  1.0  6.4  0.3  0.5  0.9  1.5  1.2  0.4  0.9  8.6  0.2  0.0  0.2  1.1  0.0  1.1  100.0
Bangladesh  0.5  1.8  4.0  44.3  1.2  37.4  0.1  0.4  0.2  3.2  0.8  0.4  0.6  4.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.4  100.0
Rest of Sub-Saharan  
    Africa  0.3  0.7  6.1  40.7  1.4  25.5  0.2  2.5  4.2  2.9  1.4  0.4  1.1  2.3  3.5  0.1  0.1  5.1  0.2  1.2  100.0
Zambia  0.1  0.1  8.6  45.9  3.9  1.6  0.0  0.1  3.2  6.6  1.1  0.1  0.2  9.6  12.3  0.0  0.1  5.6  0.0  0.8  100.0
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Notes: Importing countries are listed in columns, exporting countries in rows. MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organi- 
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SACU, Southern African Customs Union.
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Table C.3    Initial pattern of trade, by importing country, 2005 (percent)
                          Rest of          Rest of    Rest  
  australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing      Latin  Rest of        Sub-Saharan    of the
  new Zealand  canada  asia  eU 25  Oecd  States  argentina  Brazil  china  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  SacU  tunisia  Bangladesh    africa  Zambia  World  total
Australia/New Zealand  5.8  2.0  28.2  19.2  0.9  12.2  0.2  0.5  6.6  10.4  1.7  0.9  1.2  6.0  0.9  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.0  2.3  100.0
Canada  0.5  0.0  4.9  10.5  0.7  74.6  0.1  0.4  1.8  1.3  0.3  1.1  1.7  1.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.5  100.0
Developed Asia  1.8  2.0  14.6  19.0  0.9  25.3  0.2  0.8  13.4  12.0  0.7  1.2  2.4  3.5  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.8  0.0  0.9  100.0
EU 25  0.9  1.4  5.3  59.7  4.0  11.2  0.3  0.9  1.8  2.6  0.6  0.8  1.3  4.4  0.5  0.3  0.0  1.0  0.0  2.9  100.0
Rest of OECD  0.8  2.0  6.4  60.2  1.2  12.8  0.2  0.8  1.5  3.2  0.5  0.8  1.6  5.0  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.0  1.8  100.0
United States  1.8  16.2  15.2  30.3  1.6  0.0  0.6  1.9  3.3  6.1  0.7  10.2  4.6  4.7  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.8  0.0  1.4  100.0
Argentina  0.5  1.1  4.4  21.8  0.7  10.7  0.0  19.9  4.4  3.8  1.8  1.6  17.8  7.4  1.1  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.0  1.0  100.0
Brazil  0.5  1.5  7.6  28.7  1.3  23.3  7.4  0.0  3.6  2.7  0.6  3.0  10.0  5.1  0.7  0.1  0.2  1.1  0.0  2.5  100.0
China  1.7  2.2  30.4  20.0  0.7  28.5  0.3  0.4  0.0  6.6  0.7  0.8  1.7  2.9  0.3  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.0  1.3  100.0
Developing Asia  2.1  1.3  21.1  20.5  0.7  19.7  0.2  0.5  6.4  18.2  1.9  0.9  0.9  3.1  0.3  0.0  0.4  0.9  0.0  0.8  100.0
India  1.1  1.7  9.3  29.6  1.3  19.9  0.3  1.4  3.5  9.9  0.0  0.7  1.4  10.8  0.7  0.1  2.0  3.7  0.0  2.6  100.0
Mexico  0.3  3.3  2.2  6.9  0.4  78.6  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.0  4.1  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  100.0
Rest of Latin America  0.5  2.8  7.2  22.7  1.9  33.1  1.1  2.8  2.1  1.9  2.8  2.7  14.6  1.6  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  1.5  100.0
Rest of MENA  0.8  0.9  20.2  31.8  0.9  17.5  0.2  1.0  3.1  7.6  2.2  0.4  0.7  8.9  0.5  0.2  0.2  1.0  0.0  1.9  100.0
Rest of the World  0.6  0.5  5.3  44.0  3.6  7.1  0.1  0.5  5.6  2.1  0.7  0.3  1.5  7.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.0  20.2  100.0
SACU  1.3  0.9  10.6  36.5  1.6  12.5  0.2  1.0  2.7  2.7  3.3  0.7  0.8  4.5  9.9  0.0  0.0  8.1  1.3  1.3  100.0
Tunisia  0.5  0.8  3.1  71.5  1.0  6.4  0.3  0.5  0.9  1.5  1.2  0.4  0.9  8.6  0.2  0.0  0.2  1.1  0.0  1.1  100.0
Bangladesh  0.5  1.8  4.0  44.3  1.2  37.4  0.1  0.4  0.2  3.2  0.8  0.4  0.6  4.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.4  100.0
Rest of Sub-Saharan  
    Africa  0.3  0.7  6.1  40.7  1.4  25.5  0.2  2.5  4.2  2.9  1.4  0.4  1.1  2.3  3.5  0.1  0.1  5.1  0.2  1.2  100.0
Zambia  0.1  0.1  8.6  45.9  3.9  1.6  0.0  0.1  3.2  6.6  1.1  0.1  0.2  9.6  12.3  0.0  0.1  5.6  0.0  0.8  100.0
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Notes: Importing countries are listed in columns, exporting countries in rows. MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organi- 
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SACU, Southern African Customs Union.Table C.4    Initial structure of exports, 2005 (percent)
                          Rest of          Rest of    Rest  
  australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing      Latin  Rest of        Sub-Saharan    of the
  new Zealand  canada  asia  eU 25  Oecd  States  argentina  Brazil  china  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  SacU  tunisia  Bangladesh    africa  Zambia  World
Meat: cattle, sheep,  
    goat, horse  7.7  1.4  0.1  0.6  0.2  0.9  1.3  1.8  0.4  0.2  0.7  0.3  0.8  0.3  0.9  0.5  0.1  0.7  0.3  0.6
Milk (processed)  5.4  0.2  0.0  0.8  0.3  0.1  1.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3
Plant-based fibers  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  1.2  1.8  1.0  0.6
Rice (processed)  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.5  1.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
Sugar (processed)  0.8  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.0  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.1  1.2  0.1  1.2  0.1  0.0  0.7  3.0  0.1
Vegetables and fruits  1.7  0.5  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.6  2.5  0.6  0.5  0.5  1.2  1.7  4.0  1.3  2.6  1.4  0.3  2.4  0.9  0.3
Wheat  1.8  1.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.4  5.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5
Other agricultural products  1.3  0.9  0.2  0.6  0.2  2.0  19.5  13.9  0.7  1.5  2.9  0.4  3.6  0.6  1.0  0.4  0.6  8.6  4.2  1.1
Other food products  5.4  3.2  0.7  4.1  3.2  2.7  18.0  9.2  1.9  4.6  4.2  2.3  8.2  1.7  4.3  4.5  4.9  5.3  0.7  3.1
Other primary products  19.1  7.3  0.1  1.0  14.4  0.7  8.2  6.2  1.2  4.5  2.2  6.9  16.2  40.0  10.6  5.4  0.2  43.6  0.5  27.4
Textiles  0.5  0.7  4.8  1.7  0.7  1.3  0.8  1.1  11.9  4.1  13.2  2.2  2.6  2.6  1.3  2.8  24.5  1.5  2.2  1.4
Wearing apparel  0.8  0.5  1.6  1.8  0.6  0.7  2.4  3.0  29.3  4.4  11.9  3.0  4.8  2.8  1.2  14.3  45.4  2.2  0.3  3.1
Metal, mineral, petroleum,  
    and chemical products  20.3  17.0  16.7  23.0  26.4  17.2  16.2  18.6  11.3  11.6  20.0  9.8  23.7  19.5  36.7  16.1  7.3  8.4  70.2  34.6
Vehicles and equipment  10.2  40.2  56.3  38.3  25.5  43.8  10.1  23.4  24.9  48.2  8.4  62.2  9.3  8.8  14.7  20.6  1.8  3.4  2.3  9.6
Other manufacturing  
    products  4.6  15.0  3.0  7.5  8.0  5.0  3.3  7.8  12.8  6.1  13.3  4.2  6.1  5.2  15.5  2.9  0.7  6.7  11.6  6.0
Other services  9.1  7.4  6.3  12.5  12.4  17.5  5.9  8.9  1.7  8.0  12.3  3.4  9.0  8.5  3.1  12.3  11.0  7.7  1.2  5.5
Transport and trade  9.8  4.6  10.4  7.4  8.1  6.9  5.0  3.3  3.1  5.7  7.6  3.5  10.1  8.3  6.5  18.2  2.2  7.1  1.8  5.7
  Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Notes: MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SACU,  
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Table C.4    Initial structure of exports, 2005 (percent)
                          Rest of          Rest of    Rest  
  australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing      Latin  Rest of        Sub-Saharan    of the
  new Zealand  canada  asia  eU 25  Oecd  States  argentina  Brazil  china  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  SacU  tunisia  Bangladesh    africa  Zambia  World
Meat: cattle, sheep,  
    goat, horse  7.7  1.4  0.1  0.6  0.2  0.9  1.3  1.8  0.4  0.2  0.7  0.3  0.8  0.3  0.9  0.5  0.1  0.7  0.3  0.6
Milk (processed)  5.4  0.2  0.0  0.8  0.3  0.1  1.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3
Plant-based fibers  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  1.2  1.8  1.0  0.6
Rice (processed)  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.5  1.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
Sugar (processed)  0.8  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.0  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.1  1.2  0.1  1.2  0.1  0.0  0.7  3.0  0.1
Vegetables and fruits  1.7  0.5  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.6  2.5  0.6  0.5  0.5  1.2  1.7  4.0  1.3  2.6  1.4  0.3  2.4  0.9  0.3
Wheat  1.8  1.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.4  5.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5
Other agricultural products  1.3  0.9  0.2  0.6  0.2  2.0  19.5  13.9  0.7  1.5  2.9  0.4  3.6  0.6  1.0  0.4  0.6  8.6  4.2  1.1
Other food products  5.4  3.2  0.7  4.1  3.2  2.7  18.0  9.2  1.9  4.6  4.2  2.3  8.2  1.7  4.3  4.5  4.9  5.3  0.7  3.1
Other primary products  19.1  7.3  0.1  1.0  14.4  0.7  8.2  6.2  1.2  4.5  2.2  6.9  16.2  40.0  10.6  5.4  0.2  43.6  0.5  27.4
Textiles  0.5  0.7  4.8  1.7  0.7  1.3  0.8  1.1  11.9  4.1  13.2  2.2  2.6  2.6  1.3  2.8  24.5  1.5  2.2  1.4
Wearing apparel  0.8  0.5  1.6  1.8  0.6  0.7  2.4  3.0  29.3  4.4  11.9  3.0  4.8  2.8  1.2  14.3  45.4  2.2  0.3  3.1
Metal, mineral, petroleum,  
    and chemical products  20.3  17.0  16.7  23.0  26.4  17.2  16.2  18.6  11.3  11.6  20.0  9.8  23.7  19.5  36.7  16.1  7.3  8.4  70.2  34.6
Vehicles and equipment  10.2  40.2  56.3  38.3  25.5  43.8  10.1  23.4  24.9  48.2  8.4  62.2  9.3  8.8  14.7  20.6  1.8  3.4  2.3  9.6
Other manufacturing  
    products  4.6  15.0  3.0  7.5  8.0  5.0  3.3  7.8  12.8  6.1  13.3  4.2  6.1  5.2  15.5  2.9  0.7  6.7  11.6  6.0
Other services  9.1  7.4  6.3  12.5  12.4  17.5  5.9  8.9  1.7  8.0  12.3  3.4  9.0  8.5  3.1  12.3  11.0  7.7  1.2  5.5
Transport and trade  9.8  4.6  10.4  7.4  8.1  6.9  5.0  3.3  3.1  5.7  7.6  3.5  10.1  8.3  6.5  18.2  2.2  7.1  1.8  5.7
  Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Author’s calculations using MacMap-HS6.
Notes: MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SACU,  
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Table D.1  Impact of full trade liberalization on world prices,  
by sector (percent)
                            Rest of    Rest        Rest of   
    australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing       Latin  Rest of  of the        Sub-Saharan 
  World  new Zealand  Canada  asia  eU 25  OeCd  States  argentina  Brazil  China  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  World  SaCU  Tunisia  Bangladesh   africa  Zambia
Meat: cattle, sheep,  
    goat, horse  5.9  13.0  6.4  –4.6  4.3  –13.4  3.3  –0.4  16.1  7.2  5.0  0.4  2.3  4.0  –6.1  3.3  4.4  3.5  0.8  –1.0  4.3
Milk (processed)  4.6  11.6  –2.5  –5.5  4.6  0.5  5.2  3.2  4.2  0.1  0.2  –3.0  –11.7  2.1  –3.3  –0.2  0.2  1.1  –9.8  –6.9  3.5
Plant-based fibers  6.9  9.0  4.2  6.7  24.1  6.7  8.3  5.8  6.6  3.8  6.9  4.5  4.4  5.4  4.5  4.1  1.3  5.1  –5.7  –0.2  4.1
Rice (processed)  3.0  8.2  4.7  –21.4  –9.7  –2.4  2.1  –6.4  4.9  5.9  4.2  5.5  3.0  2.0  2.2  1.5  2.3  –0.6  0.5  0.5  5.7
Sugar (processed)  2.3  11.3  2.0  –18.2  –7.3  –5.2  1.8  –1.2  3.4  6.6  –1.3  –3.9  4.5  7.1  0.6  –1.3  4.0  –0.2  –0.7  0.3  7.2
Vegetables and fruits  5.3  11.1  8.7  4.0  1.6  –6.5  9.4  5.2  8.2  9.6  8.1  –0.1  6.2  7.8  1.6  5.6  6.3  4.3  1.0  2.1  8.5
Wheat  10.6  13.5  9.8  –21.5  10.4  –10.4  15.5  9.9  8.4  5.4  10.2  7.2  15.3  5.0  1.1  5.3  5.0  0.4  2.9  7.4  4.9
Other agricultural products  8.3  16.3  8.6  –9.6  7.9  3.3  14.8  6.3  10.2  8.5  6.1  1.4  5.4  5.6  1.0  4.6  4.9  2.9  2.1  2.1  7.5
Other food products  –0.9  7.8  2.3  –15.1  –1.2  –4.8  2.3  3.3  4.7  –4.7  –2.3  –5.5  0.7  0.9  –0.8  0.9  2.7  –0.8  –5.6  –1.6  5.7
Other primary products  2.9  6.4  2.2  2.6  3.0  6.2  2.1  –2.7  2.4  4.7  4.3  –6.4  3.8  –1.3  4.4  –0.4  4.7  2.7  –0.3  2.4  5.9
Textiles  3.6  4.2  0.1  2.2  –1.6  –1.7  0.8  –1.6  –1.8  12.4  7.1  0.3  –0.5  0.1  –0.8  1.7  –0.0  –6.2  7.8  –5.0  1.1
Wearing apparel  3.8  2.5  1.0  2.9  –1.0  –1.0  0.5  –0.8  0.8  10.6  1.8  –3.3  –4.3  –0.7  –1.1  0.6  –2.3  –6.6  –7.2  –5.2  1.6
Metal, mineral, petroleum,  
    and chemical products  0.3  5.5  1.6  1.2  1.1  0.4  1.5  4.8  0.3  –2.7  2.4  –7.5  2.2  –0.2  –7.3  1.1  2.8  –0.8  –15.5  –4.9  –6.8
Vehicles and equipment  1.5  4.5  2.1  1.9  4.0  1.3  1.4  4.1  1.1  –2.1  –1.5  –7.7  –1.5  0.6  2.3  1.7  2.0  2.1  12.9  –13.6  –17.4
Other manufacturing  
    products  0.2  5.7  1.3  0.7  –1.2  1.0  1.4  –3.0  3.3  1.5  4.9  –5.2  4.2  0.7  –2.9  1.4  2.4  0.8  –5.9  –1.3  8.4
Other services  1.2  5.6  –1.8  4.5  –0.3  0.5  1.4  8.5  6.2  4.0  5.9  –0.6  7.3  2.8  2.8  5.6  2.3  3.1  2.6  –0.2  9.1
Transport and trade  1.2  5.3  1.1  3.0  0.1  2.2  1.4  –5.2  4.6  0.2  5.6  –2.7  –9.9  0.7  1.1  4.1  2.3  4.3  2.8  –0.5  9.1
Notes: MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SACU,  
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Table D.1  Impact of full trade liberalization on world prices,  
by sector (percent)
                            Rest of    Rest        Rest of   
    australia/    developed    Rest of  United        developing       Latin  Rest of  of the        Sub-Saharan 
  World  new Zealand  Canada  asia  eU 25  OeCd  States  argentina  Brazil  China  asia  india  Mexico  america  Mena  World  SaCU  Tunisia  Bangladesh   africa  Zambia
Meat: cattle, sheep,  
    goat, horse  5.9  13.0  6.4  –4.6  4.3  –13.4  3.3  –0.4  16.1  7.2  5.0  0.4  2.3  4.0  –6.1  3.3  4.4  3.5  0.8  –1.0  4.3
Milk (processed)  4.6  11.6  –2.5  –5.5  4.6  0.5  5.2  3.2  4.2  0.1  0.2  –3.0  –11.7  2.1  –3.3  –0.2  0.2  1.1  –9.8  –6.9  3.5
Plant-based fibers  6.9  9.0  4.2  6.7  24.1  6.7  8.3  5.8  6.6  3.8  6.9  4.5  4.4  5.4  4.5  4.1  1.3  5.1  –5.7  –0.2  4.1
Rice (processed)  3.0  8.2  4.7  –21.4  –9.7  –2.4  2.1  –6.4  4.9  5.9  4.2  5.5  3.0  2.0  2.2  1.5  2.3  –0.6  0.5  0.5  5.7
Sugar (processed)  2.3  11.3  2.0  –18.2  –7.3  –5.2  1.8  –1.2  3.4  6.6  –1.3  –3.9  4.5  7.1  0.6  –1.3  4.0  –0.2  –0.7  0.3  7.2
Vegetables and fruits  5.3  11.1  8.7  4.0  1.6  –6.5  9.4  5.2  8.2  9.6  8.1  –0.1  6.2  7.8  1.6  5.6  6.3  4.3  1.0  2.1  8.5
Wheat  10.6  13.5  9.8  –21.5  10.4  –10.4  15.5  9.9  8.4  5.4  10.2  7.2  15.3  5.0  1.1  5.3  5.0  0.4  2.9  7.4  4.9
Other agricultural products  8.3  16.3  8.6  –9.6  7.9  3.3  14.8  6.3  10.2  8.5  6.1  1.4  5.4  5.6  1.0  4.6  4.9  2.9  2.1  2.1  7.5
Other food products  –0.9  7.8  2.3  –15.1  –1.2  –4.8  2.3  3.3  4.7  –4.7  –2.3  –5.5  0.7  0.9  –0.8  0.9  2.7  –0.8  –5.6  –1.6  5.7
Other primary products  2.9  6.4  2.2  2.6  3.0  6.2  2.1  –2.7  2.4  4.7  4.3  –6.4  3.8  –1.3  4.4  –0.4  4.7  2.7  –0.3  2.4  5.9
Textiles  3.6  4.2  0.1  2.2  –1.6  –1.7  0.8  –1.6  –1.8  12.4  7.1  0.3  –0.5  0.1  –0.8  1.7  –0.0  –6.2  7.8  –5.0  1.1
Wearing apparel  3.8  2.5  1.0  2.9  –1.0  –1.0  0.5  –0.8  0.8  10.6  1.8  –3.3  –4.3  –0.7  –1.1  0.6  –2.3  –6.6  –7.2  –5.2  1.6
Metal, mineral, petroleum,  
    and chemical products  0.3  5.5  1.6  1.2  1.1  0.4  1.5  4.8  0.3  –2.7  2.4  –7.5  2.2  –0.2  –7.3  1.1  2.8  –0.8  –15.5  –4.9  –6.8
Vehicles and equipment  1.5  4.5  2.1  1.9  4.0  1.3  1.4  4.1  1.1  –2.1  –1.5  –7.7  –1.5  0.6  2.3  1.7  2.0  2.1  12.9  –13.6  –17.4
Other manufacturing  
    products  0.2  5.7  1.3  0.7  –1.2  1.0  1.4  –3.0  3.3  1.5  4.9  –5.2  4.2  0.7  –2.9  1.4  2.4  0.8  –5.9  –1.3  8.4
Other services  1.2  5.6  –1.8  4.5  –0.3  0.5  1.4  8.5  6.2  4.0  5.9  –0.6  7.3  2.8  2.8  5.6  2.3  3.1  2.6  –0.2  9.1
Transport and trade  1.2  5.3  1.1  3.0  0.1  2.2  1.4  –5.2  4.6  0.2  5.6  –2.7  –9.9  0.7  1.1  4.1  2.3  4.3  2.8  –0.5  9.1
Notes: MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SACU,  
Southern African Customs Union.Appendix E
Decomposition of Full Trade 
Liberalization, by Liberalizing Region
115Table E.1    Impact of full trade 
liberalization in the North:  
Rate of change for world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  10.81
World trade  –2.37
World welfare  0.11
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Table E.2    Impact of full trade liberalization in the North: Rate of 
change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.1  0.6  0.2
Canada  0.6  0.0  0.0
Developed Asia  2.3  –0.2  1.2
EU 25  0.2  –0.3  –0.2
United States  0.0  –0.1  –0.1
Rest of OECD  1.0  –0.3  0.8
Argentina  –0.1  –0.2  –0.4
Brazil  0.0  0.3  0.3
China  –1.0  1.4  –0.3
Developing Asia  0.0  0.6  0.3
India  –0.1  0.2  0.3
Mexico  –0.2  –0.1  –0.5
Rest of Latin America  0.0  0.4  0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  –0.2  0.2  0.0
Southern African Customs Union  0.0  0.2  –0.2
Tunisia  0.1  –0.1  0.3
Rest of the World  0.0  0.2  0.2
Bangladesh  0.0  0.4  0.8
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  0.1  0.0
Zambia  –0.2  –0.2  –0.7
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table E.3    Impact of full trade 
liberalization in the South: 
Rate of change for world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  18.66
World trade  5.19
World welfare  0.06
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Table E.4.    Impact of full trade liberalization in the South: Rate 
of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.0  0.8  0.6
Canada  0.0  0.1  –0.2
Developed Asia  0.0  0.2  0.1
EU 25  –0.1  0.2  0.0
United States  0.0  0.1  0.1
Rest of OECD  0.0  0.3  0.1
Argentina  0.2  0.0  –0.5
Brazil  0.1  –0.1  –0.2
China  0.8  –0.2  0.2
Developing Asia  0.7  –0.6  0.0
India  1.5  –1.0  0.5
Mexico  1.3  –0.3  0.0
Rest of Latin America  0.8  –0.6  –0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  1.2  –0.7  0.8
Rest of the World  1.1  –0.5  –0.5
Southern African Customs Union  0.3  0.3  –0.1
Tunisia  0.4  0.0  0.7
Bangladesh  1.8  –1.2  1.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.3  –0.9  0.5
Zambia  1.8  –2.2  1.1
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Appendix F
Decomposition of Full Trade 
Liberalization, by Activity
119Table F.1    Impact of full trade 
liberalization in agriculture: 
Rate of change of world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  37.6
World trade  1.6
World welfare  0.18
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Table F.2    Impact of full trade liberalization in agriculture:  
Rate of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  –0.1  0.9  0.5
Canada  0.3  0.0  0.1
Developed Asia  2.1  –0.2  1.1
EU 25  0.1  –0.1  0.0
United States  0.0  0.0  –0.1
Rest of OECD  1.0  –0.3  0.8
Argentina  0.0  0.2  0.2
Brazil  0.0  0.6  0.4
China  –0.1  1.0  –0.1
Developing Asia  0.4  0.3  0.0
India  0.7  –0.1  0.6
Mexico  0.3  –0.1  0.0
Rest of Latin America  0.1  0.2  0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.4  –0.2  0.2
Southern African Customs Union  0.2  0.2  0.4
Tunisia  0.2  0.2  0.5
Rest of the World  0.3  0.0  0.4
Bangladesh  0.1  0.1  0.7
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.8  –0.3  0.6
Zambia  0.2  0.0  0.0
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table F.3    Impact of full trade 
liberalization in industry:  
Rate of change of world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  –6.2
World trade  1.0
World welfare  0.0
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Table F.4    Impact of full trade liberalization in industry:  
Rate of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.1  0.4  0.3
Canada  0.4  0.1  –0.3
Developed Asia  0.4  0.2  0.2
EU 25  0.1  0.0  –0.3
United States  0.0  0.0  0.1
Rest of OECD  0.0  0.3  0.2
Argentina  0.1  –0.4  –1.1
Brazil  0.1  –0.3  –0.3
China  0.1  0.1  –0.2
Developing Asia  0.3  –0.4  0.2
India  0.8  –0.7  0.1
Mexico  1.0  –0.3  –0.5
Rest of Latin America  0.7  –0.4  0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.7  –0.2  0.7
Rest of the World  0.6  0.0  –0.2
Southern African Customs Union  0.1  0.3  –0.7
Tunisia  0.3  –0.3  0.5
Bangladesh  1.6  –0.9  1.3
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.6  –0.4  –0.1
Zambia  1.5  –2.4  0.5
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Appendix G
Decomposition of Full Trade 
Liberalization, by Instrument
123Table G.1    Impact of full 
elimination of import tariffs: 
Rate of change of world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  39.5
World trade  9.0
World welfare  0.23
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Table G.2    Impact of full elimination of import tariffs:  
Rate of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.0  1.0  0.5
Canada  0.4  –0.1  0.1
Developed Asia  2.0  0.1  1.5
EU 25  0.2  0.0  0.0
United States  0.0  0.0  0.0
Rest of OECD  1.0  0.2  1.0
Argentina  0.1  0.0  –0.2
Brazil  0.0  0.2  –0.4
China  0.2  0.5  –0.2
Developing Asia  0.7  0.0  0.5
India  1.5  –0.9  0.3
Mexico  0.6  –0.4  0.0
Rest of Latin America  0.7  –0.3  –0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.8  –0.4  0.2
Rest of the World  0.7  –0.2  0.2
Southern African Customs Union  0.3  0.5  0.5
Tunisia  0.0  –0.4  –0.4
Bangladesh  1.0  –1.4  0.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.1  –1.0  –0.5
Zambia  0.8  –1.0  –0.5
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table G.3    Impact of a full 
elimination of domestic support: 
Rate of change of world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  –8.2
World trade  –6.1
World welfare  –0.04
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Table G.4    Impact of full elimination of domestic support:  
Rate of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.1  0.3  0.1
Canada  0.3  0.2  –0.3
Developed Asia  0.4  –0.1  –0.1
EU 25  0.0  –0.1  –0.3
Rest of OECD  0.0  –0.1  0.0
United States  0.0  0.0  0.0
Argentina  0.1  –0.2  –0.7
Brazil  0.0  –0.1  0.3
China  –0.3  0.6  0.2
Developing Asia  0.1  –0.1  0.0
India  0.0  0.0  0.5
Mexico  0.7  –0.1  –0.4
Rest of Latin America  0.0  0.1  0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.3  0.0  0.7
Rest of the World  0.2  0.1  0.2
Southern African Customs Union  –0.1  0.0  –0.8
Tunisia  0.5  0.2  1.3
Bangladesh  0.5  0.4  1.4
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.1  0.3  0.9
Zambia  1.0  –1.1  1.4
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table G.5    Impact of full 
elimination of export subsidies: 
Rate of change of world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  –5.6
World trade  –1.0
World welfare  –0.1
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Table G.6.    Impact of full elimination of export subsidies:  
Rate of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.0  –0.1  –0.1
Canada  –0.1  –0.1  –0.2
Developed Asia  –0.1  –0.1  –0.2
EU 25  0.0  0.0  0.0
United States  0.0  –0.1  –0.1
Rest of OECD  –0.1  –0.1  –0.3
Argentina  –0.1  –0.4  –0.7
Brazil  0.0  –0.2  –0.2
China  –1.0  1.0  –0.8
Developing Asia  –0.1  0.1  –0.1
India  –0.1  0.1  0.1
Mexico  –0.1  0.1  –0.2
Rest of Latin America  0.0  0.0  0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  0.0  –0.2  –0.1
Rest of the World  0.3  –0.2  –0.3
Southern African Customs Union  0.0  0.0  –0.1
Tunisia  0.2  0.3  0.6
Bangladesh  0.0  0.3  0.6
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  –0.1  –0.2  –0.4
Zambia  0.0  0.0  0.0
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Appendix H
Methodology for Assessing the Impact 
of Full Trade Liberalization by CGEM
This appendix provides synoptic tables on recent assessments (since 2001) of the 
impact of full trade liberalization and of the DDA on world welfare and poverty.1
  A study might contain several modeling exercises corresponding to different 
theoretical structures. The assessment by Diao, Somwaru, and Roe (2001) is car-
ried out using a static and a dynamic version. The two Global Economic Prospects 
from the World Bank (2002, 2004a) both utilize a dynamic framework; but the   
second exercise supposes a positive relation between trade openness and factor pro-
ductivity. Cline (2004) exercise 1 corresponds to a static model with constant return 
to scale, whereas Cline (2004) 2 assesses expected benefits from trade liberalization 
using a steady state dynamic model in which capital increases until the rate of return 
on investment returns to the preliberalization level.
  Tables H.1 and H.2 present three experiments of the Doha Agenda by Ander-
son, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005a): the first one concerns liberalization 
only in agriculture, the second one adds a sensitive products clause, and the third adds 
to the first experiment liberalization in industry. Bouët, Mevel, and Orden (2005) 
present two alternative scenarios, the ambitious scenario and the unambitious one, 
to evaluate the potential area of negotiation in the last U.S. and EU proposals.
  The columns in these tables indicate technical features of the experiment con-
ducted (either full liberalization or the implementation of a potential DDA), the 
127
1In the case of World Bank (2004a), it is a pro-poor scenario, which would imply elimination of 
export subsidies, decoupling all domestic support, and a significant cut in tariffs: rich countries would 
be subject to a maximum tariff of 10 percent in agriculture (5 percent in industry), with an average 
target of 5 percent (1 percent). For developing countries, the caps would be 15 percent (10 percent), 
with an average of 10 percent (5 percent).CGEM under which the experiment was carried out, the geographic and sectoral 
decompositions (the first value is the number of trading zones, the second is the 
number of sectors), and the data utilized. All simulations are based on the GTAP da-
tabase, either the GTAP 5 version accounting for 1997, or the GTAP 6 version, for 
2001. This database may be improved (in this case, the notation “+ . . .” is added). 
For example, Bouët et al. (2005) utilize the GTAP 5 database but replace GTAP 
tariffs by MacMap-HS6 data and construct an original dataset of domestic support 
for the EU and the United States. Moreover, they simulate a pre-experiment shock 
for 2005, which includes not only these previous changes, but also the EBA initia-
tive and AGOA, the end of the Uruguay Round, the phasing out of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement and the enlargement of the EU. If these liberalization shocks are not 
included before the experiment is conducted, the impact on trade and thus the 
benefits of openness would be overstated.
  The amount of world benefits that can be expected from trade liberalization is not 
the only worthwhile information to be studied. Other points are of key importance: 
Is agriculture the main source of benefits? Must negotiators concentrate their efforts 
on market access, domestic support, or export subsidies? What kind of countries will 
be the main beneficiaries? Are expected benefits coming from liberalizing developed 
countries’ trade policy or that of developing countries? Tables H.1 and H.2 give dif-
ferent macroeconomic results. The seventh and eighth rows of Table H.1 focus on 
world welfare that results from this experiment. The increase in this indicator is as-
sessed in U.S. dollars, then in percentage. To address the previous questions, rows five 
to eight decompose this increase in world welfare into parts coming from liberalizing 
agriculture, coming from improving market access, benefiting developing countries, 
and coming from liberalization in developing countries.
  Presenting the contribution of each distortion in potential welfare increase is 
not strictly consistent: if referring to the theory of second best, the elimination of 
one distortion in a world where several conditions for a Pareto optimum are not 
fulfilled does not necessarily entail a welfare improvement. On the contrary, add-
ing a distortion may increase welfare. As a result, simultaneously eliminating tariffs, 
domestic support, and export subsidies does not imply the same increase in welfare 
as the sum of the three separate changes in economic policy. Nevertheless, studies on 
the expected benefits of trade liberalization frequently present this sort of additive 
decomposition. I retain this presentation in my review of the literature but adopt a 
more consistent way of presenting results in the central experiment.2
  In  Tables  H.1  and  H.2,  the  following  three  rows  concern  other  macro- 
economic information: increase in world trade, increase in world agricultural trade, 
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2The decomposition technique that is used in all these studies has been inspired by Harrison, Hor-
ridge, and Pearson (2000).and variation of world agricultural prices. This last information is crucial, because 
a frequent criticism of trade liberalization is that it will entail an augmentation of 
these prices such that net food-importing countries could see a reduction in their 
welfare. The subsequent row in the tables indicates whether there are losers in this 
process in terms of national welfare.
  Finally, the last row indicates the impact on world poverty (using the US$2.00 
per day definition) when available. This result is obviously a key issue of this debate.
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Table H.1    Results of recent assessments of the impact of full trade 
liberalization
          diao,  diao,                anderson,   
  dessus,  dessus,      somwaru,  somwaru,  World  World  World  World      beghin  martin,  francois,    bouët,
  fukasaku,  fukasaku,        and roe  and roe   bank  bank  bank  bank  cline  cline  and  and  Von meijl,  hertel  mevel
  and  and  dee and  anderson  (2001)  (2001)  (2002)  (2002)  (2004a)  (2004a)  (2004)  (2004)  Van der  Van der  and Van  and  and 
  safadi  safadi  hanslow  et al.  scenario     scenario   scenario    scenario    scenario  scenario  scenario  scenario  mensbrugghe  mensbrugghe  tongeren  Keeney  orden  bouët
  (1999)  (1999)  (2000)  (2000)  1  2  1  2  1    2   1   2    (2003)  (2005a)    (2005)  (2005)  (2005)  (2006)
Experimenta  Full tariff  Full tariff  Full  Full  Full   Full   Full  Full  Pro-poor  Pro-poor  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full
Model used  Linkage  Linkage  FTAP  GTAP  Agricultural  Agricultural  Linkage  Linkage  Linkage  Linkage  HRT  HRT  Linkage  Linkage  GTAP 5  GTAP-Agr  MIRAGE  MIRAGE
          USDA-ERS  USDA-ERS                       
          model  model                       
Static/dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic 
Specific feature    TO/TFP  FDI          TO/TFP    TO/TFP    SS           
Geographic × sector    
        decomposition  16 × 4  16 × 4  19 × 3    12 × 9   12 × 9  15 × 20  15 × 20  23 ×	 23 ×	 25 × 22  25 × 22  23 × 22  27 × 25  16 × 17  30 ×	 41 × 18  20 × 17
Year of data  1995  1995  1995+  1995  1997+  1997+  1997  1997  1997+  1997+  1997  1997  1997+  2001+  1997+  2001+  2001+  2001+
World welfare
        (US$ billion)  82  1212  134  254  31  56  355  852  291  518  228  614  385  287  163  84  157  99.6
    Total (percent)  0.20  3.10  0.32  0.62  0.13  0.24  0.90  2.10  0.80  1.40  0.93  2.50  0.90  0.70  0.43  n.a.  0.50  0.33
    Agriculture (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  65  n.a.  n.a.  69  71  66  69  57  n.a.  69  63  65  66  n.a.  n.a.
    Tariffs (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.          n.a.  n.a.  99  93  91  95  n.a.  n.a.
    Beneficial to developing  
        countries (percent)  22  38  n.a.  43  8  38  52  65  55  67  38  47  56  30  8  26  n.a.  n.a.
    Stemming from trade 
        liberalization in  
        developing countries  
        (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  45  n.a.  n.a.  55  66  62  62  44  n.a.  n.a.  45  58  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
World trade (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  —  17  10        —  n.a.  12  7.50  12.10  5.25
World agricultural trade  
        (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15      32        74  76    21  n.a.  34
World agricultural prices  
        (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12              —  n.a.    n.a.  n.a.  2.5/11
Potential losers  n.a.  None  n.a.  n.a.  Mexico,   None  None  None  None  None  Malaysia,  Malaysia,  None  None  South  Philippines,  China,  Canada, 
       Rest of           Mexico  China     America,  Bangladesh,  Venezuela,  EU,   
          the World                      China,   Rest of  Bangladesh,  Argentina,
                              India  Latin   Madagascar,  Mexico,
                                America,   Mozambique,  Southern
                                Mozambique,   Zambia  African
                                Rest      Customs
                                of Sub-    Union
                                Saharan 
                                Africa            
Change in poverty   
        headcount (million)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  –320  n.a.  –144  n.a.  –110  –440    –72  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes: FDI, foreign direct investment; FTAP, Foreign Direct Investment Trade Analysis Project; GTAP, Global Trade Analysis Project;  
HRT, Harrison-Rutherford-Tarr; n.a., not applicable; SS, steady state; TO/TFP, trade openess/total factor productivity; USDA-ERS,  
U.S. Department of Agriculture–Economic Research Service.
aEntries refer to extent or type of liberalization for each model.methodology for assessing impact of full trade liberalization      131
Table H.1    Results of recent assessments of the impact of full trade 
liberalization
          diao,  diao,                anderson,   
  dessus,  dessus,      somwaru,  somwaru,  World  World  World  World      beghin  martin,  francois,    bouët,
  fukasaku,  fukasaku,        and roe  and roe   bank  bank  bank  bank  cline  cline  and  and  Von meijl,  hertel  mevel
  and  and  dee and  anderson  (2001)  (2001)  (2002)  (2002)  (2004a)  (2004a)  (2004)  (2004)  Van der  Van der  and Van  and  and 
  safadi  safadi  hanslow  et al.  scenario     scenario   scenario    scenario    scenario  scenario  scenario  scenario  mensbrugghe  mensbrugghe  tongeren  Keeney  orden  bouët
  (1999)  (1999)  (2000)  (2000)  1  2  1  2  1    2   1   2    (2003)  (2005a)    (2005)  (2005)  (2005)  (2006)
Experimenta  Full tariff  Full tariff  Full  Full  Full   Full   Full  Full  Pro-poor  Pro-poor  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full
Model used  Linkage  Linkage  FTAP  GTAP  Agricultural  Agricultural  Linkage  Linkage  Linkage  Linkage  HRT  HRT  Linkage  Linkage  GTAP 5  GTAP-Agr  MIRAGE  MIRAGE
          USDA-ERS  USDA-ERS                       
          model  model                       
Static/dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Dynamic  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic 
Specific feature    TO/TFP  FDI          TO/TFP    TO/TFP    SS           
Geographic × sector    
        decomposition  16 × 4  16 × 4  19 × 3    12 × 9   12 × 9  15 × 20  15 × 20  23 ×	 23 ×	 25 × 22  25 × 22  23 × 22  27 × 25  16 × 17  30 ×	 41 × 18  20 × 17
Year of data  1995  1995  1995+  1995  1997+  1997+  1997  1997  1997+  1997+  1997  1997  1997+  2001+  1997+  2001+  2001+  2001+
World welfare
        (US$ billion)  82  1212  134  254  31  56  355  852  291  518  228  614  385  287  163  84  157  99.6
    Total (percent)  0.20  3.10  0.32  0.62  0.13  0.24  0.90  2.10  0.80  1.40  0.93  2.50  0.90  0.70  0.43  n.a.  0.50  0.33
    Agriculture (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  65  n.a.  n.a.  69  71  66  69  57  n.a.  69  63  65  66  n.a.  n.a.
    Tariffs (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.          n.a.  n.a.  99  93  91  95  n.a.  n.a.
    Beneficial to developing  
        countries (percent)  22  38  n.a.  43  8  38  52  65  55  67  38  47  56  30  8  26  n.a.  n.a.
    Stemming from trade 
        liberalization in  
        developing countries  
        (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  45  n.a.  n.a.  55  66  62  62  44  n.a.  n.a.  45  58  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
World trade (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  —  17  10        —  n.a.  12  7.50  12.10  5.25
World agricultural trade  
        (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15      32        74  76    21  n.a.  34
World agricultural prices  
        (percent)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12              —  n.a.    n.a.  n.a.  2.5/11
Potential losers  n.a.  None  n.a.  n.a.  Mexico,   None  None  None  None  None  Malaysia,  Malaysia,  None  None  South  Philippines,  China,  Canada, 
       Rest of           Mexico  China     America,  Bangladesh,  Venezuela,  EU,   
          the World                      China,   Rest of  Bangladesh,  Argentina,
                              India  Latin   Madagascar,  Mexico,
                                America,   Mozambique,  Southern
                                Mozambique,   Zambia  African
                                Rest      Customs
                                of Sub-    Union
                                Saharan 
                                Africa            
Change in poverty   
        headcount (million)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  –320  n.a.  –144  n.a.  –110  –440    –72  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes: FDI, foreign direct investment; FTAP, Foreign Direct Investment Trade Analysis Project; GTAP, Global Trade Analysis Project;  
HRT, Harrison-Rutherford-Tarr; n.a., not applicable; SS, steady state; TO/TFP, trade openess/total factor productivity; USDA-ERS,  
U.S. Department of Agriculture–Economic Research Service.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































132      appendix hAppendix I
Custom Taxes as a Proportion 
 of Gross Domestic Product
Table I.1    Custom taxes as a proportion of gross domestic 
product, by country (percent)
  Custom taxes/    Custom taxes/



















Rest of Former Soviet Union  0.2
Netherlands  0.3
Bulgaria  0.3
New Zealand  0.3















South Africa  0.7
Taiwan  0.7
Brazil  0.7
Rest of Southern African  







Czech Republic  0.9
Philippines  0.9
Colombia  0.9
Russian Federation  0.9
Peru  0.9
Venezuela  1.0
(continued)  Custom taxes/    Custom taxes/
Country  gross domestic product   Country  gross domestic product
China  1.1
Romania  1.1
Rest of Middle East  1.1
Zimbabwe  1.2





Sri Lanka  1.6
Rest of Free Trade Area  
    of the Americas  1.6
Malaysia  1.6
Rest of South Asia  1.6
Rest of Latin America  1.6
Rest of the Caribbean  1.7
Mozambique  1.7
Bangladesh  1.9
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Rest of North Africa  2.0
Malawi  2.0





Rest of Europe  2.5
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.7
Malta  2.9
Rest of Oceania  3.1
Morocco  3.2
Vietnam  4.0
Rest of Southern African 
    Development Community  4.0
Tunisia  4.3
Rest of North America  13.9
Source: GTAP 6 database (see Dimaranan 2006).Appendix J
Model Option: No Pre-Experiment
135Table J.2    Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001:  
Rate of change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  Allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.1  1.5  1.1
Canada  0.7  0.3  0.1
Developed Asia  2.3  0.2  1.6
EU 25  0.2  0.0  0.0
United States  0.0  0.1  0.3
Rest of OECD  1.0  0.2  1.0
Argentina  0.4  0.7  0.5
Brazil  0.1  0.6  0.4
China  1.6  –1.0  0.9
Developing Asia  0.8  –0.1  0.6
India  1.6  –1.1  0.5
Mexico  1.4  –0.6  –0.2
Rest of Latin America  0.8  –0.2  0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  1.3  –0.5  0.9
Rest of the World  1.0  0.0  0.0
Southern African Customs Union  0.3  0.6  –0.1
Tunisia  0.2  –1.0  –0.8
Bangladesh  1.8  –1.3  1.0
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.3  –0.5  0.7
Zambia  1.6  –2.5  0.1
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Table J.1    Impact of a full 
trade liberalization from 
2001: Rate of change of world 
indicators for 2015 (percent)
indicator  Total
World agricultural imports  39.05
World trade  4.59
World welfare  0.45Table J.3    Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Rate of change 
of factor remuneration for 2015 (percent)
          Real   
  Agriculture:  industry:  Real  Real  return to  Skilled 
  Unskilled  Unskilled  return  return  natural  real
  real wages   real wages  to capital  to land   resources  wages
Australia/New Zealand  10.9  2.2  –0.6  4.0  –4.8  1.4
Canada  –0.1  –0.2  –0.2  –24.3  4.2  0.1
Developed Asia  –2.7  2.1  1.6  –31.4  –6.4  2.5
EU 25  0.4  0.3  –0.6  –41.4  –3.4  0.1
United States  1.4  0.1  –0.2  –15.7  2.2  0.1
Rest of OECD  –4.6  0.9  0.9  –50.0  5.4  1.3
Argentina  10.5  2.6  –1.1  10.5  –10.7  –0.8
Brazil  9.5  1.7  –0.5  10.9  –9.5  0.2
China  –0.6  4.2  –2.2  –9.3  –21.3  6.6
Developing Asia  0.6  1.3  0.1  –6.0  –17.1  1.0
India  –1.7  1.8  –0.1  –4.8  –25.6  4.2
Mexico  –4.7  0.2  0.5  –23.6  –22.9  –1.8
Rest of Latin America  4.3  1.2  –1.3  7.9  –13.1  –0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  –2.4  0.9  1.1  –7.5  –10.1  1.2
Rest of the World  –1.1  2.0  –2.5  –5.6  13.2  –0.3
Southern African Customs Union  5.0  0.9  –1.6  12.9  9.0  –0.2
Tunisia  0.2  –0.2  –0.4  –0.9  –5.5  –1.0
Bangladesh  1.0  0.6  0.7  1.8  –6.2  –0.3
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.7  1.8  –1.0  0.2  –4.4  1.5
Zambia  –4.2  –1.1  1.6  –8.9  –22.7  0.3
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Model Option: No Preferential Duties
139Table K.1    Impact of full trade 
liberalization: Rate of change of 
world indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  30.61
World trade  4.11
World welfare  0.41
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Table K.2    Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Rate of 
change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Argentina  0.3  0.3  –0.2
Australia/New Zealand  0.1  1.4  1.1
Canada  0.6  0.3  0.0
Developed Asia  1.8  0.0  1.1
EU 25  0.3  –0.1  –0.1
United States  0.0  0.2  0.2
Brazil  0.0  0.7  0.9
China  0.8  0.0  0.4
Developing Asia  1.2  –0.5  1.0
India  3.1  –1.5  1.3
Mexico  1.1  –0.1  –0.2
Rest of Latin America  3.0  –0.9  2.5
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  1.2  –0.6  0.6
Rest of OECD  1.1  –0.2  0.5
Rest of the World  1.0  –0.1  –0.3
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.1  0.5  2.0
Southern African Customs Union  0.4  1.9  2.7
Tunisia  6.6  –1.8  5.2
Bangladesh  1.7  –0.8  1.8
Zambia  1.7  –1.1  2.7
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table K.3    Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Rate of change 
of factor remuneration for 2015 (percent)
          Real 
  agriculture:  Industry:  Real  Real  return to  Skilled 
  Unskilled  Unskilled  return  return  natural  real
Country/zone  real wages   real wages  to capital  to land   resources  wages
Argentina  6.2  1.4  –1.4  2.9  –8.7  –1.6
Australia/New Zealand  11.5  2.3  –0.6  3.8  –12.4  1.5
Canada  0.2  –0.1  –0.4  –24.3  3.8  0.0
Developed Asia  –2.6  1.6  1.1  –30.1  –0.9  1.8
EU 25  –0.6  0.5  –0.8  –42.4  –3.6  –0.2
Rest of OECD  –6.7  0.9  0.2  –50.9  –1.9  1.3
USA  1.1  0.2  –0.2  –17.1  1.8  0.1
Brazil  6.1  1.9  1.0  1.4  –9.7  1.1
China  –1.6  1.1  –0.6  –7.5  –25.5  3.1
Developing Asia  –0.5  0.2  0.1  –7.1  –19.7  0.9
India  –0.4  3.3  –0.5  –4.4  –29.9  6.5
Mexico  –4.0  0.6  0.8  –23  –13.2  –2.0
Rest of Latin America  6.0  4.5  0.0  4.9  –19.8  3.9
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  –1.5  1.3  0.1  –6.7  –11.3  1.1
Rest of the World  –1.8  1.3  –3.1  –6.9  22.4  –1.6
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  3.0  3.2  0.7  2.4  –2.6  2.8
Southern African Customs Union  6.2  3.2  2.1  10.3  –4.3  2.8
Tunisia  –1.1  5.5  7.6  –14.7  –25  7.9
Bangladesh  2.4  1.9  0.3  3.1  –3.1  1.2
Zambia  –0.9  1.0  4.0  –6.3  –26.9  3.7
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Model Option: Higher Trade Elasticities
143Table L.1    Impact of full trade 
liberalization: Rate of change of 
world indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural trade  57.07
World trade  5.25
World welfare  0.44
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Table L.2    Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Rate of 
change of macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.1  1.4  0.9
Canada  0.7  0.1  0.0
Developed Asia  2.3  0.1  1.8
EU 25  0.3  –0.1  –0.1
United States  0.0  0.1  0.2
Rest of OECD  1.3  –0.1  1.1
Argentina  0.3  0.4  0.0
Brazil  0.1  0.7  0.5
China  0.8  0.1  0.6
Developing Asia  1.1  –0.1  0.6
India  2.4  –1.1  1.0
Mexico  1.5  –0.6  –0.2
Rest of Latin America  0.5  0.1  0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  1.5  –0.3  1.4
Rest of the World  1.2  –0.2  0.6
Southern African Customs Union  0.4  0.6  0.0
Tunisia  0.4  –0.5  0.3
Bangladesh  2.0  –1.1  1.7
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.9  –0.8  1.2
Zambia  1.8  –2.1  0.7
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table L.3    Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Rate of change 
of factor remuneration for 2015 (percent)
          Real
  agriculture:  Industry:  Real  Real  return to  Skilled 
  Unskilled  Unskilled  return  return  natural  real
Country/zone  real wages   real wages  to capital  to land   resources  wages
Australia/New Zealand  10.6  2.1  –0.8  4.8  –3.9  1.2
Canada  –0.7  –0.2  –0.3  –23.0  2.0  –0.1
Developed Asia  –2.1  2.4  1.7  –35.1  –4.9  2.9
EU 25  –0.4  0.4  –0.7  –43.0  –3.9  0.0
United States  0.6  0.1  –0.2  –17.0  1.9  0.1
Rest of OECD  –4.7  1.2  0.8  –51.8  0.6  1.6
Argentina  6.6  1.7  –1.5  4.8  –5.7  –1.4
Brazil  9.5  2.1  –0.7  6.6  –9.1  0.6
China  –0.9  2.5  –1.8  –7.9  –16.1  4.3
Developing Asia  –0.3  1.5  0.3  –9.3  –14.3  1.5
India  –3.4  2.6  1.6  –7.8  –17.3  5.4
Mexico  –5.7  0.4  0.6  –26.0  –21.2  –1.7
Rest of Latin America  5.9  1.7  –1.5  11.8  –11.9  –0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  –3.4  1.5  1.6  –9.5  –8.2  2.1
Rest of the World  –0.4  2.3  –1.6  –3.2  8.5  0.7
Southern African Customs Union  5.6  1.1  –1.7  17.1  6.2  –0.1
Tunisia  0.4  1.0  0.7  –1.8  –7.4  0.4
Bangladesh  0.3  1.7  1.7  –0.1  –2.5  1.0
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.1  2.3  –0.4  0.5  –2.9  2.0
Zambia  –6.3  –0.4  2.8  –11.8  –14.1  1.1
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Model Option: Trade Increases 
 Factor Productivity
147Table M.1    Impact of full trade 
liberalization: Rate of change of 
world indicators for 2015 (percent)
Indicator  Total
World agricultural imports  32.49
World merchandise trade  4.87
World welfare  0.59
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Table M.2.    Impact of full trade liberalization: Rate of change of 
macroeconomic indicators for 2015 (percent)
  allocation  Terms-of-trade 
Country/zone  efficiency gains  gains  Welfare
Australia/New Zealand  0.0  1.3  0.3
Canada  0.7  0.2  0.3
Developed Asia  2.2  0.1  1.3
EU 25  0.2  –0.1  0.2
Rest of OECD  1.0  0.1  1.2
United States  0.0  0.1  0.3
Argentina  0.2  0.3  –0.4
Brazil  0.0  0.4  –0.2
China  0.9  0.3  1.9
Developing Asia  0.8  –0.2  0.5
India  1.7  –1.0  3.2
Mexico  1.3  –0.5  0.4
Rest of Latin America  0.8  –0.2  0.6
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  1.2  –0.4  1.5
Rest of the World  0.9  –0.1  0.9
Southern African Customs Union  0.3  0.5  0.0
Tunisia  0.3  –0.3  0.0
Bangladesh  1.8  –1.0  2.5
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.4  –0.7  1.7
Zambia  1.6  –2.3  –0.6
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Table M.3    Impact of full trade liberalization: Rate of change of factor 
remuneration for 2015 (percent)
          Real
  agriculture:  Industry:  Real  Real  return to  Skilled
  Unskilled  Unskilled  return  return  natural  real
Country/zone  real wages   real wages  to capital  to land   resources  wages
Australia/New Zealand  8.6  1.5  –1.3  2.1  –4.2  0.8
Canada  –0.4  0.1  0.0  –25.1  4.3  0.2
Developed Asia  –3.1  2.0  1.3  –30.8  –4.1  2.3
EU 25  0.0  0.6  –0.4  –41.8  –3.0  0.1
Rest of OECD  –4.2  1.1  1.1  –48.8  5.4  1.4
United States  0.5  0.2  –0.2  –17.6  2.3  0.2
Argentina  5.0  1.4  –1.9  1.8  –6.9  –0.9
Brazil  6.3  1.5  –1.3  3.8  –8.7  0.5
China  0.0  3.5  –0.4  –7.2  –18.0  6.4
Developing Asia  0.4  1.3  –0.1  –6.1  –16.6  1.3
India  –0.1  4.4  3.0  –4.6  –17.9  7.9
Mexico  –3.9  1.1  1.0  –23.4  –23.2  –0.3
Rest of Latin America  4.3  2.0  –0.5  6.8  –13.2  0.9
Rest of Middle East and North Africa  –1.8  1.8  1.8  –7.0  –11.6  2.3
Rest of the World  –1.2  2.4  –1.1  –6.1  11.6  1.3
Southern African Customs Union  4.4  1.1  –1.5  11.1  9.0  0.2
Tunisia  0.4  0.6  0.3  –1.6  –6.9  0.0
Bangladesh  1.9  2.8  2.5  0.4  –6.5  2.6
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.0  2.6  0.5  0.0  –4.5  2.9
Zambia  –5.3  –1.6  0.9  –10.4  –23.8  0.3
Note: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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